臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要

我國對於公司治理制度中以董監事職能來預防公司弊案之起源可追溯於2001年起對於公司法之修改與金管會制定相關董監事法源開始。董監事制度所設立之精神根據台灣證劵交易所股份有限公司於上市上櫃公司治理實務守則(2004)之用意，在於給與董監事等內部稽核機制充分權限，用以評估內部控制制度之缺失與監督公司營運之績效，並透過此制度提供股東等企業關係人充分之保障。足以見得近年所推行之董監事制度對於公司治理實擔任一重要之角色。
本研究有別於其他文獻之處即在於探討董監事制度在國內家族企業與交叉持股嚴重之企業下，是否能夠保持其獨立性之特質？本研究主要將探討董監事制度結構、企業財務結構、股東型態結構、以及經理人因素四大構面對於公司經營績效之間的關係。並針對於四大構面提出問題假設來檢定董監事制度之獨立性。實證結果顯示，企業財務結構與董事會結構兩大構面對於公司治理之經營績效的影響最為顯著，股東型態構面與經營階層型態構面則較不顯著。
本章之研究範圍主要在於公司治理上較為明顯之量化數據，並加入部份虛擬變數對質性研究做為考量。建議在後續研究中能夠加入更多詳細資料外，除了討論公司治理的量化結果，能夠更深入探討公司治理的質性因素也是很有意義的議題。
關鍵字：董監事制度、公司治理、董事會、股權結構

Independence of directors and supervisors system about the performance
of traditional industries in empirical study -2002 to 2007

Abstract

For China''s corporate governance system in order to prevent future functions of directors and supervisors of company scandals of origin can be traced back to 2001 from 2006 to amend the Company Law and the Fund will formulate relevant source of law began to directors and supervisors. Directors and supervisors system set up by the mental According to the Taiwan card Securities Exchange Co., Ltd. listed on the OTC corporate governance code of practice (2004) intention is to give directors and supervisors, and other internal audit mechanism for full access to Assessment of the internal control system and lack of oversight of the company operating performance, and through this system, and other enterprises to provide shareholders of the full protection of human relations. Enough to see in recent years by the directors and supervisors to implement the system for corporate governance is as important a role.
This study is different from other literature of the directors and supervisors is to investigate the system of family business in domestic and cross-shareholdings serious business, it can maintain its independence of the qualities » This study will explore the structure of directors and supervisors system, corporate financial structure, shareholders style structure, as well as four major factors managers in the face of the company structure of the relationship between business performance. The empirical results show that enterprises and the financial structure of the Board of Trustees of the two major structures in the face of corporate governance of the operating performance of the most significant impact, shareholders pattern dimensions and type of business dimensions are less significant.
This chapter of the scope of the study mainly in corporate governance on the more obvious the amount of data, and add some virtual confrontation between variables as considerations. In the proposed follow-up study to be included more detailed information, in addition to discuss corporate governance of the amount of results, to more in-depth study of corporate governance qualitative factors are also very meaningful topic.

Keyword: directors and supervisors system, corporate governance, boards of directors, ownership structure.

目 錄
中文摘要..................................................................i
英文摘要................................................................ ii
目錄................................................................. iii
表目錄................................................................. iv
第一章、緒論...............................................................1
1.1 前言.......................................................1
1.2 研究流程...........................................................2
第二章、文獻探討...........................................................3
2.1公司治理文獻緒論....................................................3
2.2公司代理問題........................................................3
2.3內部公司治理機制...................................................4
2.4外部公司治理機制....................................................5
第三章、研究架構與問題假設.................................................6
3.1 研究架構..........................................................6
3.2 研究方法...........................................................7
第四章、研究設計..........................................................9
4.1 資料來源與樣本處理...............................................9
4.2 研究變數操作性定義...............................................10
4.3 實證迴歸模型性設定...............................................13
4.4 迴歸模型檢定程序................................................14
第五章、實證結果與分析 ...................................................15
5.1 基本統計量分析...................................................15
5.2 多元迴歸分析實證結果.............................................17
第六章、結論與後續研究建議 ...............................................21
5.1 研究結論.........................................................21
5.2 後續研究建議.....................................................21
參考文獻................................................................22





表目錄
表3.1 代理關係架構圖.......................................................7
表3.2 本研究之架構圖......................................................8
表4.1 操作型變數彙總表....................................................14
表5.1 年度樣本公司之家數統計表............................................15
表5.2 樣本公司之產業類別分布表...........................................15
表5.3 相關變數之敘述統計量...............................................16
表5.4 虛擬變數之敘述統計量...............................................16
表5.5 ROA迴歸模型分析結果...............................................17
表5.6 ROE迴歸模型分析結果...............................................18
表5.7 ROC迴歸模型分析結果...............................................20

參考文獻

中文部分

1.李亭誼（民92），「董事身分特性與董監經理人相關資訊揭露程度關係之研
究」，政治大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。
2.呂坤穎（民92），「機構投資人對公司經理人進行盈餘管理行為之影響」，中
正大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
3.林明謙（民90），「股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究」，
輔仁大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
4.林玉振、黃荃、林容竹（民91），「董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究－以台灣上市公司為例」，管理與系統，第九卷第三期，345-368
頁。
5.陳業寧、邱顯比、洪雲萍（民94），「獨立董事與公司治理:政府應該要求所
有上市上櫃公司聘任獨立董事嗎?」，證券市場發展季刊，第十六卷第四
期，1-35 頁。
6.葉銀華、邱顯比、何憲章（民86），「利益輸送代理問題與股權結構之理論與實證研究」，中國財務學刊，第四卷第四期，47-73 頁。
7.葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩（民91），公司治理與評等系統，商智文化事業股
份有限公司，台北。
8.劉啟群（民88），「我國銀行年報自願性揭露與銀行特質關聯性研究」，中山
管理評論，第七卷第一期， 57-80 頁。
9.證券交易所與櫃檯買賣中心（民91），上市上櫃企業公司治理實務守則，台
北。

英文部分

1.Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property,MacMillan, New York, N. Y.
2. Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.
3. Haniffa, R. M. and Cooke, T. E. (2002), “Culture, Corporate Governance and
Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations,” Abacus, 38, 317-349.
4. Jensen, M. C. (1993), “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control System,” Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880.
5.Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
6. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
7.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (2002),“Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance, 57, 1147-1170.
8. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1988), “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1999), OECD principles of corporate governance.