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研究生:劉筱筠
研究生(外文):Hsiao-Yun Liu
論文名稱:權力CEO是否有利於股東?
論文名稱(外文):Is powerful CEO friendly to the shareholders?
指導教授:丁秀儀丁秀儀引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiu-I Ting
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:金融營運所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:79
中文關鍵詞:權力CEO股東財富流動性風險
外文關鍵詞:Powerful CEOShareholder WealthLiquidityand Risk.
相關次數:
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  • 點閱點閱:230
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
CEO (總經理) 在公司扮演一個重要的角色,其權力大小影響支配公司決策及運作程度息息相關,進而影響公司的績效表現,因此本研究採用2002年至2006年的上市公司作為研究樣本並將研究樣本分為權力CEO形成、權力CEO離開、非權力CEO異動與權力CEO異動四類群體,以股東財富、流動性與風險三種角度分析個別群體對於股東是否有利。
本研究發現對稱權力之CEO更迭對股東財富有較正面影響、權力CEO與公司績效無顯著關聯性以及權力CEO形成與離開後流動性沒有顯著地改變,權力CEO形成亦不會改變風險,然而權力CEO的離開將導致市場風險有降低的趨勢。
CEOs play an important role in the company, and their power effect on dominating the decision of company and relate with operating activities. Other-wise, the powerful CEO also influences company performance. First, this study distinguish the sample to four groups including becoming power CEO, powerful CEO leaving, un-powerful CEO turnover and powerful CEO turnover over five year (2002-2006). Second, we use the groups about becoming power CEO, pow-erful CEO leaving, un-powerful and powerful CEO turnover events to analysis their impact on shareholder wealth, liquidity, and risk.
The results show that the events about symmetry of powerful CEO turnover will more positive with shareholders in event study. Otherwise, the paper also find that when powerful CEO left the company, the turnover rate and risk about the company in stock market will reduce.
中文摘要..................................................................................................................i
英文摘要.................................................................................................................ii
誌謝........................................................................................................................iii
目錄........................................................................................................................iv
表目錄.....................................................................................................................v
圖目錄.....................................................................................................................v
附錄.........................................................................................................................v
第壹章 緒論.................................................................................................1
第一節 研究動機與目的.............................................................................1
第二節 論文結構.........................................................................................3
第貳章 文獻探討.........................................................................................3
第一節 權力CEO的四種權力.....................................................................3
第二節 權力CEO異動的影響....................................................................11
第三節 公司特性對權力CEO的影響.......................................................19
第參章 研究設計.......................................................................................19
第一節 研究架構.......................................................................................19
第二節 研究假說.......................................................................................20
第三節 變數定義.......................................................................................22
第四節 研究方法.......................................................................................34
第五節 資料來源.......................................................................................38
第肆章 資料分析與研究結果...................................................................40
第一節 敘述統計分析...............................................................................40
第二節 CEO異動與對股東財富之關聯性...............................................44
第三節 權力CEO與公司績效之關聯性...................................................50
第四節 流動性與風險...............................................................................56
第伍章 結論...............................................................................................60
第一節 研究結論.......................................................................................60
第二節 研究建議.......................................................................................61
第三節 研究限制與發展...........................................................................61
參考文獻...............................................................................................................62
附錄.......................................................................................................................69
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