在美國，員工認股權是存在於各企業一種相當普遍的員工激勵制度。台灣企業在民國八十九年以前主要的獎酬激勵制度為員工分紅配股，直到民國八十九年七月證交法增修第二十八條之二以及之三，引進員工認股權後，民國九十年二月才由世界先進積體電路公司首先開始正式實施認股權制度，許多企業在此之後也陸續引進。
認股權是一種激勵制度，但企業經營者可能因為自身利益，利用盈餘管理行為來提升其認股權價值，此時認股權的發放不但無法提升企業績效，反而成為企業內部管理者操弄盈餘的動機。本研究主要探討民國九十年至九十四年間，台灣上市上櫃電子業公司，發放高階主管認股權與盈餘管理的三個主題，首先是探討企業發放高階主管認股權，是否會因為閉鎖期的結束而產生比發行當年度多的盈餘管理；二是在閉鎖期結束時，有發放高階主管認股權的企業，是否會比未發放高階主管認股權的企業，產生較多的盈餘管理行為；最後則探討認股權股數是否會影響企業的盈餘管理。
本研究實證結果顯示，我國有發放高階主管認股權的上市櫃電子業，在發放認股權的閉鎖期間內，發放當年度的盈餘管理程度最低，閉鎖期結束年度時的盈餘管理程度最高。在比較有無發放高階主管認股權的企業之後，有發放認股權的企業，比未發放的企業從事較多的盈餘管理。最後本研究實證結果顯示，高階主管認股權發放的股數，與盈餘管理程度高低無顯著的影響。

Executive Stock Option (ESOs) is the most prevailing encouragement system in the United States. Until the amended Securities Law ξ28-Ⅱ and III in July, 2000, the most popular encouragement system in Taiwan is Employee Stock Bonus (ESBs). After introducing the ESOs in 2000, Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation (VIS) is the first company to implement the ESOs in February, 2001. Taiwan’s Companies start to implement the ESOs one after another after VIS’s adoption.

ESOs are an encouragement system for companies. However, the company management might use earnings management on account of self-interests to increase the value of stock options they owned. The issuance of ESOs can’t increase the profit of the corporate in this situation. On the contrary, it becomes a motivation of the management to manipulate the earnings. This research is about three topics between ESOs and earnings management and the targets are the Taiwan listed electronic companies from year 2001 to year 2005. This study is mainly about three issues of the relations about ESOs and Earnings Management in Taiwan listed companies in the time between 2001 and 2005. First, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management over time in the lock-up period. Second, if companies that grant ESOs would come up more earnings management than those that don’t grant ESOs when the lock-up period ends. Finally, this study is about the relations between the volume of ESOs and the earnings management.

The experiment findings conclude that companies that issue ESOs have the lowest earnings management level at the year of issuance and the highest level at the year of the end of the lock-up period. Comparing with the companies that don’t issue ESOs, companies that issue ESOs have higher earnings management level. Finally, this study concludes that the amount of the ESOs doesn’t affect the earnings management significantly.

壹 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程 5
第三節 論文架構 6
貳 文獻探討與假說發展 7
第一節 文獻探討 7
第二節 假說發展 11
參 研究設計 16
第一節 各變數內涵 16
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 21
第三節 驗證方式 23
肆 實證結果分析 24
第一節 樣本敘述性統計值 24
第二節 相關性分析 27
第三節 高階主管認股權發放對盈餘管理行為影響分析 29
伍 結論 34
第一節 研究結論 34
第二節 研究限制 36
第三節 研究建議 37
參考文獻 39

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