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研究生:林秀鳳
研究生(外文):LIN, HSIU-FENG
論文名稱:管理品質要素及對企業績效之影響-管理團隊特性之探討
論文名稱(外文):The Determinants of Management Quality and Firm Performance: A Study on Management Team
指導教授:李建然李建然引用關係
指導教授(外文):LEE, JAN-ZAN
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:109
中文關鍵詞:管理品質績效企業價值高階管理團隊
外文關鍵詞:Management qualityPerformanceTobin''s qTMT
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本研究擴展Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005)「管理品質」之衡量架構,透過檢視管理階層具備管理方面之知識與經驗、結構、外部名聲以及經濟誘因等面向,探討管理團隊之特性是否影響管理職能之發揮,使管理品質產生差異,進而影響企業績效良窳。研究重點在於使用以人為本的價值創造指標,研究最終目的即在於對管理能力驅動企業績效與價值的關鍵性因素加以辨識。
本研究以台灣上市公司高階主管為研究對象,研究期間自2003至2005年。本研究同時以人力質量、結構、外部名聲及經濟誘因捕捉管理品質,除了填補過去文獻使用檔案型資料,卻僅侷限於管理團隊單一因素或個別構面之不足外,在實證模型上,本研究也避免主觀選擇估計方法導致推論之偏誤,根據檢定結果,本研究以追蹤資料固定效果模型為合理的估計模式。
實證結果顯示,管理人力質量、外部名聲以及經濟誘因在市場高度競爭情況下皆與企業績效正相關。至於結構面,公司高階主管平均任期較長、年資差異較大的組成之結構,在市場高度競爭情況下有較佳的獲利表現;層級式組織結構的績效較差,CEO兼任董事長之領導結構也與績效顯著負相關。不過,從市場的角度來看,管理團隊任期長易發生僵固,特別是在市場高度競爭情況下投資人因恐未來缺乏創新性,失去利基而予以負面評價。此外,在市場競爭度較低的情況下,CEO權力愈集中,績效愈好,然而市場高度競爭情況下,CEO較需要高階主管蒐集資訊、共同研擬及執行競爭行動,使得提高CEO在管理團隊權力對績效的正面效應,在市場高度競爭情況下較為緩和。另一方面,管理品質與企業績效關係也因控制股東管理家族化程度不同而有所差異,提高家族參與管理將增強管理人力、管理團隊中擁有管理學歷背景主管的比率、團隊平均任期、CEO領導權力、管理階層外部董事會連結以及股權激勵誘因之效益;減弱管理團隊中擁有管理經驗背景主管的比率、年資差異化以及員工分紅成數激勵誘因對績效之正面影響。從投資人的角度觀察,年資差異不利績效卻隨家族參與管理比率之增加較為緩和。家族成員有高的凝聚力,較不致因年資差異而影響溝通效率,在此情形下,年資差異大可收經驗傳承與新知之效,有利未來發展,故市場予以較高之評價;市場預期家族管理程度之提高將減弱股權激勵效果,由於控制股東家族成員一般持有較多的股權,負面評價可能反映投資人對管理者高持股,易產生「職位鞏固效應」而降低公司價值的疑慮。
Firm performance and the value drivers have been the core issue for participants in the capital market. There were few literatures focused on managerial ability and involving the systemic analysis on critical factors of firm performance and value, despite it has been widely recognized by scholars and the practitioners that managerial ability is closely associated with success of an organization. Extending the measurement framework of “management quality” proposed by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), this study investigates whether the development of management functions varies management quality and further influences firm performance by examining the management’s various aspects such as management expertise and experience, external reputation, and economic incentives. This study focuses on the use of the human-oriented value creation index, with an ultimate goal of distinguishing critical factors for managerial ability that drive firm performance and value.
Using a sample of listed companies in Taiwan over 2003 to 2005, this study explores the impact of determinants for managerial ability on firm performance by capturing the management quality data in human and knowledge source, structure, external reputation, and economic incentives. In addition, this study also avoids inference errors resulting from a subjectively selected estimation method. According to the test result, this study applies panel-data models with fixed effects.
The empirical results show that in an intensively competitive market, all human and knowledge source, external reputation, and economic incentives are positively related with firm performance. In terms of structure, an organization whose top executives have a longer tenure and more significant differences in seniority will reach better profitability under dramatic competition of the market. However, a hierarchical organization structure will have poorer performance and a leadership structure combining the power of Chairman and CEO also has significantly negative relation with performance. From a perspective of the market, a management team with a prolonged tenure is likely to become rigid. Particularly, investors may give negative valuation for fear of lacking niche due to loss of innovation within the competitive market. Moreover, in a market where the competition is mild, the more centralized the CEO’s power is, the better the firm performance will be. In contrast, in a fierce competition, a CEO needs top executives for data collection and joint planning and execution of actions, resulting in a positive effect of the CEO dominance. Alternatively, the relation between management quality and firm performance may vary depending on the degree of family management, expanding the controlling family’s active involvement in the management will increase management manpower, the ratio of executives with management academic background in the management team, the average tenure of the management team, CEO dominance, outside directorate ties of the management, and the benefits of equity incentives. From an investor’s perspective, seniority differentiation is disadvantageous to performance but will be mitigated following the increase of the family’s participation ratio in management. The negative valuation of controlling family’s large shareholdings may reflect investors’ concern about the entrenchment effects of controlling shareholder.
目錄
第壹章、 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 6
第三節 名詞定義 8
第四節 論文架構 10
第貳章、 文獻探討與假說發展 12
第一節 資源基礎觀點與策略性人力資源管理 12
第二節 代理理論與管理激勵性合約 14
第三節 高層理論 19
第四節 管理品質與研究假說之建立 20
第五節 市場競爭度 29
第六節 家族管理 31
第參章、 研究設計 33
第一節 統計分析方法與估計模型之檢定 33
第二節 變數衡量及實證模式 38
第三節 樣本篩選與資料來源 48
第肆章、 實證結果 50
第一節 基本資料分析 50
第二節 管理品質要素對企業績效之影響 56
第三節 市場競爭度 64
第四節 家族管理 76
第五節 不同績效指標實證結果差異之比較 83
第六節 其他額外分析 87
第伍章、 結論與建議 94
第一節 研究結論 94
第二節 管理意涵及未來研究方向 96
參考文獻 98

圖目錄
圖 1 論文研究架構 11
圖 2 高層理論研究架構 19
表目錄
表3 樣本產業-年度分佈狀況表 49
表4-1-1 管理品質要素探索性因素分析結果 50
表4-1-2 管理品質要素驗證性因素分析結果 52
表4-1-3 敘述統計量 54
表4-1-4 相關係數矩陣 55
表4-2-1 公司績效實證模型適合檢定 56
表4-2-2 管理品質要素對會計績效影響之分析 59
表4-2-3 管理品質要素對市場績效影響之分析 62
表4-3-1 各產業各年度之HHI值 65
表4-3-2 市場高度競爭情況下,管理品質要素與會計績效之關聯性 67
表4-3-3 市場高度競爭情況下,管理品質要素與市場績效之關聯性 71
表4-4-1 管理品質要素與會計績效之關聯性-家族管理 77
表4-4-2 管理品質要素與市場績效之關聯性-家族管理 81
表4-5-1 管理品質要素與會計績效檢定結果彙總表 85
表4-5-2 管理品質要素與市場績效檢定結果彙總表 86
表4-6-1 管理者股權與公司績效U型關係實證模型適合檢定 87
表4-6-2 股權激勵誘因與會計績效之U型關係 89
表4-6-3 股權激勵誘因與市場績效之U型關係 90
表4-6-4 管理品質要素與資產報酬率之關係 91
表4-6-5 大小公司管理品質要素影響企業績效之差異性 92
表4-6-6 管理品質構面影響企業績效之相對重要性 93
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