臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　近年來，台灣公司治理的改革方向，是朝向設立獨立董事制度與審計委員會為發展方向，並期許其能發揮真正監督的效用，而使我國公司治理能夠與國際間機構的評比相互接軌。本研究主要探討台灣上市公司設立獨立董事制度與公司經營績效之間的關連性探討，也探討家族董事與公司績效之間的相關性，另加入代表公股角色之變數群，也擬測試其是否會直接影響企業之績效，探討獨立董事與公股角色企業之間經營績效的關聯性。本研究的樣本以台灣254家設立一席以上獨立董事之上市公司為主，研究期間為1998到2007年，本研究的實證結果得出的結論為：
一、強制性設置獨立董事在2002年設立獨立董事後較尚未設立獨立董事前的公司績效為差。
二、2002年之後，強制性設置獨立董事之企業較自願性設置獨董事之企業績效為佳。
三、獨立董事席次比例較高與企業的經營績效呈現正相關。
四、忙碌獨立董事比率與公司經營績效呈現正相關。
五、家族個人董事席次比例愈高與公司之經營績效呈現負相關。
六、曾是公營事業之公司與公司經營績效呈現正相關。
七、公股持股比率與公司經營績效間呈現正相關。
本研究經由實證結果可以推論出，獨立董事制度可以發揮監督功能並提供專業諮詢以能提升公司的經營績效，而公股民營化之後與公股董事對於公司的經營也是有相當程度的幫助，期望本研究的研究結果，對於台灣上市公司與政府對於設立獨立董事制度的決策能有參考的依據。

In recent years, the reform of the Taiwanese corporate governance is heading toward the direction of setting the independent director system and audit committee, in the view of making the system more eligible to take its real effect of supervision so that the level of the corporate governance in Taiwan will be aligned with that of the world.
This research is mainly exploring the relationship between those companies with independent director systems and their corporate operating performances. The research further encompasses the relations between Family directors and their corporate operating performances. Besides, the variable of State Owned Minor Ownership is further added to test its effect on the corporate operating performances.
The research is sampled from 254 companies listed in Taiwan, which are built with one or more than one Independent Director, with a research period of 1998 through 2007. The research has reached the conclusion as following based on the empirical results:
(1)The corporations with the mandatory setting of independent director system after 2002 show worse corporate performance than those without the setting of independent directors before 2002.
(2)After 2002, the corporations with the mandatory setting of independent director system show better corporate performance than those corporations who voluntarily set the independent director system.
(3)The higher percentage of independent directors is positively correlated with the corporate operating performances.
(4)The percentage of busy independent directors is positively correlated with corporate operating performances.
(5)The higher percentage of family directors is negatively correlated with the corporate operating performances.
(6)The corporations which were once Public Corporations have shown positive correlation with the corporate operating performances.
(7)The ratio of the public shareholders has shown positively correlation with corporate operating performances.
According to the empirical results, the research can infer that the independent director system actually takes its real effect of supervision and offer the professional consultation to improve corporate operating performances. Furthermore, the privatization of public share and public directors contribute positively to the corporate operations. Hope that the result of this research can be a useful reference for those Taiwanese listed companies and government who wish to set an independent director system.

謝 辭……………………………………………………………i
中文摘要……………………………………………………………ii
英文摘要……………………………………………………………iii
目 錄……………………………………………………………v
圖 目 錄……………………………………………………………vii
表 目 錄……………………………………………………………viii

第一章 緒論………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景…………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機與目的…………………………………………2
第三節 論文架構…………………………………………………3

第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………5
第一節 代理問題與公司治理……………………………………5
第二節 股權結構與公司治理……………………………………7
第三節 董事制度與經營績效……………………………………11

第三章 獨立董事各國之實務比較………………………………13
第一節 公司治理原則……………………………………………13
第二節 各國獨立董事實施現況…………………………………17
第三節 我國獨立董事實施現況…………………………………20
第四節 審計委員會及監察人制度………………………………24

第四章 研究架構與方法…………………………………………31
第一節 研究架構…………………………………………………31
第二節 研究變數定義與衡量……………………………………33
第三節 研究假說…………………………………………………37
第四節 研究方法…………………………………………………40

第五章 實證結果與分析…………………………………………44
第一節 樣本資料的描述…………………………………………44
第二節 自我相關檢定……………………………………………46
第三節 複迴歸模型分析…………………………………………48
第四節 實證結果與假說驗證……………………………………56

第六章 結論與建議………………………………………………62
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………62
第二節 研究建議…………………………………………………64

參考文獻…………………………………………………………66
一.中文部分………………………………………………………66
二.英文部分………………………………………………………67

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