臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

Basu(1997)將穩健原則解釋為會計人員傾向對在財務報表認列的好消息比壞消息要求較高的驗證程度。根據他對穩健原則的解釋，盈餘反應壞消息將比反應好消息快速。Basu稱上述盈餘及時反應好壞消息的差異程度為盈餘及時反應消息的不對稱性，並且以它來衡量會計穩健性。在本篇論文中，除了股票報酬率之外，另以壞帳沖銷增減以及不良資產增減作為銀行業好壞消息指標以測試美國金融控股公司盈餘及時反應消息的不對稱性。本研究發現，盈餘對壞帳沖銷增減及不良資產增減的異常反應顯示出銀行業者有進行盈餘操縱的跡象；雖然盈餘與股票報酬率仍然可以維持正常的關係，本研究認為，以單一期（當期）盈餘及時反應股票報酬率的不對稱性來衡量會計穩健性的能力將會因盈餘操縱的存在與會計目的缺乏明確界定而被削弱。

Basu (1997) defines conservatism as the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Under his interpretation of conservatism, earnings will reflect bad news more quickly than good news. Basu calls the differential timeliness of earnings response to bad news versus good news the asymmetric timeliness of earnings and uses it as a measure of conservatism. In this paper, I choose changes in net loan charge-offs and changes in nonperforming assets as two news indicators in addition to stock returns for testing asymmetric timeliness of earnings in the banking industry. By observing the timeliness of earnings response to changes in net loan charge-offs or nonperforming assets, I obtain evidence of management manipulation in the banking industry. Although the normal relation between contemporaneous earnings and returns can still be maintained, I don’t think accounting conservatism can better be captured unless the effect of management manipulation is filtered out and the purpose of accounting is well defined.

I. Introduction 1
II. Concept of Conservatism and Differences Between Two Types of News Indicators 4
Concept of conservatism 4
Changes in net loan charge-offs and changes in nonperforming assets as news indicators in the banking industry 7
Differences between two types of news indicators 11
III. Research Design 13
a. Good news timeliness of earnings 16
a.1 Non-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 17
a.2 Intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 18
a.3 Highly-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 18
b. Bad news timeliness of earnings 18
b.1 Non-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 20
b.2 Intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 20
b.3 Highly-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 20
c. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 20
c.1 No asymmetry 21
c.2 Non-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 21
c.3 Intensive or highly-intensive management manipulation revealed by news indicators 21
d. Incremental explanatory power beyond that provided by stock returns 22
d.1 No incremental explanatory power 22
d.2 Incremental explanatory power 23
IV. Sample Data and Descriptive Statistics 23
V. Empirical Results 25
a. Good news timeliness of earnings 26
b. Bad news timeliness of earnings 29
c. Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 32
d. Incremental explanatory power beyond that provided by stock returns 35
VI. Concluding Remarks 37
References 39
Appendix: Summary of Data Fields Used 69

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