臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究提供台灣家族持股與家族管理對公司績效的影響，以2002到2006年之465家上市公司為樣本，實證結果顯示：(1)台灣家族公司無論在會計(ROA)或市值(Tobin’s Q)績效指標上均較非家族公司來的優異，即證實結合股權與管理權的家族公司有助於降低代理成本，符合代理成本假說 (agent cost hypothesis)。(2)家族持股與績效間呈現聯合內生 (jointly endogenous) 的關係，家族持股增加，導致公司績效上升；公司績效上升，亦驅使家族持股增加。且在考慮聯合內生問題 (jointly endogenous issue) 之下，家族成員持股總合若在30%以內，對公司績效上才具有幫助(3)在家族管理方面，若以家族成員或外部經理人擔任總經理為區分，由公司創始人擔任總經理時，對公司績效幫助最大；值得注意是，由後代子孫擔任總經理時，對公司績效上的提升亦具有幫助性的。更進一步以家族成員或外部經理人分別擔任董事長或總經理為區分，以公司創始人同時擔任董事長與總經理時，對公司績效幫助最大；當總經理一職無論傳給後代子孫或外部經理人時，均需由公司創始人擔任董事長，對於公司績效上才有明顯的幫助。

This article presents a critical investigation of the impacts of family ownership and management on firm performance in Taiwan. By utilizing panel data based on Taiwan 465 listed firms between 2002 and 2006. The empirical results exhibit the influences of both family ownership and management on firm performance. A brief overview of the results are described as follows:

(1)Family firms perform better than nonfamily firms on both ROA and Tobin’s Q, which is proving that family firms combining ownership and management are helpful to reduce agent cost, conform to agent cost hypothesis.

(2) Family ownership and performance are jointly endogenous, while higher family ownership cause higher performance；higher performance also result in increase of family ownership. Consideration to the jointly endogenous issue, it will be helpful to the firm performance only when the total amount of family members holding (have) to be held under 30% of outstanding shares.

(3) In terms of family management, the firm performance will be largest supported by the founder serves as CEO. Noteworthily, having descendant serves as CEO is also stimulating firm performance.

Furthermore, distinct firm performance is reflected from family members or hired manager serves as Chairman or CEO. In addition, it would be best when the founder holds both positions of Chairman and CEO at the same time. It is required that the founder holds the Chairman position, while the vacancy of CEO is handed over to a descendant or hired manager to attain significant firm performance.

第壹章 緒論……………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………..………1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………..……………………6
第三節 研究流程…………………………………………………………..……7
第貳章 文獻探討………………………………………………………..8
第一節 家族公司之定義………………………………………………………..8
第二節 家族公司之優勢與劣勢………………………………………………12
第三節 家族成員參與公司經營之績效影響..………………………………..17
第四節 家族持股與公司績效之內生性探討…………………………………20
第參章 研究方法………………………………………………………21
第一節 觀念性架構……………………………………………………………21
第二節 研究架構與假說………………………………………………………22
第三節 研究對象與期間………………………………………………………22
第四節 變數定義與衡量………………………………………………………24
第五節 實證模型………………………………………………………………26
第肆章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………33
第一節 敘述性統計……………………………………………………………33
第二節 多變量迴歸模型之實證結果分析……………………………………38
第伍章 結論與建議……………………………………………………46
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………46
第二節 研究建議………………………………………………………………49
第三節 後續研究與建議………………………………………………………50
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………51
第一節 中文文獻………………………………………………………………51
第二節 英文文獻………………………………………………………………51

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