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研究生:陳泰良
研究生(外文):Tai-Liang Chen
論文名稱:國際混合寡占下貿易自由化、民營化與管制政策分析:環境稅、股權管制與併購
論文名稱(外文):TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATION POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY: ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION, EQUITY REGULATION, AND MERGER
指導教授:王鳳生王鳳生引用關係
指導教授(外文):Leonard F.S. Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:經濟管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:英文
論文頁數:56
中文關鍵詞:貿易自由化民營化環境稅股權控制併購
外文關鍵詞:Trade LiberalizationPrivatizationEnvironmental TaxationEquity ControlMerger
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近年來,發展中國家如中國、印度和東南亞國協等利用課稅、股權管制或民營化政策來保護國內產業、環境和追求社會福利;本論文將在一個國際混合寡占市場下的架構下分別探討環境稅、對外國投資廠商的股權管制與併購等議題。
在環境議題上,Lai (2004)探討在一個雙占市場中貿易和環境稅的關係,而Ohori (2006)擴充Lai的模型至一混合雙占市場。我們在兩篇文獻基礎上探討當存在消費外部性造成環境損害時,不同寡占市場結構(純粹寡占、混合寡占)與財貨性質下最適環境稅率的訂定與貿易自由化對環境損害的影響。結果顯示,無論在雙占市場或是寡占市場,存在低效率的公營廠商下所課徵的環境稅高於純民營市場;此外,在市場高度開放後,純粹寡占市場相較於混合寡占市場,環境損害程度將減少。
在股權管制議題上,我們在一國際混合寡占模型下討論最適民營化比例與股權管制的影響。我們發現嚴厲股權管制措施會增加民營企業產出、利潤、市場價格和社會福利,但會降低公營企業的產出;又隨著股權管制的增加,政府將提升民營化的程度,且廠商家數越高亦將提升政府民營化的程度;此外,我們證明出Fjell and Pal (1996)文中所指出的部份結論並非完全無誤,即無論外國廠商是否再投資於本國,公營廠商的產出將隨著外國私營廠商的進入而增加。
最後,Méndez-Naya (2008)指出當部份廠商參與成為水平併購者之一且有利可圖,而非市場並構成唯一個獨佔市場時,合併的矛盾(merger paradox)是可被修正的。我們在一個國際混合寡占市場架構且廠商間生產水平異質產品下,發現在存在足夠併購誘因而達成併購時,大部分市不存在併購矛盾;對政府而言,當存在足夠誘因可達成併購時,藉由併購方式來進行民營化的策略將使福利高過公營廠商直接進行民營化的策略。
For developing countries or those in transition, to protect domestic firms, environment, and social welfare, the government always steps in to affect market, such as taxation, equity control/regulation or privatization. For instance, China, India and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) not only choose privatization policy, but have passed legislation which implements taxations on controlling pollution, limits private shareholding, and/or the upper limit of foreign investment. This thesis will consider the issues of public policy-environmental taxation, equity control on foreign competitors, and merger for partial privatization-in an international mixed oligopoly.
Concerning the environmental issue, Lai (2004) examined trade and environmental policies in a pure duopoly market, while Ohori (2006) extended Lai’s work in a mixed duopoly model. We investigated the environment tax and trade liberalization with different market structures (pure oligopoly or mixed oligopoly) juxtaposing the substitutability of the goods (homogenous goods and differentiated goods), wherein environmental damage is associated with consumption. It shows that the environmental tax in mixed oligopoly is higher than in pure oligopoly irrespective of the properties of goods. In addition, it demonstrates that when the domestic market increases its openings, the tariff reduction does not always bring positive effects on the environment in mixed oligopoly; but, in pure oligopoly with homogeneous goods, the tariff reduction is bad for the environment.
Subsequently, concerning the issue on equity control, we demonstrated that the stringent control on domestic equity increases private firms’ outputs, profits, market price and social welfare, but decreases public firm’s output. Furthermore, along with the stringent control on domestic equity, the government ought to increase the degree of privatization. In an opening market, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization. It is shown that for the result in Fjell and Pal (1996): the public firm’s output always increases with an additional foreign private firm even if foreign firms reinvest in the home country; may not hold.
Finally, Méndez-Naya (2008) found the “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. We considered in a single international mixed oligopoly market, firms produce horizontal differentiated commodity, and found that most merger cases are profitable under considering the incentives for mergers, and do not exist “The Merger Paradox”. For government, if enough incentives for all insiders, namely, public and private owners, the privatization strategy should be chosen to merge. Therefore, the way is more profitable and welfare-improving than privatizing directly.
CHAPTER ONE:AN INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Research Background 1
1.2 Literature Review 2
1.2.1 Privatization 2
1.2.2 Privatization and Environmental Taxation 3
1.2.3 Privatization and Equity Regulation 4
1.2.4 Privatization and Merger 5
1.3 Structure of Thesis 6
CHAPTER TWO:PRIVATIZATION WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 8
2.1 Basic Model 9
2.2 Environmental Tax in Oligopoly 11
2.2.1 Pure Oligopoly 11
2.2.2 Mixed Oligopoly 12
2.3 The Effect of Trade Liberalization 13
2.4 Concluding Remarks 15
CHAPTER THREE:PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION AND EQUITY REGULATION 16
3.1 Basis Model 16
3.2 Privatization and an Open-door Policy 18
3.2.1 Optimal Degree of Privatization 20
3.2.2 Free Entry 23
3.2.3 Effects of an Open-door Policy 24
3.3 Concluding Remarks 25
CHAPTER FOUR:PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION, FOREIGN COMPETITORS, AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGERS 27
4.1 Basic Model 27
4.2 Merger Profitability and Partial Privatization 30
4.2.1 Benchmark 30
4.2.2 Public Firm Privatizes Directly 31
4.2.3 Merging Firm and Partial Privatization 34
4.2.4 Incentives for Mergers 35
4.3 Concluding Remarks 38
CHAPTER FIVE:CONCLUSION 39
REFERENCES 41
APPENDIX A 44
APPENDIX B 46
APPENDIX C 47
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