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研究生:陳玟樺
研究生(外文):Chen Wen Hua
論文名稱:資本結構及董事會特性與高階主管薪酬績效敏感度之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):The effect of capital structure and board structure on CEO compensation-performance sensitivity.
指導教授:邱秀清邱秀清引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiu-Ching Chiu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:75
中文關鍵詞:資本結構董事會特性高階主管薪酬績效敏感度
外文關鍵詞:capital structureboard characteristicscompensation-performance sensitivity
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公司資本結構可以區分為權益資金與債務資金,使高階經理人對於可以操縱的資金範圍有所不同,進而產生與股東及債權人與高階經理人間的代理問題。而董事會決定高階經理人的獎酬,以確保股東利益極大化,降低代理問題,因此本研究以資本結構及董事會特性作為實驗變數,高階主管薪酬績效敏感度作為代理問題的代理變數,探討公司資本結構及董事會特性如何影響所有者與經理人間的代理問題。
研究結果發現負債比例與高階主管薪酬績效敏感度呈顯著負相關,是否有流通在外可轉換公司債與高階主管薪酬績效敏感度呈顯著正相關,董事會規模與高階主管持股比例皆與高階主管薪酬績效敏感度呈顯著正相關,外部董監事席次比例與高階主管薪酬績效敏感度呈現顯著負相關。
The purpose of this paper is how CEO compensation is related to firms’ debt capital and board characteristics. There are two kinds of agency problems: one is shareholder-manager conflict, the other is shareholder-bondholder conflict. Because of convertible debt has both debt and equity fund characteristics, it can mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts, debt measures that exclude convertible debt are a more precise proxy for examine the effect of stockholder-bondholder conflicts that could be mitigated through the use of deferent types of debt. A firm’s board characteristics can make different effect on agency problems. If the effectiveness of the board is greater, monitor factor can alignment agency problem between stockholders and manager.
Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, I find that compensation -performance sensitivity decreases in straight debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. This results support the prediction that firms exist the trade-off effect through shareholder-manager and shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest.
Moreover, I find that pay-performance sensitivity increases in board size and CEO ownership, but is lower in outside director percentage. This results support the prediction that board characteristic exist significant relationship to CEO compensation-performance
中文摘要 ..................... iii
英文摘要 ..................... iv
誌謝辭  ..................... v
內容目錄 ..................... vi
表目錄  ..................... viii
圖目錄  ..................... ix
第一章  緒論................... 1
  第一節  研究背景與動機............ 1
  第二節  研究問題與目的............. 5
第三節 論文架構............... 6
第二章  文獻探討................. 8
  第一節  資本結構............... 8
  第二節  董事會特性.............. 14
第三節 高階主管薪酬............. 22
第四節 高階主管薪酬績效敏感度........ 26
第三章  研究方法................. 30
  第一節  研究架構................. 30
  第二節  研究假說............... 31
第三節 變數的定義與衡量........... 36
第四節 模型建立與資料分析方法......... 39
第五節 樣本選取與資料蒐集.......... 41
第四章 實證研究結果............... 42
第一節 敘述性統計分析.............. 42
第二節 相關係數分析............. 47
第三節 多元迴歸分析............. 48

第五章 結論與建議................
54
第一節 研究結論................. 54
第二節 研究限制............... 56
第三節 研究建議............... 57
參考文獻 ..................... 58
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