臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討經理人固守職位與投資決策之關聯性，研究中有部分結果顯示經理人為了固守職位將避免採用負債。以負債總額與長期負債衡量方面，短期投資與長期投資都與固守職位程度呈顯著負相關。本研究推論為台灣的現今狀況下，經理人不太可能利用『增加負債』來固守職位，因為外部投資人都會將公司的資本結構視為該公司營運是否良好之指標，經理人為了固守職位而舉債來進行投資，會使得公司的資本結構變差，所以更不可能利用『負債』來增加投資。
外資法人會比機構投資人監督經理人有更佳的效果，顯示在台灣環境下，法人對經理人無有效監督作用。獨立董事與董事會規模皆對經理人固守職位有顯著監督作用，減少經理人固守職位行為。股權結構方面，經理人股權愈大，愈不會固守職位與被監督，顯示經理人會朝向與股東財富極大化一致。
盈餘管理方面，當盈餘管理大時，短期投資與長期投資呈顯著正相關，表示其是利用來衡量公司固守職位的一個良好指標。經理人固守職位程度愈高，愈會操弄盈餘來減少被解僱或替換的機率。加入CEO股權與盈餘管理等控制變數下，對經理人投資決策亦會有所影響，增加對經理人固守職位的了解程度。

This thesis studies the relationship between managerial entrenchment and corporate investment decision. Part of the results suggests that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. Using total debt and long-term debt as evaluation tools, short-term investments and long-term investments are negatively correlated with managerial entrenchment. This study further concludes that under the current Taiwanese investment atmosphere and financial market structure, CEOs tend not to use debt to secure their positions. This is because using debt to invest may have a negative impact on capital structure and outside investors may use corporate capital structure as an index to measure corporate performance . Hence, CEOs are less likely to use debt to invest.
In addition, there is a significant relationship between independent directors and the scale of board of directors and entrenched CEOs, fulfilling the purpose of decreasing the degree of managerial entrenchment. Entrenched CEOs prefer using long-term investments instead of short-term investments to secure their positions. The possible reasons are that long-term investments tend to have higher profits, while short-term investments are less likely to bring about positive results to the entrenched CEOs. Foreign capital investors have more impact than institutional investors in Taiwan in monitoring managerial entrenchment. Therefore, this study concludes that corporations in Taiwan do not monitor CEOs effectively. In terms of CEOs’stock ownership structure, the study shows that the more stocks CEOs have, the less likely they will be willing to be entrenched and monitored. Furthermore, such CEOs will move towards the goal of maximizing the stockholders’wealth.
In evaluating earnings management, when there is more earnings management, short-term investments and long-term investments are significantly positively correlated. Therefore, earnings management is a good index to measure managerial entrenchment. The more managerial entrenchment CEOs practice, the more manipulation he/she might utilize to decrease the probability of being laid off or replaced. Overall, this study’s findings indicate that adding CEO’s stock ownership and earnings management variables can lead to a significant impact on CEO’s investment decisions. This thesis’findings add to the literature a deeper understanding of the degree of managerial entrenchment.

謝辭 I
摘要 II
ABSTRACT III
目錄 V
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VIII
第一章 緒 論 1
第一節 前言 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第四節 研究流程圖 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司治理 6
第二節 固守職位的意義與方法 15
第三節 投資決策文獻探討 22
第三章 研究設計 24
第一節 研究假說 25
第二節 模型建立 31
第三節 變數定義 33
第四節 資料來源與樣本期間 42
第四章 實證結果與分析 43
第一節 樣本敘述性統計 43
第二節 變數之共線性 45
第三節 迴歸結果之實證分析 47
第五章 結論與建議 68
第一節 研究結論 68
第二節 研究限制及建議 70
參考文獻 72

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