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研究生:謝舜華
研究生(外文):Shun-hua Hsieh
論文名稱:運用修正經濟附加價值於獎酬制度對資源配置影響之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study of the Impact of the Modified Economic Value Added Compensation System on the Resource Allocation
指導教授:郭瑞基郭瑞基引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ruey-ji Guo
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:經濟附加價值獎酬制度
外文關鍵詞:economic value addedcompensation system
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在資本支出投資決策中,企業管理當局期望可使廠商報酬(企業整體獲利)最高,資源配置最佳化,然部門經理人之策略目標乃係其自身所獲獎酬最大化,企業管理當局與部門經理人二造間的自利動機存在利益衝突。在授權管理及有限資源下,本研究獎酬制度之設計,以經濟附加價值為基礎規劃獎酬制度模型,設計二模型皆係以企業剩餘利益扣除資金使用之成本,一制度為原始經濟附加價值之獎酬制度,以扣減企業負債及股東權益加權平均資金成本為獎酬計算基礎;一制度模型為修正經濟附加價值之獎酬制度,則係以扣減犧牲替代方案提報投資案預估投資報酬率,經機會成本修正因子調整後之機會成本作為獎酬計算基礎,並運用賽局均衡及數值分析,藉以瞭解企業如經籌措特定額度資金財源,在資源有限下可否使資源配置最適,促使獎酬制度更趨符合廠商報酬極大之目的。
在本研究所設計之最高管理當局決策情境及部門經理人提報投資案情況變數數值假設下,所模擬獎酬制度在賽局競爭下之策略結果發現,原始EVA獎酬制度,將使納許均衡落於二部門經理人均採取高報預估投資報酬率之策略組合,致資源配置不當;而本研究設計之修正EVA獎酬制度,可使納許均衡點及部門經理人所採之優勢策略落於資源配置較佳之策略組合,使廠商報酬最大。
此外,在修正EVA獎酬制度下,機會成本修正因子之設定,係一重要之變數,最高管理當局倘將該數值設定較高,雖可降低部門獎酬之給與而提高廠商報酬,惟其設定值不同,亦將影響部門經理人所採取之提報策略。若部門投資案間預估獲致高投資報酬率之機率有明顯差距時,機會成本修正因子之設定,除須高於最低門鑑外,若可低於預估獲致高投資報酬率機率較低者投資案之期望報酬率與可實現低投資報酬率之比值,可使賽局競爭下A、B部門經理人採取之策略組合,符合最高管理當局廠商報酬最高而資源配置最佳之期望。而不同部門投資案其預估獲致高投資報酬率之機率大小差距,亦將影響修正EVA獎酬制度之有效性,制度仍有其實施之風險。
In the process of deciding the capital expenditure, the management of an enterprise expects to maximize the compensation (the total profit of business) and optimize the resource allocation; nevertheless, the strategic objective of a manager of a section is to maximize the self-interested compensation. In other words, the interest conflict exists between the self-interested motivations of the management of an enterprise and a manager of a section. With the authorized management and limited resources, this study designs two compensation-system models comprised of the basis of economic value added (EVA) deducting the cost of capital utility from the residual interest of an enterprise. One is the original EVA compensation system deducting the liability and shareholders’ weighed average capital cost as the basis of the compensation. The other is the modified EVA compensation system employing the alternative decucting program replacing the investment program to predict the rate of return and adopting the opportunity cost adjusted by the opportunity-cost correction factors as the basis of the compensation. Meanwhile, it utilizes the equilibrium analysis and numerical analysis of Game Theory to understand whether an enterprise can optimize the resource allocation under the limited resources as raising the specific capital source for facilitating the compensation system to match the objective of maximal compensation.
With the deciding situation of the highest management and the investment program proposed by a manager as the variables, the compensation system is simulated through Game Theory. It is found that the original EVA compensation system enables Nash equilibrium point to fall on the strategic composition of both high expected returns from two managers in diverse sections leading to the improper resource allocation. Nonetheless, the modified EVA compensation system in this study enables Nash equilibrium point and the superior strategy adopted by the managers both fall on the strategic composition of the optimal resource allocation leading to the maximal compensation of an enterprise.
Moreover, with the modified EVA compensation system, the setting of the correction factors of opportunity cost becomes an important variable. With the higher value set by the highest management, it may decline the compensation expenditure to a section and increase the compensation of an enterprise. However, the diverse setting values influence the proposal strategies of managers of sections as well. If a magnificent difference of the probability of rate of return appears among the investment programs proposed by diverse sections, the setting of the correction factors of opportunity cost must require the value higher than the threshold. In addition, were it less than the expected returns of the lower probability of the investment program and the ratio of the practiceable low returns, it may enable the competitors, managers of sections A and B, to adopt the strategic composition matching the optimal resource allocation expected by the highest management of an enterprise. Besides, the gap of the predicted probability of the returns of the investment programs proposed by diverse sections will also impact the effectiveness of the modified EVA compensation system. Therefore, this system still has the risk of implementation.
第 一 章 緒 論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機1 
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程 4
第 二 章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理問題 6
第二節 資源配置與誘因獎酬 8
第三節 經濟附加價值 11
第四節 賽局理論 18
第 三 章 模式之基本假設與設定 22
第一節 研究方法概述 22
第二節 基本假設與設定 23
第 四 章 數值分析與結果 32
第一節 基本變數數值之建立 32
第二節 原始及修正EVA獎酬制度之比較35
第三節 修正EVA之獎酬制度下機會成本修正因子設定之影響37
第四節 修正EVA之獎酬制度下預估獲致高、低投資報酬率機率
    差距之影響39
第 五 章 結論與建議 49
第一節 研究結論49
第二節 研究限制及建議51
參考文獻 52
中文部分:
1.Bloxham, Eleanor 著(2003),陳虹妙、余慕薌譯(民92),EVM經濟附加價值管理(Economic Value Managemtnt),台北:天下雜誌。
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3.Dixit, Avinash, and Susan Skeath 著(2002),藍兆杰、徐偉傑、陳怡君譯(民91),策略的賽局(Games of Strategy),台北:弘智文化。
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11.陶鴻文(民93),經濟附加價值(EVA)、現金附加價值(CVA)與股票報酬關聯性之研究,碩士論文,國立中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
12.張維迎(民92),賽局理論與信息經濟學,台北:茂昌圖書。
13.蔡佳妤(民95),財務資訊、經濟附加價值與股票報酬關聯性之研究-考慮股價超出帳面價值之溢酬,國立高雄應用科技大學商務經營研究所碩士論文。
14.謝昺村(民92),EVA運用於醫院績效與獎酬管理之研究∼以C財團法人醫院為例,國立中正大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
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16.謝明俊(民91),應用經濟附加價值於績效管理,國立臺灣大學會計研究所碩士論文。
英文部分:
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