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研究生:崔雯玲
研究生(外文):Wen-Ling Tsui
論文名稱:公司治理與企業經理人薪酬之關聯性
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Management Compensation
指導教授:吳淑幸吳淑幸引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shwu-Hsing Wu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:台南科技大學
系所名稱:商學與管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:一般商業學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:72
中文關鍵詞:公司治理企業經理人薪酬
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceManagement Compensation
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本研究旨在探討企業經營績效、董事會組成、股權結構及企業特性對於企業經理人薪酬之影響。本研究以代理理論作為出發點,探討現代企業在所有權與經營權分離之下,其所衍生之企業經理人薪酬問題,並以公司治理等變數來檢視其對企業經理人薪酬之影響。研究樣本為台灣上市上櫃企業,研究期間為2002年至2005年,共279家上市上櫃企業,1116筆觀察值。本研究重要結論如下:
1.董事會規模愈大,企業經理人薪酬愈低,當企業存有獨立董事時,企業經理人薪酬愈高。
2.大股東持股比率愈大與存有交叉持股時,企業經理人薪酬愈高。
3.企業規模愈大、風險愈高、研發支出愈高及現金股利愈高時企業經理人薪酬愈高。
This research explores the influence of corporate performance, board composition, shareholder composition and industry particularity on the compensation of the management. Starting with agency theory, this research studies the issue of management compensation in the separation of ownership and management of modern corporations. It also studies the influence of factors such as corporate governance on management salaries. The subject of this research is publicly listed companies on TAXIEX and TASIDAQ from 2002 to 2005, with a total sample size of 279 companies and 1116 observations.
The main findings of this research are as follows:
1.When the size of the board is lager, the management compensation tends to be lower; if the board has independent directors, the management compensation ends to be higher.
2.When the percentage holding of large shareholder is higher, or there are cross holdings, the management compensation tends to be higher.
3.When the corporation is larger, or when the risk, the R&D expenditure or he cash dividends are higher, the management compensation tends to be higher.
摘要 I
Abstract II
致謝辭 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理理論 6
第二節 企業經理人薪酬 7
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究問題 24
第二節 樣本資料選取 27
第三節 變數定義與研究模型 27
第四章 實證結果與分析 31
第一節 基本統計敘述 31
第二節 實證結果 34
第三節 敏感性分析 43
第五章 結論與未來研究方向 47
第一節 重要結論 47
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 49
參考文獻 51
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