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研究生:胡映伶
研究生(外文):Ying-Ling Hu
論文名稱:股權結構與董事會組成對董事酬金契約誘因有效性之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board Composition on the Incentive Effectiveness of Director Compensation
指導教授:丁碧慧丁碧慧引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:長榮大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:67
中文關鍵詞:董事酬金公司經營績效
外文關鍵詞:Director Compensation、Firm Performance
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本研究以2002年至2007年之台灣上市公司為研究對象,探討董事酬金對經營績效是否具有激勵效果,並進而探究股權結構與董事會組成對董事酬金契約誘因有效性之影響。
董事酬金一般包含董事固定報酬與董事酬勞兩個主要部分,由於董事酬勞係公司每年稅後盈餘所提撥的一部分金額,以酬謝董事過去一年辛勞並激勵董事於未來年度繼續為公司奉獻心力,故本研究採平均董事酬勞、董事酬勞占稅後盈餘分配比率以及董事酬勞占董事酬金總額之比率為董事酬金之代理變數。
實證結果發現,會計績效方面,平均董事酬勞與董事酬勞占董事酬金總額之比率皆對其產生正向顯著影響,至於其餘酬金變數則對市場與會計績效均無影響。若進一步將股權結構與董事會組成等相關變數列入討論後,則可發現在會計績效方面,股權結構與董事會組成確實會影響董事酬金契約誘因有效性。會計績效方面,當控制股東之所有權愈高時,對董事酬金契約誘因有效性有負向顯著影響。其次,外部董事比例愈高,愈能發揮董事酬金契約誘因有效性。至於市場績效方面,則僅有機構投資人持股比率愈高時,方能發揮董事酬金契約誘因之有效性。
In this research, listed companies of Taiwan between 2002 and 2007 are targeted to study if compensation for directors are having incentive effect on firm performance, and extend to the study of the influence of ownership structure and composition of board of directors on the incentive effectiveness of director compensation contract.
The compensation for directors is generally consisted of fixed compensation for directors and variable compensation for directors and it was paid out from the after-tax earning of the company each year to show gratitude to directors for their hardworking and endeavor of the past year and prompt their contribution for the future years. In this research, we took average variable compensation for directors, the ratio of compensation for directors to the distributed after tax earning and the ratio of variable compensation for directors to gross compensation as the proxy variables of compensation for directors.
The empirical study gave the following findings:
1. In accounting performance: All variable, average variable compensation for director and the ratio of variable compensation for directors to gross compensation are having significant positive effect.
2. All other compensation variables do not have effect in both market and accounting performances.
When the ownership structure and composition of board of directors are included in the variables for discussion, it is found that ownership structure and composition of board of directors are indeed affecting the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors. In accounting performance, when the ratio of ownership of controlling stockholders is higher, the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors is with significant negative effect. However, in accounting performance, with internal and external supervision mechanism, the higher the ratio of outside directors, the incentive effectiveness of compensation for directors is higher. As to the market performance, only the higher ratio of the institutional investor holding has shown the incentive effectiveness of contract of compensation for directors.
誌謝.................................................... I
中文摘要................................................ II
英文摘要................................................ III
目錄.................................................... V
表目錄.................................................. VII
圖目錄.................................................. IX
第一章  緒論............................................ 1
第一節 研究背景與動機............................... 1
第二節 研究目的與架構............................... 4
第二章  文獻探討........................................ 5
第一節 台灣董事酬金制度之法源依據................... 5
第二節 董事酬金對公司經營績效之影響................. 8
第三節 股權結構.....................................10
第四節 董事會組成...................................14
第三章  研究設計........................................ 16
第一節 研究假說.....................................16
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源...........................20
第三節 變數界定與衡量...............................22
第四節 實證方法.....................................27
第四章  實證結果與分析.................................. 30
第一節 敘述性統計...................................30
第二節 相關係數分析.................................32
第三節 迴歸分析.....................................35
第五章  結論............................................ 51
參考文獻 ............................................... 54
一、 中文文獻........................................54
二、 英文文獻........................................55
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二、英文文獻
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