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研究生:林昆鋒
研究生(外文):Kuen-Feng Lin
論文名稱:企業型態、供應鏈與績效衡量之高階經理人薪酬-台灣資訊電子業之實證研究
論文名稱(外文):Firm type, supply chain and performance measuresin CEO compensation- An empirical study ofTaiwan IT and electronic industry
指導教授:陳玉麟陳玉麟引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yu-Lin Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中原大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:81
中文關鍵詞:薪酬績效衡量供應鏈企業型態
外文關鍵詞:CompensationFirm typePerformance measuresSupply chain
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本研究主要探討董事會是否會因企業型態與供應鏈位置的不同,在衡量高階經理人薪酬的財務與非財務績效指標時會有所差異。本研究樣本為1998年至2004年的台灣上市電子業。本研究發現:企業型態為自有品牌比代工更著重在創新的非財務績效指標來衡量高階經理人薪酬。另外,企業型態為代工比自有品牌更重視財務與非財務來衡量高階經理人薪酬。最後,當供應鏈屬於上游公司則強調在盈餘與創新來衡量高階經理人薪酬。屬於中游公司則著重在製程方面來衡量高階經理人薪酬。而屬於下游公司則重視在創新與製程改進方面來衡量高階經理人薪酬。
This study focused on whether financial and non-financial performance measures vary in accordance with firm types and firm positions of supply chain, when board of directors’ compensate their CEO. The research sample is Taiwan electronics industry during the year form 1998 to 2004. These findings are as follows. Firstly, OBM firms put more emphasis on non-financial performance measure of innovation than OEM/ODM firms, when compensating their CEO. Instead, OEM/ODM firms put more emphasis on both financial and non-financial measures than OBM firms, when compensating their CEO. Lastly, when the companies are in the upper-stream of supply chain, profits and innovation are highlighted to compensate their CEO. When the companies are in the midstream, they focus on manufacturing process to compensate their CEO. When the companies are in the down-stream, the emphasis is placed on innovation and manufacturing process improvement to compensate their CEO.
目錄
中文摘要.................................................................Ⅰ
英文摘要.................................................................Ⅱ
誌謝辭...................................................................Ⅲ
目錄.....................................................................Ⅳ
圖目錄...................................................................VI
表目錄...................................................................Ⅶ
附錄表目錄...............................................................Ⅷ
第一章  緒論............................................................. 1
第一節 研究背景與動機................................................ 1
第二節 研究目的...................................................... 3
第三節 研究流程...................................................... 4
第二章  文獻探討......................................................... 6
第一節 代理理論與績效衡量指標之探討.................................. 6
第二節 薪酬與績效衡量指標之探討...................................... 8
第三節 企業型態/供應鏈與績效關係之探討............................... 10
第四節 假說發展...................................................... 13
第三章  研究方法......................................................... 18
第一節 資料來源...................................................... 18
第二節 樣本選擇...................................................... 19
第三節 實證模型...................................................... 22
第四章  實證結果分析與討論............................................... 28
  第一節 敘述統計分析.................................................. 28
第二節 相關係數分析結果.............................................. 32
第三節 迴歸分析...................................................... 36
第四節 敏感性分析.................................................... 43
第五章  結論、限制與建議..................................................50
  第一節 研究結論...................................................... 50
  第二節 研究貢獻...................................................... 52
  第三節 研究限制與建議................................................ 53
參考文獻................................................................. 55
附錄..................................................................... 61



圖目錄
圖1-1 研究流程圖....................................................... 5
圖2-1 理論架構圖....................................................... 13


表目錄
表2-1 代工與自有品牌優缺點比較......................................... 11
表2-2 重要文獻整理表................................................... 12
表3-1 資訊電子供應鏈................................................... 20
表3-2 樣本篩選彙總表................................................... 21
表3-3 H1預期符號....................................................... 22
表3-4 H2預期符號....................................................... 23
表3-5 變數定義彙整表................................................... 27
表4-1 企業型態的敘述性統計量表......................................... 29
表4-2 企業供應鏈的敘述性統計量表....................................... 30
表4-3 企業型態的相關係數表............................................. 33
表4-4 企業供應鏈的相關係數表........................................... 35
表4-5 企業型態對薪酬之影響-EPS......................................... 38
表4-6 企業供應鏈對薪酬之影響-EPS....................................... 41
表4-7 企業型態的敏感性分析-ROE與ROA.................................... 44
表4-8 企業供應鏈的敏感性分析-ROE與ROA.................................. 45
表4-9 2SLS.................................. .......................... 48
表4-10 內生性問題-SUR.......................... ........................ 49


附錄表目錄
表1 樣本產業分佈與選取過程............................................ 61
表2 企業型態敘述統計量................................................ 62
表3 企業型態變數檢定.................................................. 63
表4 企業供應鏈敘述統計量(上游與中游).................................. 64
表5 企業供應鏈變數檢定(上游與中游).................................... 65
表6 企業供應鏈敘述統計量(中游與下游).................................. 66
表7 企業供應鏈變數檢定(中游與下游).................................... 67
表8 企業供應鏈敘述統計量(下游與上游).................................. 68
表9 企業供應鏈變數檢定(下游與上游).................................... 69
表10 敏感性分析(專利權數)............................................. 70
表11 敏感性分析(無發放股票紅利)....................................... 72
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1. 任立中,林婷鈴,陳靜怡與李吉仁,2006,高科技產業產品價值創造與行銷價值專屬化之最適資源配置,中山管理評論,第14卷第1期,11-42。
2. 任立中,林婷鈴,陳靜怡與李吉仁,2006,高科技產業產品價值創造與行銷價值專屬化之最適資源配置,中山管理評論,第14卷第1期,11-42。
3. 李伶珠,2003,績效評估與酬勞制度之理論架構-代理理論觀點,會計研究月刊,第206期,77-85。
4. 李伶珠,2003,績效評估與酬勞制度之理論架構-代理理論觀點,會計研究月刊,第206期,77-85。
5. 洪榮華,郭怡萍與張清惠,2008,負債對產品市場競爭行為的影響,管理學報,第25卷第1 期,67-83。
6. 洪榮華,郭怡萍與張清惠,2008,負債對產品市場競爭行為的影響,管理學報,第25卷第1 期,67-83。
7. 黃俊英,1986,高科技產品的行銷,現代管理月刊,18-20。
8. 黃俊英,1986,高科技產品的行銷,現代管理月刊,18-20。
9. 楊朝旭,2004,產品市場競爭可否降低公司內部治理機制不佳所導致的代理成本?管理學報,第21卷第2期,153-173。
10. 楊朝旭,2004,產品市場競爭可否降低公司內部治理機制不佳所導致的代理成本?管理學報,第21卷第2期,153-173。
11. 蔡柳卿,2003,總經理薪酬、非財務績效衡量指標與公司未來績效,會計評論,第37期, 85-116。
12. 蔡柳卿,2003,總經理薪酬、非財務績效衡量指標與公司未來績效,會計評論,第37期, 85-116。
13. 歐進士,1998,我國企業研究發展與經營績效關聯之實證研究,中山管理評論,第6卷第2期,357-386。
14. 歐進士,1998,我國企業研究發展與經營績效關聯之實證研究,中山管理評論,第6卷第2期,357-386。
15. 劉正田,2001,研發支出資本化之會計基礎股票評價,會計評論,第33期,1-26。