臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

前人之研究指出，自由現金流量愈大，自由現金流量之代理成本(過度投資)愈嚴重，且當公司存在正自由現金流量時，對過度投資的影響將愈嚴重，此種研究證實企業多餘之現金容易造成過度投資之問題。然而自由現金流量理論立基於代理理論資訊不對稱之前提假設下，因資訊不對稱造成主理人無法適當監督代理人，造成自由現金流量之過度投資情形。

故本研究欲由代理理論之觀點，檢視公司投資與其資訊不對稱之關聯性。
本研究採用股票報酬率標準差及公司規模作為資訊不對稱之代理變數，實證結果顯示：
1.公司規模與過度投資皆呈現不顯著正向關聯，亦即公司規模
愈大，代理問題愈嚴重，愈可能有過度投資之情形，然而，
此種情形並不顯著。
2.股票報酬率標準差與過度投資間呈現不顯著負向關聯，亦即
公司股票報酬率變異愈大，愈不可能有過度投資之現象。

Prior research shows the positive relationship between free cash flow and over-investment; moreover, this phenomenon is concentrated in firms with higher levels of free cash flows. In that case, that research shows that firms with superfluous cash may tend to overinvest.

However, the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis is based on the agency theory—which emphasizes that information asymmetry prevents owners from monitoring managers and further leads to the over-investment of free cash.

On the base of the Agency Theory, the main purpose of this study is to examine the association between a firm’s asymmetry and its overinvestment. This study uses the size of firm and the standard variance of stockreturns as the proxy variable. The empirical results suggest that:
1.The relationship between the size of firm and the over-investment of free cash is insignificantly positive; that is, bigger firms tend to over-invest.
2.Moreover, further tests show the insignificantly negative relationship between the over-investment of free cash and the standard variance of stockreturns. It means that the over-investment of free cash might not happen to those firms with higher standard variance of stockreturns.

摘 要 Ⅰ
Abstract Ⅱ
表目錄 Ⅳ

第一章 緒論 1

第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 2


第二章 文獻探討 3

第一節 代理理論 3
第二節 自由現金流量理論 7
第三節 資訊不對稱 12


第三章 研究方法 23

第一節 研究問題 23
第二節 研究模型 24
第三節 研究範圍 26
第四節 分析方法 27


第四章 實證結果與分析 29

第一節 投資支出及投資預測模型 29
第二節 敘述性統計分析 31
第三節 實證結果 32


第五章 結論與建議 36

第一節 結論 36
第二節 研究限制 37
第三節 後續研究建議 37


參考文獻 38

表目錄
表4-1 各類投資支出之敘述性統計量............................................................30
表4-2 投資預測模型迴歸分析........................................................................30
表4-3 敘述性統計量........................................................................................32
表4-4 資訊不對稱(公司規模)與過度投資之關聯性 迴歸分析...................33
表4-5 資訊不對稱(股票報酬率標準差)與過度投資之關聯性 迴歸分析...33
表4-6 過度投資與自由現金流量、股權結構之關聯性： White Test...........34
表4-7 過度投資與公司規模之關聯性:Durbin-Waston 統計........................35
表4-8 財務槓桿與股價報酬率標準差之關聯性 Durbin-Waston 統計量… 35

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