臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

財務報表功能之一即為提供有助於投資者對公司未來獲利能力的資訊，乃是資本市場投資人釐訂決策的主要依據，本研究旨在分析公司管理階層是否會藉由遞延所得稅費用進行盈餘管理行為，因而被證期局強制要求重編財報之研究，分析是否遞延所得稅費用愈高，財務報表重編之可能性愈高之證據，相較於課稅目的，經理人為了財務報導目的而利用更大的裁量權，操縱盈餘以達到一些門檻(例如，避免報導盈餘下降)，而且經理人寧願提高帳面所得卻沒有提高課稅所得，欲探討遞延所得稅費用在偵測財務報表重編是否具解釋力，查核人員或是報表使用者是否可以藉由遞延所得稅費用科目偵測財務報表重編，便是本研究欲探討的對象。

本研究實證結果顯示遞延稅費用愈高，財務報表重編的可能性愈高，表示遞延所得稅費用可以作為公司是否從事財務報表重編的一個偵測訊號，公司想要增加帳上所得但是卻不要增加課稅所得，重編公司不願支付全部操弄盈餘金額的稅負，因而增加遞延所得稅費用；稅前淨利為正之公司，其遞延所得稅費用愈高，財務報表重編之可能性愈高，表示公司真正利用遞延所得稅費用進行盈餘管理的部份，主要是依據會計與稅法規範之寬鬆不同，企業從收入與費用認列的時間點上加以操弄，一方面達成美化稅後盈餘的目的，另一方面也可延緩所得稅的繳納，達到現金流量與租稅上的規劃。最後，本研究實證結果亦顯示當期稅前淨利為正之公司，其前一年之遞延所得稅費用越高則發生財務報表重編之可能性愈高，重編公司意圖美化財務報表從事盈餘管理，於財報重編前一年便開始虛增帳上收益，並且盡可能的低列應課稅淨利，以致於提高了遞延所得稅費用。

One of the financial statement's functions is to provide information of firms’ future profitability to investors for decision making. The main purpose of this study is to analyze whether firms been asked by Securities and Future Bureau to restate their financial statements use deferred tax expenses to manage their reported earnings. This study analyzes the relation between a company’s deferred tax expenses and the possisibility of financial restatement. From prior study, we know that managers use discretionary accruals for earning management for financial reporting purpose. They manage earnings to reach some goals (such as avoiding reported earnings decline). Nevertheless, managers are willing to raise book income but not taxable income. This study examines whether deferred tax expenses can detect financial restatement, as well as that auditor and users of financial statement can detect financial restatement via deferred tax expense.

The empirical research of this study shows that if deferred tax expense is higher then the possibility of the financial restatement is also higher. The results show that deferred tax expenses can be an indicator of detection of financial restatemenst. Firms want to increase book income but not taxable income. Restatement firms are not willing to pay extra tax as a result of earnings management, and thus, by using the difference between accounting standards and tax rules, increase fims’ deferred tax expense. For firms with positive income before tax, while deferred tax expense is higher, the probability of the financial restatement is also higher. The result indicates that firms use deferred tax expense to engage in earnings management. They manipulate the timing of recognition of revenue and expense according to the difference between accounting standard and tax rules. On the one hand firms have reached the earnings goals, on the other hand they also postpone paying tax for cash flow planning. Finally, our results show that, while the deferred tax expenses in the preceding year is higher, the probability of the financial restatement is also higher for fims with positive income before tax. Financial restatements firms intending to embellish financial statements engage in earnings management by understating taxable income and inflating accounting income in preceding year, which in turn increase deferred tax expense.

目錄
頁次
中文摘要–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– І
英文摘要–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Ⅱ
謝辭–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Ⅲ
目錄–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Ⅳ
圖表目錄–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Ⅴ

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景及動機–––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1
第二節 研究目的––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 3

第二章 文獻探討
第一節 財務報表重編相關文獻––––––––––––––––––––––– 4
第二節 遞延所得稅費用與盈餘管理之研究相關文獻–––––––––––––– 9

第三章 研究方法
第一節 假說建立–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––13
第二節 實證模型與變數定義––––––––––––––––––––––––15
第三節 研究期間、資料來源與樣本選取–––––––––––––––––––21

第四章 實證結果分析
第一節 敘述性統計––––––––––––––––––––––––––––25
第二節 相關係數–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––31
第三節 實證結果–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––38

第五章 結論與建議
第一節 結論–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––56
第二節 研究貢獻與限制––––––––––––––––––––––––– 58

參考文獻–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 59

圖表目錄
表3-1 全體觀察值選取說明表–––––––––––––––––––––––––– 22
表3-2 財務報表重編觀察值組成彙總表：依重編年度–––––––––––––––– 22
表3-3 財務報表重編觀察值組成彙總表：依產業別––––––––––––––––– 23
表4-1 全體樣本公司敘述性統計分析(全體樣本公司)–––––––––––––––– 26
表4-2 全體樣本公司敘述性統計分析(強制重編樣本公司)–––––––––––––– 27
表4-3 全體樣本公司敘述性統計分析(非強制重編樣本公司)––––––––––––– 28
表4-4 正值稅前重編樣本公司敘述性統計分析––––––––––––––––––– 29
表4-5 正值稅前重編樣本對照組(非重編公司)敘述性統計分析–––––––––––– 30
表4-6 全體樣本公司相關係數–––––––––––––––––––––––––– 32
表4-7 稅前淨利為正之重編公司與其對照組相關係數–––––––––––––––– 34
表4-8 稅前淨利為負之重編公司與其對照組(非重編公司)相關係數–––––––––– 36
表4-9 全樣本公司實證結果(DTE、POS_DTE) ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––39
表4-10 全樣本公司實證結果(DTE_dummy、POS*DTE_dummy) ––––––––––––––––––––––––40
表4-11 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE) –––––––––––––––––––––––––– 43
表4-12 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE-lag) –––––––––––––––––––––– 44
表4-13 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_dummy) –––––––––––––––––––– 45
表4-14 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_dummy-lag) –––––––––––––––– 46
表4-15 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_TOP20、DTE_LOW20) ––––––––––47
表4-16 正值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_TOP20-lag、DTE_LOW20-lag) ––48
表4-17 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE) –––––––––––––––––––––––––– 50
表4-18 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE-lag) –––––––––––––––––––––– 51
表4-19 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_dummy) –––––––––––––––––––– 52
表4-20 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_dummy-lag) –––––––––––––––– 53
表4-21 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_TOP20、DTE_LOW20) ––––––––––54
表4-22 負值稅前淨利重編公司與其對照組實證結果(DTE_TOP20-lag、DTE_LOW20-lag) ––55

中文部份：
證券交易法第三十六條，民國91 年3 月25 日修正

公司制證券交易所財務報告編製準則第八條，94 年12 月27 日

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