臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

為積極加強公司治理機制與功能，臺灣證券交易所及櫃檯買賣中心規定新申請上市(櫃)之公司自2002年2月22(25)日起，必須設置獨立董事至少二人及獨立監察人至少一人；以及自2007年起，金融業及資本額500億以上之非金融業上市(櫃)公司，應於章程規定設置獨立董事制度等。
然而，各界對獨立董事與監察人制度似乎有功能重疊之疑慮。贊成獨立董事制度者認為各國公司制度逐漸朝向英美模式，因此基於與國際接軌，有其必要性；而反對者則認為，除董事會外另有監察人行使監督權，若要改善公司監督成效不彰之問題，亦可由監察人制度改善著手。
因此，本研究探討2002-2006臺灣上市(櫃)公司監察人機制對於獨立董事設置之影響，以瞭解獨立董事與監察人是否存有替代關係或互補關係。實證結果發現，監察人席次比率、監察人持股、經理人持股、國外法人持股比率、董事長兼任總經理、經營績效、負債比率、家族企業，對獨立董事監督效果有強化的作用；而董事持股與獨立董事為替代關係。本研究結果可瞭解獨立董事與監察人於公司治理架構之互動功能，並提供企業經營與主管機構制定相關決策之參考。

In order to reinforce corporate governance, Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) require that, initial public offering companies should install at least two independent directors and at least one independent supervisor from 2002/2/22(25). Moreover, from 2007 onward, financial enterprises and non-financial listed companies with more than 50 billion in capital ought to institute independent directors in their corporate constitutions.
However, not all circles agree on the coexistence of independent directors and supervisors because the former might overlap the functions of the latter. True, some people think that since companies around the world are following American/British enterprises, it is necessary to institute independent directors in order to be “internationalized.” But those who oppose hold that one can also resort to the betterment of supervising systems to reinforce corporate governance.
Hence, this study explores how supervisors influenced independent directors in Taiwan’s listed companies (2002~2006). The following factors are found conducive to the supervising effects of independent directors: the ratio of supervisors, supervisors and managers holding stocks, foreign corporations with shares, chairman of the board as general manager, operation performance, debt ratio, and family-run enterprises. One can also notice that independent directors and stock-holding directors are able to displace each other. These findings show how independent directors interact with independent supervisors in corporate governance, and they may hopefully contribute to the making of corporate decisions.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 3
第三節 研究目的 3
第四節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 公司治理之意義 5
第二節 公司的內部監督機制 9
第三節 監察人規範與研究 16
第四節 獨立董事之規範與研究 21
第五節 公司治理機制之替代與互補關係 25
第六節 家族企業 30
第三章 研究方法 32
第一節 研究假說 32
第二節 研究樣本 34
第三節 模型與變數定義 35
第四章 實證結果 42
第一節 敘述性統計 42
第二節 相關性檢定 48
第三節 平均數檢定 49
第四節 迴歸分析 51
第五章 結論與建議 55
參考文獻 57

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