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研究生:許有志
研究生(外文):YU-CHIH,HSU
論文名稱:股份有限公司經理人CEO法律制度之研究
論文名稱(外文):Research on C.E.O Law System for The Limited Liability Company
指導教授:楊敏華楊敏華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Minhua Yang,PH.D.
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:嶺東科技大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:90
中文關鍵詞:公司治理 代理理論
外文關鍵詞:Company management Replacement theory
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摘 要

二十世紀,隨著跨國公司全球業務的拓展,總公司與世界各地的子公司內部與外部交流頻繁,在此背景下,因應而生的經理人(CEO),來處理公司重大決策的反應和執行能力。台灣過去三十年來在經濟上突飛猛進的發展與成就,尤其高科技產業,一直是亞洲第一是世界科技產品代工的王國,目前我國正走在高科技與傳統產業交替之際,傳統產業在舊董事會的制度執行下,已經無法適應市場風雲變幻;決策的速度和執行的力度比以往任何時候都更加重要。經理人(CEO)就是這種變革的產物!
本研究想了解公司董事會制度對經理人(CEO)管理的影響,了解公司經理人(CEO)法律制度權利、義務及責任,成功的經理人(CEO)所需的內在特質,除了聰明、負責、信服,使員工願意為他效命外,也能為投資者創造非凡的利潤。一位出色經理人(CEO)領導者對經營管理、行銷、財務、人力資源等。讓公司上下都有一致的方向;展現出眾的領袖氣質,在法律制度下領導公司,串起全球化的溝通,創造傲人的業績,帶領公司邁向國際舞台。
經理人(CEO)的職責,我國《民法》第553條規定,從契約的角度解釋經理人(CEO)與股東之間的代理關係,目的在於保障股東對公司的控制權,實現所有權與經營權分離關係。經理人(CEO)負責製訂公司全球資訊化的政策與標準,並確定實施程序與方法,將公司的經營情況和財務結算表有義務報告給投資人。經理人(CEO)隨時要有源源不斷的新發現及新創意的開發策略,讓公司產品保有競爭力。將知識管理的流程與業務行銷流程緊密融合為一體;建立與董事會(股東)水乳交融的機制;營造經理人(CEO)優質的管理、信任、勤勉及創新的公司文化氛圍。

關鍵字: 公司治理 代理理論
Abstract

As for the 20th Century with the business expansion of multinational companies, the head quarter and various subsidiaries have lots of communication frequently. During this kind of circumstance, it created the position of Chief Executive Officer CEO to execute the company's strategic policies with speed and power. Over the past 30 years, Taiwan's economy has great performance on the economic aspect, especially in the field of technology, because Taiwan has always been the second to none of outsourcing kingdoms in Asia. Currently, our nation is on the way of transition between the high technology and the traditional industries, which is not suitable for today’s business environment. Under today's ever changing market conditions, the speed of execution is more important than any other time.

This study attempts to understand a corporation’s board of director system's effects on the aspect of CEO's obligation with responsibility. It also wants to delve into CEO's legal rights with internal property. The characteristics of a successful CEO includes intelligent, responsible, make believe and the employees' willingness to work for him. He also has the ability to produce extraordinary profits for investors. On the other hand, an outstanding CEO has to know about the operation's management, marketing, finance and human resources so that he can keep the same pace with the company. In order to show an unusual leader quality, lead the cooperation under the legal systems, link global communications, create impressive accomplishments, as well as lead the corporation to the international stage.

According to the section 553 of Civil Law, the obligations of a CEO is to explore the replacement relationship between CEO and company’s stake holders and the goal is to ensure the shareholders' control of the corporation; achieve integrate relationship of ownership and management and as well as the operation of the cooperation.

Keyword: company management, replacement theory
Table of Contexts

English Abstract…………………………………… ……………… ………………. I
Chinese Abstract ………………………………………………………………….. III
Acknowledgement ………………………………………………………………. .. IV
Table of Contexts ……………………………………………………..…………….VI

1. Introduction … ………………………………………………………………. 1
1.1 Research background & motivation ……………… ………………………… 1
1.2 Research theory—to explore the core of agency theory ………… …………..5
1.3 Research purpose…………………………………………………… ………...9
1.4 Research method…………………………………………………………......12
1.5 The content and scope of research………………………………………… ..13
2. The legal right of manager C.E.O…………………… …………………19
2.1 The operating right of manager……………………………………………... 19
2.1.1 The definition of operating right……………… ………………… ... 20
2.1.2 The granted operating right……………...………………………… ..21
2.1.3 The scope of manager right………… ……………………………… 22
2.2 The content for manager’s right……………………………………………. .27
2.2.1 The deputy right for manager … …………………………………… 27
2.2.2 The management behavior right for manager ……..…………… .... .28
2.2.3 The lawsuit right for manager…………..……………………………29
2.3 The limitation for manager’s right ………………………………………… .29
2.3.1 The limitation for manager’s official signature …………………. ....30
2.3.2 The manager authority limitation for the responsible sector …… .…30
2.3.3 The relevant restrictions on manager authorized writing .… ..……...31
2.3.4 The common replacement restriction for manager ……………… …32
3. Legal duties of chief executive officer C.E.O ..………... …………….34
3.1 Duty of task execution ….………………………...………………………….35
3.1.1 Duty of Prohibition of abuse of company assets ….……………… ...35


3.1.2 Duty of prohibition of self-dealing ………………..……………….. 37
3.1.3 Duty of trade secret keeping………… …………………………….. 38
3.2 The duty of prohibition of business strife……………..………………… … 39
3.2.1 The content of prohibition of business strife……….……… ……… 39
3.2.2 The scope of prohibition of business strife………….……………… 40
3.2.3 The effect of violating duty of prohibition of business strife ……… 41
3.3 The duty of loyalty of CEOs…………………..……………………… ……44
3.3.1 Content of duty of loyalty……………………………………………45
3.3.2 Scope of duty of loyalty…………………………………………….. 47
3.3.3 Litigation mechanism of duty of loyalty…………….……………… 47
3.4 Duty of care of CEOs………………………………………………………. 48
3.4.1 Highly focusing on duty of care and duty of care and content……... 49
3.4.2 The occupational moral of highly focusing duty of care……..…….. 50
4. Legal liability of C.E.Os…………… ………………………………….. 53
4.1 The liability of C.E.Os toward the company……………………………….. 55
4.1.1 The liability of C.E.Os violating duty of loyalty and care………….. 56
4.1.2 The liability of C.E.Os out of violation of contract or tort…………..58
4.2 The liability of C.E.O toward the third party…………….…………………. 60
4.2.1 C.E.Os are jointly liable to the third parties ……………...………….61
4.2.2 The C.E.Os are individually liable to third parties…………………63
4.3 The responsibility of C.E.Os and liability release …………………………..64
4.3.1 The liable element of C.E.Os…………………...……………………64
4.3.2 The reliability of civil liability of C.E.Os ………..………………….66
4.3.3 The indemnity of C.E.Os……………………...……………………..71
5. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….74
Reference………… ……………………………………………………………….79
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