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研究生:杜夏蘭
研究生(外文):Hsia-Lan Tu
論文名稱:私募應募人、股權結構與私募績效之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the Relationships among Private Investors, Ownership Structure, and the Performance of Private Placements
指導教授:陳育成陳育成引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:財務金融系所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:45
中文關鍵詞:私募應募人股權結構私募績效
外文關鍵詞:private investorsownership structurethe performance of private
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本研究主要探討台灣上市(櫃)公司辦理普通股私募時,私募應募人與股權結構是否會影響私募績效。在私募應募人方面,本研究採用Barclay et al. (2007)所提及之應募人分類方式,將私募樣本分為三類,即為管理私募、積極私募與消極私募,加上是否為單一應募人。而股權結構方面,分為董監事、經理人與大股東的持股比率,加上獨立董監事占董事會的比率。研究期間為2002年至2008年,研究對象共70間公司,樣本數達104筆。
在私募績效方面,私募可以帶來績效提升,且其較好的績效維持約七季;多次私募的績效高於單次私募的績效。在私募應募人方面,當高階管理階層在私募活動出資,可以使私募後績效成長率較好。而在股權結構部分,當經理人持股比率愈高,私募後績效成長率愈差;大股東持股比率愈高,私募後績效成長率愈好;獨立董監事比率愈高,私募後績效成長率愈差。
This study is mainly to discuss whether private investors and ownership structure can affect the performance of private placements when public companies raise capital through private placements of common stocks. In private investors, this research uses the classification of private investors mentioned by Barclay et al. (2007) as our classification base, and divides the samples of private placements into three groups, including “managerial investors”, “active investors”, and “passive investors”. In addition, judge whether there is just one investor in private placements. And in ownership structure, there are the ratios of shares held by “directors”, “mangers”, and “major shareholders”, including the ratio of “the independent directors’ seats in the board”. The amounts of samples are 104 consist of the research objects including 70 companies during the research period from 2002 to 2008.
About the performance of private placements, private placements improve the performance. Besides, its better performance can last approximately for seven seasons. In addition, the performance through private placements for many times is better than the one through private placements for just once. About the private investors, if the top management teams invest in private placements, the growth ratio of the performance after private placements will become much better. About the ownership structure, the higher the ratio of shares held by the managers is, the worse the growth ratio of the performance after private placements is. Besides, the higher the ratio of shares held by the major shareholders is, the better the growth ratio of the performance after private placements is. Moreover, the higher the ratio of the independent directors’ seats in the board, the worse the growth ratio of the performance after private placements is.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程 3
第三節 論文架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 台灣有價證券私募相關法規 5
第二節 國內外相關文獻 9
第三章 研究方法 14
第一節 研究樣本 14
第二節 研究假說 15
第三節 變數定義 18
第四節 實證分析方法 21
第四章 實證結果 25
第一節 敘述性統計與相關分析 25
第二節 辦理私募與公司績效之關係 29
第三節 私募應募人與私募後績效之關係 31
第四節 迴歸分析 34
第五章 結論與建議 40
參考文獻 43
中文部分
陳振智,2006,「私募股權之異常報酬探討」,國立臺灣大學國際企業學研究所碩士論文

張文魁,2005,「股權結構對私募發行公司價值影響之分析」,國立政治大學財務管理研究所碩士論文

陸瀛謙,2007,「私募折價幅度及私募前後異常報酬與應募人之關聯」,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文

黃怡翔,2005,「企業私募後股價表現之研究」,國立中山大學企業管理學系研究所碩士論文

黃莉茹,2006,「私募股權之宣告效果-公司治理機制、盈餘管理行為與無形資產之影響」,國立臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文

西文部分
Agrawal, A. and G. N. Mandelker. 1990. “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments”, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2): 143-161.

Barclay, M. J., C. G. Holderness, and D. P. Sheehan. 2007. “Private placement and managerial entrenchment”, Journal of Corporate Finance 13(4): 461-484.

Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn. 1985. “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155-1177.

Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2): 301-325.

Fosberg, R. 1989. “Outside directors and managerial monitoring”, Akron Business and Economic Review, 20(2): 24-32.

Folta T. B., and J. J. Janney. 2004. “Strategic benefits to firms issuing private equity placements”, Strategic Management Journal, 25: 223-242.

Goh J., M. J. Gombola, H. W. Lee, and F. Y. Liu. 1999. “Private placement of common equity and earnings expectations”, The Finance Review, 34: 19-32.

Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. 1991. “The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance”, Financial Management, 20(4): 101-112.

Hertzel M., M. Lemmon, J. S. Linck, and L. Rees. 2002. “Long-run performance following private placements of equity”, Journal of Finance, 57(6):2595-2617.

Hertzel, M., and R.L. Smith, 1993, “Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately”, Journal of Finance, 48(2): 458-485.

Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback. 1983. “The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1): 5-50.

Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976.” Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305-360.

Leland, H., and Pyle, D. H., 1977, “Information Asymmetric, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance, 32: 371-388.

Marcriukaityte D., S. H. Szewczyk, R. Varma. 2005. “Investor overoptimism and private equity placements”, The Journal of Finance Research, 591-608.

Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf. 1984. “Corporate financing and investment decisions when the firm has information that investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 187-221.

Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1986. “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, The Journal of Political Economy, 94(3): 461-488.

Wruck, K. H. 1989. “Equity ownership concentration and firm value : Evidence from private equity financings”, Journal of Financial Economics, 23(1): 3-28.
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