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研究生:黃書彥
研究生(外文):Shu-Yan Huang
論文名稱:異質性感測網路及多使用者廣播鑑別機制安全架構之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Study on the Security Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks and Multi-User Broadcast Authentication
指導教授:林詠章林詠章引用關係
指導教授(外文):Iuon-Chang Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:資訊管理學系所
學門:電算機學門
學類:電算機一般學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:92
中文關鍵詞:無線感測網路金鑰管理完美安全完美前推安全廣播鑑別RSA
外文關鍵詞:Wireless Sensor NetworksKey ManagementPerfect SecurityPerfect Forward SecrecyBroadcast AuthenticationRSA
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近年來,許多的研究已經集中於無線感測網路的多層架構上。相較於平坦式的感測網路,這個架構的主要優點為更好的延展性、能源有效性和安全性。因此,在本文中,我們使用了這個多層架構。

安全的通訊是在感測網路中一項必要的安全服務。因此,在本文中,我們提出了兩個安全的通訊方案去解決此問題。感測節點是資源有限的,像是低電量、有限的計算、低頻寬以及有限的記憶體,所以傳統的公開金鑰方法通常不適用於無線感測網路。在先前的金鑰管理方法中,對稱式金鑰是最常被使用的方法。因此,分配金鑰給每個節點以達到安全的通訊是階層式感測網路的一個重要議題。然而,惡意節點的駁回是必要但棘手的。一或多個被竊取的節點可能導致整個感測網路的竊取。在本文中,我們提出兩個有效的方法在一個叢集中去建立節點間的安全連結並且有效地處理節點竊取攻擊。第一個提出的方法能夠在感測節點竊取下保證完美的安全性。第二個提出的方法不僅能確保完美的安全性,並且在每一次的傳輸中亦能確保完美的前推安全。此外,這個方法能支援節點間安全的單點傳輸、多點傳輸和廣播,並且也能處理叢集首被竊取的情況。

在另一方面,對一些漫遊在無線感測網路中的使用者來說,為了獲得最近的感測資料,他們可以利用他們的行動裝置對無線感測網路廣播請求封包。在這個情節中,每一個感測節點必須去驗證每個使用者請求封包的正確性。因此,我們利用一個相似於RSA的方法為多使用者廣播鑑別機制設計一個有效的架構。在我們的方法中,使用者憑證是不需要的。當使用者廣播請求封包至無線感測網路時,每個感測節點可以立刻地驗證每個請求封包,而不需要暫時儲存任何一個封包。經由我們的評估,每個感測節點去驗證一個請求封包所花費的能源是非常小的。此外,我們的方案提供了足夠的延展性和安全性。最後的量化方析顯示了我們的方法在儲存和計算成本方面是有效的。
Recently, many researches have focused on a multi-tiered architecture for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The advantages of such an architecture are better scalability, energy efficiency and security as compared with flat sensor networks. Thus, we use this multi-tiered architecture in this thesis.

Secure communication is a critical security service in WSNs. Therefore, we propose two secure communication schemes to address such a problem in this thesis. Sensor nodes are resource-constrained, such as low battery life, limited computation, low bandwidth and limited memory, so traditional public key schemes are usually impractical in WSNs. In the previous key management schemes, symmetric key is the most common method used in sensor nodes. Therefore, distributing keys into every sensor node for secure communication is an important issue in hierarchical sensor networks. However, the revocation of compromised sensor nodes is also necessary but troublesome. One or more compromised nodes may lead to the entire compromise of WSNs. In this thesis, we present two efficient approaches to establish security links among nodes in a cluster and efficiently deal with the node compromise attack. The first proposed schemes can ensure the perfect security against sensor node compromises. The second scheme can ensure not only the perfect security against sensor node compromises, but also perfect forward secrecy in every transmission. Furthermore, this scheme can support secure unicast, multicast and broadcast among nodes, and also deal with the situation that cluster heads are compromised.

On the other hand, for network users roaming in WSN, they can broadcast queries to WSN in order to obtain the latest sensed data from sensor nodes using their mobile devices. In such a scenario, each sensor node has to verify the validity of every query sent from users. Therefore, we employ an RSA-like scheme to design an efficient mechanism for multi-user broadcast authentication in WSN. In our scheme, the use of users'' certificates is not necessary. When users broadcast queries to WSN, each sensor node can verify every query immediately without buffering any one. Through our evaluation, the energy cost for verifying a query by a sensor node is very small. Furthermore, our scheme provides enough scalability and security. The quantitative analyses show that our scheme is efficient in terms of storage and computational overheads.
Abstract (in Chinese) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract (in English) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Preliminaries 11
2.1 Network Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Multi-User Broadcast Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 A Polynomial Based Key Establishment Scheme for Heterogeneous
Sensor Networks 15
3.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 The Requirements of Our Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 t − degree Trivariate Symmetric Polynomial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 The Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.1 Our Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.2 Deploying New Sensor Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.1 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.2 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.3 Computational Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5.4 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6 Discussion and Summery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4 Providing Perfect Forward Secrecy for Location-Aware Wireless Sen-
sor Networks 29
4.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 The Requirements of Our Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 The Broadcast-Encryption-Based Key Management scheme . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 The Adversary Model and Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 The Proposed Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5.1 Our Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5.2 Re-Clustering After Cluster Head Capture/Compromise . . . . . 42
4.5.3 Revocation After Sensor Node Capture/Compromise . . . . . . . 43
4.5.4 Adding New Sensor Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.6 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.6.1 Eavesdropping and Injection Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.6.2 Sensor Node Replication Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.6.3 Sybil Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6.4 Wormhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.6.5 Sinkhole Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.6.6 Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.6.7 Resilience Against Node/Cluster Head Compromises . . . . . . . 48
4.7 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.7.1 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.7.2 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.7.3 Computational Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.8 Discussion and Summery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5 An RSA-Like Scheme forMulti-User Broadcast Authentication inWire-
less Sensor Networks 54
5.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.2 Energy Cost of Primitive RSA and ECC Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.3 The Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4 RSA Public Key Cryptosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.5 RSA Master-Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.6 The Proposed Multi-user Broadcast Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . 62
5.6.1 Our Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.6.2 User Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.8.1 Communication Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.8.2 Storage Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.8.3 Storage Overhead on Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.8.4 Computational Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.9 Discussion and Summery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
6 Conclusions and Future Works 79
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.2 Future Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
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