臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

對於都會區中運送小型文件或商品之快遞產業而言，機車是較具有外型優勢和機動性之載具，其營運網路模式主要分為傳統「點對點式」(Point-to-Point，簡稱PP)與新興之「軸輻式」(Hub-and-Spoke，簡稱HS)兩類。在現行的機車快遞市場中，HS網路之營運獲利已完全超越傳統PP網路，本研究將分別以獨佔(Monopoly)與競局兩類市場環境探討並分析HS與PP兩種機車快遞網路模式在送件效率與獲利上之表現。首先，我們將此兩類快遞網路營運模式加以簡化統整，推導出兩種營運網路之總送件數與延遲送件數理論值，以作為其在獨佔市場下送件效率之衡量指標；而在競局模式的環境下，本研究以競局理論為研究方法，視兩種營運模式為競局之網路策略，探討當機車快遞產業為雙頭寡佔(Duopoly)市場時所產生之競局。
在競局模式中，我們以獨佔模式下所推導而得的兩種營運網路之送件效率為基礎，將遲交送件所帶來之懲罰成本(包括商譽損失、
商品遺失等加以量化)，使模式能充分表現出兩種營運網路之特性對獲利的影響，建構出競爭者為同時或不同時決策下之同時競局(Cournot)與依序競局(Stackelberg)，使用數值分析的方式模擬各種可能的競爭關係之獲利情形，並探討先行或後行者之優勢對參賽者獲利性和市場均衡狀況的影響。最後，我們亦提出一個包含高低品質兩種快遞產品之市場情境模式，將整體市場中高低品質需求量比例視為外部變數，以推導出兩種產品之最佳產能分配之比例。

In a metropolitan area where the conventional four-wheel vehicles may have difficulties in shipping small consignments efficiently due to the limited parking spaces and congested traffic, the motorcycles become perfect means for such a task. Two major network configurations are used in the industry of the metropolitan motorcycle courier services: the hub-and-spoke network (HB) and the point-to-point network (PP). Conventional motorcycle courier services usually employ PP as their network structure, yet the largest motorcycle courier service in Taipei metropolitan area uses HB to achieve higher quality of service and thus dominates the market of shipping small consignments. This thesis, with both network strategies employed, analyzes the efficiency of service and trend of profits for both the monopoly and competition models, respectively. In the monopoly model, we derive the total amount, on-time amount, and delayed amount of consignments as the performance indices representing the service efficiency for each network strategy. Then, we try to exploit the theories of games and incorporate the penalty of delayed consignments into the profit function to analyze the profits for two motorcycle courier services
in a Duopoly market.
By exploring the three different network strategy combinations (HS,HS), (PP,PP) and (PP,PP) in a simultaneous-move Cournot game where both players serve the same service zones, we observe the following three facts: First, the HS strategy will always have more profits when the economies of scale is sufficiently significant so that it can conduct more consignments with less cost (and thus is considered to have more service advantages); Second, the PP strategy may beat the HS strategy in the cases where the HS strategy does not have sufficient service advantages, in which case the equilibrium would exist; Third, when both the HS and PP strategies have the same service efficiency, the PP strategy becomes the only profitable choice. In the cases when both players are free to serve different amount of service zones and choose their network strategies, generally the PP strategy is competitive to, or even sometimes beats the HS strategy. Nevertheless, if the HS strategy has sufficient service advantages, it becomes the profitable choice for both players. Finally, we take two types of services into consideration and derive their best composition while the proportions of market demand for these two service types are known.

摘要. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
誌謝. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
表目錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
圖目錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
第一章緒論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 研究動機. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 研究目的. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 論文架構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
第二章文獻探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 點對點網路(Point-to-Point，PP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 航空產業之點對點網路. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 機車快遞產業之點對點網路. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 軸輻式網路(Hub-and-Spoke，HS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 航空產業之軸輻式網路. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 機車快遞產業之軸輻式網路. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 網路競局之文獻探討. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 競局理論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 網路競局. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
第三章模式建構與發展. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 模式環境與研究假設. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 獨佔模式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1 獨佔式HS機車網路策略之送件效率. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.2 獨佔式PP機車網路策略之送件效率. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 競局模式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3.1 獲利函式建構. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3.2 同時競局(Cournot game) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.3 依序競局(Stackelberg game) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.4 高低品質商品共存之市場模式. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
第四章數值分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1 獨佔模式數值分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1.1 獨佔模式參數範圍設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1.2 分區數(n) 對送件效率之影響. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 競局模式數值分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.1 Hub優勢(ε) 對競局獲利性之影響. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.2 Hub優勢(ε) 對競局均衡解之影響. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.3 高低品質商品共存市場之數值分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 小結. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
第五章結論與未來研究方向. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 結論. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 研究成果與貢獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.3 未來研究方向. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
參考文獻. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
附錄A PP網路送件量推導(λ= 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
附錄B G公司訪談紀錄. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
表目錄
3.1 HS策略週期a產生之需求對應至各週期完成之收送件數(λ= 2) . . . 21
3.2 HS策略在t0週期內完成之送件數(λ= 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 PP 策略週期a產生之需求對應至第一至第三週期完成之收送件數
(λ= 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 PP 策略週期a產生之需求對應至第四及第五週期完成之收送件數
(λ= 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5 PP策略在t0週期內完成之送件數(λ= 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 參數基本設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2 不同n對應各週期a 產生需求之第一次被收件量. . . . . . . . . . 37
4.3 競局模式之參數基本設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4 a對應HS、PP網路之送件能力上限. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.5 同時競局參數基本設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.6 依序競局參數基本設定. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.7 ε對應HL、PL競局之獲利. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.8 HS與PP網路分區數組合情境之命名. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.9 SS 情境下ε對應DNS、SNS競局之獲利. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.10 SS 情境(ε = 0.18) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.11 MM情境下ε 對應DNS、SNS競局之獲利. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.12 MM情境(ε = 0) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.13 MM情境(ε = 0.1) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.14 MM情境(ε = 0.4) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.15 MS情境下ε 對應DNS、SNS競局之獲利. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.16 MS情境(ε = 0) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.17 MS情境(ε = 0.2) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.18 MM情境(ε = 0.4) HS、PP策略競爭均衡表格. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1 PP策略在 週期內完成之送件數(λ= 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A.2 PP策略週期a產生之需求對應至各週期完成收送件數(λ= 3) . . . . 72
A.3 各週期a需求第b次接受收件量之關係(λ= 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B.1 平均送件價格. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
B.2 固定成本支出. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
B.3 單位生產與延遲送件成本. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

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