臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在現今的社會當中，國際化的金融市場是更趨於全球化與自由化，為了讓企業能維持長久發展與競爭力，所以有許多新的籌資管道的出現，就台灣而論，自2001年與2002年分別通過「公司法」與「證券交易法」的相關修正條文，正式引進另一個籌資新管道「私募」制度。
故本文主要是探討什麼樣的公司特性會影響到企業對於籌募資金方式的選擇，本文的籌募資金的方式分為兩種，分別是私募普通股與公開發行普通股，針對所要探討的議題，本文提出兩個假設與五個變數，並且使用羅吉斯迴歸來做實證分析。
一、資訊不對稱：
針對資訊不對稱，本文提出三個變數，分別是公司規模、公司年紀與負債比率，實證結果可知，公司規模對於採取私募發行有顯著負向影響，顯示公司規模越小，資訊不對稱的可能性越高，這樣的公司越有可能採取私募發行。然而公司年紀在本文中，由實證結果可知，它不是影響融資決策的決定性因素之一。就負債比率而言，負債比率對於採取私募發行有顯著正相關，也就是說負債比率越高的公司，越有可能採取私募方式來進行公司融資。
二、代理問題
針對代理問題，本文提出兩個變數，分別是內部人持有比例和自由現金流量，由實證結果可知，內部人持有比例對於採取私募發行有顯著負向影響，也就是說當內部人持有比例越低的公司，越有可能採取私募方式；而自由現金流量對於採取私募發行呈正相關，這與本文所預期的假設不同，所以推測出企業並不會依賴私募發行來增加監督的機會，進而減少自由現金流量所帶來的代理問題。

The development of the international financial markets followed the trend to globalization and liberalization in recent years. In order to maintain the enterprise’s permanent development and competition, more and more new financing channels were launching. In Taiwan, the government concluded the “Company Law” and “Securities Exchange Act” to amend the relevant provisions in October 2001 and January 2002. Private placement was then officially introduced. It was a new financing channel in Taiwan.
This study discussed the firms’ characteristics influencing the choice of the enterprise’s financing methods. Financing methods were divided into two categories respectively: private placement and public offering. For the issue discussed, the study addressed two hypotheses and five variables, and further tested the hypotheses through logistic regression model.
1. Information Asymmetry:
For the information asymmetry, the study addressed three variables respectively: firm size, firm age and the ratio of liabilities respectively. The results showed that they were significantly negative correlation between the firm size and the private placement. Besides, it showed that the information asymmetries were more severe when the firm size is smaller. And the firms would take private placement easily. However, the empirical results reported that firm age was not a determinant of affecting financing methods. For the ratio of liabilities, there existed significantly positive correlation between the ratio of liabilities and the private placement. It represented that the firm would take private placement in financing easily when the ratio of liabilities were higher.

2. Agency Problem:
For the agency problem, the study addressed two variables respectively: the proportion of the insiders holding shares and the free cash flow. The results showed that they were significantly negative correlation between the proportion of the insiders holding shares and the private placement. On the other words, the enterprises would take the private placement easily when the proportion of the insiders holding shares was lower. There were positive correlation between the free cash flow and the private placement. However, it was conflicting with the expected hypothesis. Therefore, firms did not rely on the private placement to increase the monitoring opportunities in solving the agency problem of free cash flow.

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................ 10
1.1 Research motivation ........................................................................................... 10
1.2 Research objectives ............................................................................................ 12
1.3 Research process ................................................................................................. 13
Chapter 2 Literature Review ................................................................. 14
2.1 Private placement literature ............................................................................. 14
2.2 The information asymmetry ............................................................................ 17
2.3 The agency problem ........................................................................................... 18
2.4 The direction of effort in this paper.............................................................. 20
Chapter 3 Data and methodology ....................................................... 23
3.1 Sample data ........................................................................................................... 23
3.2 Definition of variables and research hypotheses ..................................... 25
3.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 29
3.3.1 Multicollinearity Test – Klein’s Method ............................................. 30
3.3.2 Significant Test – Nested Hypothesis Test ......................................... 30
3.3.3 Heteroskedasticity Test–White Heteroskedasticity Test ............... 31
3.3.4 Autocorrelation Test – Durbin-Watson Test ..................................... 31
3.3.5 The logistical regression .......................................................................... 32
3.4 Research design ................................................................................................... 34
Chapter 4 Empirical Result .................................................................... 35
4.1 Regression Results of the Preliminary Model .......................................... 35
4.2 Regression Result of the Multicollinearity Test ...................................... 37
4.3 Regression Result of the Significant Test .................................................. 38
4.4 Regression Result of Heteroskedasticity Test .......................................... 39
4.5 Regression Result of the Autocorrelation Test ........................................ 40
4.6 Result of Logistic Regression ......................................................................... 41
Chapter 5 Conclusion ................................................................................. 47
5.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 47
5.2 Research limitation and suggestion .............................................................. 49
References ............................................................................................................. 50

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