臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

我國自2001年與2002年通過「公司法」與「證券交易法」的相關修正條文，引進「私募」制度。企業針對特定的法人機構或符合一定資格的自然人發行有價證券，籌募資金，不公開對外募集，無須交付公開說明書給應募人，也不須請證券承銷商評估、律師審核。因法令限制應募人的相關資格條件，需專業及有財力的人士方可認募，故金管會對私募企業採事後報備的管理程序，而對財務困難的企業，則可以加快資金到位速度。
本文嘗試分析私募權益證券，其宣告對公司股東財富價值之影響，及相關私募公司財務特性，實證結果如下：
一、宣告效果：
如果公司曾有過財務危機，則宣告日雖為正面報酬，並不顯著。但其累積平均異常報酬率連續5日皆為負數，其30日的累積平均異常報酬率，呈下滑的趨勢，顯示私募並無提高投資人對公司未來信心。
如果是財務體質正常公司，則有顯著正面的異常報酬，顯示市場對管理者提高股權比例，或有外部監督股東，持正面的看法。
如為策略聯盟目的，有正面的報酬，但宣告日前二日則有異常正面報酬，似乎私有資訊已先流出。
綜上所論，公司私募不論有無財務危機的情形下，宣告日皆會產生正面的報酬。但若曾有財務危機，則會產生負面的累積平均異常報酬。事件日的5 日內，其累積平均異常報酬皆呈上升趨勢，但三十日的累積平均異常報酬皆回到當初起漲點。
二、財務特性：
跟發行權益證券的公開現金增資比較，私募公司財務特性的每股盈餘，負債比例、淨值報酬率、流動比例不佳情形顯著，企業會考量是否容易從市場上募集所需資金，主管機關是否會核准其公開募集有價證券，及銀行是否願意貸更多款項。從實證得到的財務特性因素，會走向私募的公司，一般而言，大多數企業都財務結構有惡化的現象。

The Legislative Yuan in Taiwan passed the amended Securities and Future Act and Company Act in 2001, a public company may carry out private placement of securities with the following persons： natural persons, juristic persons meeting the conditions prescribed by the Competent Authority. An issuer shall not be required to deliver a prospectus to the subscriber, no application for approval to publicly offer ,no securities underwriters or lawyers to examine ,it may save enterprises cost. The Competent Authority adopts a rule of post-approval for private placement of securities, for financial crisis enterprises, the funds will speed up.
The study try to analyze private placement of securities, the declaration of private placement for stockholders wealth impact and related financial characteristics, empirical results as follows：
一、declaration effect：
If the company ever occurred financial crisis, although declaration day is positive returns, but it’s not significant, and accumulated abnormal returns is negative for the next 5 days. In 30 day accumulated abnormal returns, its curve is downward, it shows private placement declaration of the company can’t raise individual investment confidence for the company in the future.
If the company doesn’t occur financial crisis, it’s significant positive returns, it shows the market is positive response for managers raise the proportions of owner’s stock or outside stockholders may monitor the company operation.
If the company is for allied strategy, it’s positive returns, not significant, but it has abnormal returns before 2 days on the declaration day. It seems that private information flows out in advance.
In summary, no matter whatever the company has financial crisis. It has positive returns on declaration day. If the company ever occurred financial crisis, it will produce negative accumulated abnormal returns on announcement period. First declaration within 5 days of private placement, average accumulated abnormal returns show uptrend, but after 30 days, the accumulated abnormal returns is almost the same as first declaration day.
二、financial characteristics：
Compared with Seasoned Equity Offings, the financial characteristics of private placement company, EPS, the proportion of liability to total equity, returns on net worth and current ratio are all significant, enterprises will consider that Raising capital is easier, The Competent Authority approve to issue securities and banks are willing to loan. From our empirical results, we find most corporate finance is deteriorate if the company raise of capital via private rather than public placement.

中文摘要 iii
Abstract v
誌謝 vii
目錄 viii
表目錄 ix
圖目錄 x
一、緒論 1
1.1 研究動機 1
1.2 研究目的 8
1.3 研究架構 10
二、文獻回顧 12
2.1 公司治理文獻 12
2.2 私募有價權益證券文獻 15
三、研究方法與樣本說明 20
3.1 資料來源及標準 20
3.2 假說建立 21
3.3 研究方法 23
3.4 研究範圍及限制 32
四、實證結果與分析 33
五、結論與建議 44
5.1 結論 44
5.2 未來研究方向 46
參考文獻 48
附錄一 50

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