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研究生:鄭人輔
研究生(外文):Jen-Fu Cheng
論文名稱:薪酬,董事網絡與公司績效
論文名稱(外文):Compensation, Director Network, and Firm Performance
指導教授:林穎芬林穎芬引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ying-Fen Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立東華大學
系所名稱:公司理財碩士學位學程
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:91
中文關鍵詞:未來績效董事網絡薪酬
外文關鍵詞:Future PerformanceDirector NetworkCompensation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
本研究以公司治理的角度,觀察董事薪酬及董事網絡兩影響公司治理要素,是否與高階經理人薪酬具正向關係。並以未來績效加以判斷此正向關係產生之原因,瞭解公司治理機制是否仍有效力。由於家族企業於國內普遍存在,公司經營與治理有其特色,故另將樣本分為家族與非家族,比較兩群體之差異。
本研究以2004年至2007年在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市之企業為研究樣本,利用相關分析、敘述性統計、線性迴歸等統計方法驗證各變數之關係。
本研究結果彙整如下:
(1)公司董事薪酬較高時,會發放較多高階經理人薪酬。
(2)董事薪酬與高階經理人薪酬之正向關係,是因為當公司較具經營與監督複雜度時,會付出較高薪酬聘請專業董事與高階經理人。
(3)公司董事網絡較高時會發放較多高階經理人薪酬。
(4)家族董事網絡與高階經理人薪酬水準正向關係是由於董事網絡降低企業風險,導入社會規範,改善公司經營績效,提昇高階經理人薪酬。
(5)由於家族企業經營注重網絡關係,較能發揮網絡功能。
This paper investigates whether director compensation or director network associates with the executive compensation, and the influence to future performance. In order to understanding the variations between family and not family firms , the investigation also separates the sample firms into family and not-family firms.
This study investigates a sample of listed companies from 2004 to 2007, adopts summary statistics, correlation and multiple regression analysis to measure the relativity.
The conclusions of the empirical investigation are listed below .
First, with greater director compensation, firms would pay more executive compensation, and have better future performance. This finding suggests that firms pay more compensation to employ more professional executives or directors when firms are harder to operate and govern.
Second, with greater director network, all sample firms and family firms would pay more executive compensation and have better future performance. This finding suggests that family firms are network governance system that family firms can apply network to get outside information and resources, abate risk level and adapt social norms.
目錄
壹、緒論 1
一、研究背景與動機 1
二、研究目的 5
三、研究架構及流程 7
貳、文獻探討與假說建構 9
一、代理問題與公司治理 9
二、高階經理人薪酬 11
三、董事薪酬 15
四、董事網絡 19
參、研究方法 26
一、研究期間與研究樣本 26
二、變數定義與衡量 27
三、實證模型 35
四、研究方法 37
肆、實證分析 39
一、敘述性統計 39
二、董事薪酬實證結果 48
三、董事網絡實證結果 62
四、穩固性測試 76
伍、結論與建議 79
一、討論與結論 79
二、研究建議 83
參考文獻 84
參考文獻
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