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研究生:吳淑芳
研究生(外文):Shu-Fun Wu
論文名稱:董事會特性、股權結構與資訊揭露關聯性之探討
論文名稱(外文):Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and Information Disclosure
指導教授:陳香蘭陳香蘭引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiang-Lan chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:財務管理所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:80
中文關鍵詞:資訊揭露董事會特性股權結構
外文關鍵詞:information disclosurecharacteristics of the board of directorsownership structur
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自1998年起國內外陸續發生多起重大公司治理事件,對金融市場造成極大影響。此類案件發生的主要原因,乃在於控制股東掌控了董事會,主導公司營運及掌握資金之支配權,加上財報資訊不夠透明,以致於因資訊不對稱問題,而造成外部投資人權益蒙受重大損失。基於上述原因,國內證管機關、美國證管會,皆經由法規之修訂,針對公司內部控管機制、財務及重大經營決策資訊之揭露有更明確之規範,使得公司的資訊能正確及充份的公開揭露,讓投資人有充分且透明的訊息,做正確之投資選擇,並達到外部投資人監督之作用。
資訊揭露程度關係投資人的權益,而影響公司資訊揭露的因素為何?本研究針對董事會特性及股權結構與資訊揭露程度之關聯性加以研究,透過瞭解其關聯性,提供管理當局未來在資訊揭露規範上做參考,也給投資大眾在選擇投資標的時多一些參考指標。
本研究以2007年上市公司製造業為選取樣本,利用公司年報、公開說明書及台灣經濟新報社之財務資料庫資料做分析,結果顯示董事會規模愈大、獨立董監事席次比率愈高、法人持股比率愈高、轉投資占淨值比率愈高及公司規模愈大,公司資訊揭露程度愈高,大股東持股比率愈高、股份盈餘偏離差愈大,資訊揭露程度愈低。
There have been numbers of scandals and corruption around the world since 1998, and those events have aroused a huge influence in the financial market. The controlling shareholders control the board of directors and dominate the major decisions regarding the operation, management, cash flow and allocation of company resources. Because lack of information transparency leads to the asymmetry problem and makes the interest of minority shareholders damaged. In response to solve the problem, the governments amend the related laws and establish lots of regulations to require the companies should build the internal control mechanism and fully disclose all information of financial and important operation decisions. The information disclosure could provide the investors necessary information to do the right choice of investment and also give the outside shareholders a chance to monitor the management of the company.
What determines the level of information disclosure? In this study we examine this question from two dimensions one is the characteristics of the board and another is the ownership structure. We hope that we can find some useful proposal for the authorities and some reference for the investors from this empirical evidence.
We use the annual report of the firms listed on the stock market in 2007 and the TEJ database for the testing. Empirical results indicate that: the board size, the ratio of independent directors and auditors and the ownership of institution have a positive relationship with the level of information disclosure. The divergence between voting-rights and cash-flow-rights and the ownership of large shareholders have a negative one
目 錄
中文摘要  ------------------------------------ i
英文摘要 ----------------------------------- ii 誌謝 ---------------------------------- iii 
目錄 ----------------------------------- iv
表目錄 ------------------------------------vi
圖目錄 -----------------------------------vii
第壹章 緒論 -----------------------------------1
第一節 研究背景及動機-----------------------1
第二節 研究問題與目的-----------------------5
第三節 研究流程及架構-----------------------9
第貳章 文獻探討及研究假說----------------------11
第一節 公司治理----------------------------11
第二節 資訊揭露----------------------------17
第三節 我國目前推動狀況 ------------------22
第四節 研究假說----------------------------26
第叁章 研究設計 ------------------------------38
第一節 樣本選取 --------------------------38
第二節 資料來源-----------------------------40
第三節 研究設計-----------------------------41
第四節 變數之操作性定義及衡量 -------------42
第肆章 實證結果及分析 ------------------------45
第一節 基礎統計敘述 -------------------------45
第二節 相關係數分析 -------------------------48
第三節 實證結果 ----------------------------51
第伍章 結論與建議 -----------------------------54
第一節 結論----------------------------------54
第二節 研究貢獻------------------------------55
第三節 管理意涵------------------------------56
第四節 研究建議及限制------------------------58
參考文獻-------------------------------------------59
附錄一---------------------------------------------64
附錄二---------------------------------------------66
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1. 4. 林宛瑩、許崇源,2008年,“台灣集團企業之控制型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議”,交大管理學報, Vol. 28, pp.269-312。
2. 4. 林宛瑩、許崇源,2008年,“台灣集團企業之控制型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議”,交大管理學報, Vol. 28, pp.269-312。
3. 5. 洪榮華、陳香如、柯璟瑩,2005年,“從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與負債之關連性”,管理與系統,第12卷,第4期,pp.33-53。
4. 5. 洪榮華、陳香如、柯璟瑩,2005年,“從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與負債之關連性”,管理與系統,第12卷,第4期,pp.33-53。
5. 7. 陳瑞斌、許崇源,2007年,“公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究”,交大管理學報, Vol.27, pp.55-109。
6. 7. 陳瑞斌、許崇源,2007年,“公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究”,交大管理學報, Vol.27, pp.55-109。
7. 9. 菅瑞昌、丁秀儀、闕河士,2008年,“經理人資訊揭露裁量與股票報酬率偏態關係”管理評論,第27卷,第3期,pp.65-92。
8. 9. 菅瑞昌、丁秀儀、闕河士,2008年,“經理人資訊揭露裁量與股票報酬率偏態關係”管理評論,第27卷,第3期,pp.65-92。
9. 11. 溫育芳、吳鴻毅, 2006年,“我國上市公司治理評等系統之建立”,金融風險管理季刊,第2卷,第3期,pp.1-28。
10. 11. 溫育芳、吳鴻毅, 2006年,“我國上市公司治理評等系統之建立”,金融風險管理季刊,第2卷,第3期,pp.1-28。
 
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