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研究生:陳于欣
研究生(外文):Yu-hsin Chen
論文名稱:公司獨立董事為何忙碌?
論文名稱(外文):Why are independent directors busy?
指導教授:丁秀儀丁秀儀引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ting, Hsiu-I
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:金融營運所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:企業資源需求假說董事專業假說忙碌獨立董事市場認同假說
外文關鍵詞:Resources Need HypothesisDirector Professional HypothesisBusy Independent DirectorMarket Assurance
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本研究主要探討公司獨立董事忙碌是否導因於公司對獨立董事專業所帶來的聲譽資本有需求或公司本身需求外部資源補給的程度。而市場對於公司獨立董事忙碌程度提高之反應為何,若市場認同忙碌程度提高是因為公司對獨立董事專業所帶來的聲譽資本有需求,或公司需要資源補給,則忙碌成因應與標準化累積異常報酬有正相關。
本研究以公司獨立董事具專業的比例,衡量公司對獨立董事聲譽資本的需求程度,實證結果顯示公司會基於對獨立董事專業所帶來的聲譽資本愈有需求,獨立董事忙碌程度會愈高。當公司規模大或成長潛力愈高時,因公司屬於需求外部資源補給程度高的企業,故其獨立董事忙碌程度也會愈高。市場反應方面,發現當公司獨立董事忙碌程度提高時,市場會有顯著負的標準化累積異常報酬,且若忙碌是導因於公司追求專業獨立董事帶來之聲譽資本,市場會認為公司缺乏對獨立董事忙碌後是否仍能堅守本職,善盡獨立監督之責的評估,而對標準化累積異常報酬有顯著負向影響。然而,市場對於公司規模愈大時,認同公司因監督管理難度較高向外補給資源,使公司獨立董事忙碌程度提高,對標準化累積異常報酬有顯著正向影響。
This paper examines the reasons of why independent directors are busy: (1) if firms have high demand for reputational capital brought by the professional independent directors, would it cause their independent directors busy; or (2) the busyness of a firm’s independent directors is associated with the firm’s need from outside resources. Besides, this paper also examines the market reaction when independent directors of a firm become busier. Suppose that market agrees with these two possible reasons of busyness, there should have a positive relationship between the reasons and market’s standardized cumulative abnormal return (SCAR).
In this paper, a proportional ratio of professional independent directors on their independent board is used as a measure of a firm’s demand for reputational capital brought by these professional directors. The empirical results show that firms have higher demand for the directors’ reputational capital would cause their independent directors with higher busyness. Besides, firms with lager size or higher growth potential would have higher demand for outside resources, and then result in a busier independent board. When independent directors of firms become busier, market would have negative reaction. If the higher busyness is caused by firms’ demand of director reputational capital, the SCAR would be even worse; however, if it is cause by the nature of firm’s outside resource demand level, the SCAR would be higher.
中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 v
1 緒論 1
2 文獻回顧與假說 4
2.1 外部董事忙碌與其影響 4
2.2 董事專業假說 6
2.3 企業資源需求假說 7
2.4 市場認同假說 9
3 資料、變數與模型 10
3.1 資料來源與篩選 10
3.2 變數設定 11
3.3 模型建立 18
4 實證結果 19
4.1 台灣上市公司之獨立董事專業程度與公司特性 19
4.2 公司獨立董事忙碌成因—由公司董事專業比例與外部資源需求探討 23
4.3 股票市場對獨立董事忙碌程度提高的反應 27
4.4 市場是否認同公司獨立董事忙碌程度提高的理由? 28
4.5穩健性檢定 32
5 結論與建議 37
參考文獻 40
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