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研究生:汪秩仁
研究生(外文):Chih-jen Wang
論文名稱:廣告與通路結構關係之探討
論文名稱(外文):Advertising and Channel Structures
指導教授:吳基逞吳基逞引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chi-cheng Wu
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:92
中文關鍵詞:賽局理論產品替代性通路結構資訊性廣告說服性廣告
外文關鍵詞:game theoryproduct substitutabilitychannel structurepersuasive advertisinginformative advertising
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廣告效應從1920年代開始至今就一直是研究的重要議題。例如在經濟領域、行銷領域上。經濟領域研究的焦點集中在對社會福利、消費者福利的影響;而行銷領域研究的焦點則集中在對消費者行為的影響、廠商間競爭性互動的影響。這些研究都集中在整合行銷通路的情境下來探討,然而只有到近幾年才有學者開始討論共同零售商通路的情境。在實務上,間接通路是極為普遍的,而在不同的通路結構中,由於零售商獨立的存在與所處特定的競爭情境,而使得廣告與通路結構間存在著互動的可能影響,因此本研究利用賽局理論進一步地探討通路結構與廣告這兩種策略性決策間值得進一步探討的三個議題。
第一個議題探討廣告在不同通路結構中的策略性角色差異。本文主張廣告策略角色的使用受到通路結構相當大的影響。明確地說,本文闡述,相較於其他兩種通路結構,當製造商將銷售責任委與專屬的零售商時,製造商有更高的機率會藉由資訊性廣告的促成競爭本質來獲取更大的利潤。相反的,相較於專屬零售商通路,當製造商採取整合通路或共同零售商通路時,說服性廣告會被更廣泛地使用。本文可以提供一個理論基礎,從製造商與零售商間因廣告而產生的策略性互動中,從製造商的觀點來說明,這兩種廣告策略如何在不同的通路結構中成為廠商最適的選擇。因此而能提供製造商一個操作準則,用以決定在不同的通路情境中該如何運用廣告的策略性角色。
第二個議題探討直接與間接通路的選擇問題。本文主張專屬零售商通路結構所提供的價格競爭緩衝機制,會在兩種情況下,即使是兩者的產品差異性很低,也會顯得微不足道,而使得整合的直接通路變得較為有利。第一種情況為,製造商擁有足夠多的忠誠顧客,雖然採用整合通路會因面對面的直接競爭而使價格下降,但這樣的低價反而能吸引足夠多的忠誠者購買。第二種情況為,即使忠誠顧客不夠多,但若考慮可能的廣告競爭,製造商仍然會傾向選擇整合通路,而比較不在意價格競爭的問題。此乃因採用間接通路會迫使製造商陷入廣告的囚犯困境,而虛擲更多的廣告花費。
第三個議題探討說服性廣告在共同零售商通路結構中所產生的利益衝突問題。現行的行銷文獻認為說服性廣告往往會激起競爭對手的報復行動(投入更多的廣告),或者激起共同零售商採取反制的做法(消極上推介沒有廣告的品牌,積極上引進私有品牌)。然而最近亦有實證研究發現,大多數並不會激起這些行動。其中一種可能是反制並不見得更為有利,但本文提出另一種可能是,也許策略性地使用說服性廣告除了自己可以獲利外,並不見得會傷害通路中的其他成員。本文將說服性廣告效果模型化為兩種效果,一方面廣告可以使消費者更喜歡自己的品牌(絕對效果);另一方面,也會使競爭品牌更難取代(相對效果)。藉此,本文顯示只要製造商能策略性地選擇廣告要影響的對象,那麼通路衝突是可以避免的。相較於現今的文獻,本文的廣告策略乍看之下似乎會傷害其他成員,但卻可藉由聰明地選擇廣告目標閱聽眾,而可以使所有的通路成員,廣告的製造商自己、競爭對手、及共同零售商均獲益,以達柏拉圖改進,避免激起其它成員反制。
Due to the important role of advertising in marketing practice, its effects have been the research focus since 1920. Among relevant research fields, the issue that has been paid close attention in the economic field is its impact on consumer welfare. Issues focused in the marketing field are its impacts on consumer perception, feelings, attitudes, behaviors, and competitive interaction among firms. However, in these two fields the integrated channel is the focused scenario where the advertising works in vast majority of literatures. Only very few of them investigate effects of advertising in other channel structure context. However, in practice indirect channels are very common. There may be interactions between advertising and channel structure due to the existence of the independent retailer and the specific degree of competition. Since advertising is an important strategic instrument, it deserves to pay more efforts to relate the advertising and channel structure. This dissertation use game-theoretical approach to target three issues relating the advertising and channel structure.
The first issue focuses on discussing the differential of choices between informative and persuasive advertising across three channel structure contexts for two competing manufacturers. This dissertation argues that the use of advertising strategy crucially depends on the channel structure. Specifically, it shows that when manufacturers delegate the sales responsibility to dedicated retailers, informative advertising may yield a higher profit for the manufacturers due to its pro-competitive nature. On the contrary, persuasive advertising should be used more extensively when either the manufacturers sell directly to the end consumers or sell through a common retailer. This therefore provides a theoretical foundation for why both advertising strategies can emerge as optimal responses from the manufacturers'' viewpoints and subsequently provides handy guidelines for when these advertising strategies should be used in various scenarios.
The second issue is about the choice between direct and indirect channels. The introduction of independent retailers has long been recognized as a buffer that alleviates the price competition between channels. If the sales responsibility is delegated to the retailers, the retail prices are driven upwards, thereby allowing the manufacturers to avoid the head-to-head competition. In this dissertation, we argue that this effect may be counter-balanced if the manufacturers are privileged with sufficiently large loyal segments. It shows that, selling directly to the consumers (through the direct channel) may be more beneficial for the manufacturers than delegation with the presence of competition, because the low prices due to the intense competition may help the manufacturers to extract more revenue from loyal consumers. Furthermore, if the manufacturers compete along dimensions that differ from prices, they may be further in favor of the direct channel and less concerned about price competition. In particular, this dissertation shows that if the manufacturers also compete on their advertising strategies, delegating to the retailers may force them to invest on the wasteful advertising, which could be prevented had the manufacturers sold the products themselves.
The third issue discusses the combativeness of the persuasive advertising in the common retailer channel. The existing marketing literature suggests that persuasive advertising elicits counteractions from competing manufacturers and consequently leads to wasteful cancellation of the advertising effects. However, recent empirical studies document a surprisingly negative result against this conventional wisdom. To provide a theoretical ground for this empirical puzzle, we propose a novel way to model the advertising effect on the consumers'' preference that incorporates two critical driving forces: on one hand, advertising shifts the consumers'' preferences towards the advertised product (the "absolute effect"); on the other hand, it also makes the rival product a less desirable substitute from the consumers'' viewpoints (the "relative effect"). Through our alternative interpretation of persuasive advertising, we show that channel conflict can be alleviated if a manufacturer adopts persuasive advertising that wisely "targets" appropriate consumers. In stark contrast with the established work, this advertising strategy may give rise to profit increases for every channel member, including the rival manufacturer and the retailer that were previously believed to always counteract/ resist to such persuasive advertising. We further identify the detailed operating regimes within which such a manufacturer-initiated persuasive advertising strategy is no more harmful for other channel members.
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction........................................................................................1
Chapter 2 Strategic Roles of Advertising in Distribution Channels...................4
2.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................................4
2.2 The Model...........................................................................................................................8
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis........................................................................................................11
2.3.1 Advertising Equilibrium under Each Channel Structure………...............................11
2.3.2 Advertising Strategies and Channel Structure...........................................................16
2.3.3 Discussions……………………….........................21
2.4 Concluding Remarks.........................................................................................................21
Appendix…………………………………………………….............22
Chapter 3 Channel Structures, Brand Loyalty, and Advertising......................32
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................32
3.2 The Model.........................................................................................................................36
3.3 The Impact of Loyal Segments.........................................................................................39
3.4 Advertising Competition……….......................................................................................41
3.4.1 Direct Channel…………………...............................................................................42
3.4.2 Indirect Channel.........................................................................................................44
3.4.3 Channel Comparison………….. ...............................................................................45
3.5. Discussions and Conclusions………...............................................................................47
Appendix.................................................................................................................................48
Chapter 4 Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel?..........................................................................................58

4.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................58
4.2 The Model.........................................................................................................................62
4.3 The Impact of Persuasive Advertising..............................................................................64
4.3.1 All Consumers Are Exposed......................................................................................65
4.3.2 Only Consumers with Moderate/Weak Preferences Are Exposed............................66
4.3.3 Only Consumers with Strong Preferences Are Exposed...........................................69
4.4 Discussions and Concluding Remarks………………………...........................70
Appendix……………………………………………………................................71
Chapter 5 Conclusions………………………...........................80
References………………………………............................82
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