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研究生:高啟益
研究生(外文):Kao, Chi-Yi
論文名稱:一個基於加強ReturnAddressStack安全性之改進
論文名稱(外文):An Enhancement of Return Address Stack for Security
指導教授:孫宏民
指導教授(外文):Sun, Hung-Ming
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立清華大學
系所名稱:資訊系統與應用研究所
學門:電算機學門
學類:系統設計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:堆疊覆寫攻擊記憶體指標損毀攻擊返回位址堆疊執行檔改寫安全
外文關鍵詞:Stack Smashing AttackMemory Pointer Corruption AttackReturn Address StackBinary RewritingSecurity
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Stack smashing is still one of the most popular techniques for hijacking program controls. A return address of a program is the best-known target, and its previous frame pointer is the second best. Various techniques have been proposed to defeat stack smashing attacks, but most techniques need to alter compilers or require hardware support, and only few of them are developed for Windows. We discover there is a potential security risk in those schemes which dynamically allocate a return address stack to backup return addresses against stack smashing attacks. We are able to hijack the program control from applications that are protected by them via manipulating Memory Pointer Corruption Attack because they only pay attention to protect the return address stack and all neglect to protect Entry Pointer of the return address stack. In this thesis, we design a Secure Return Address Stack to protect both of them from stack smashing attacks on Windows. Moreover, we also extend our approach to instrument a DLL, a multi-thread application, and DLLs used by multi-thread applications. In contrast to previous researches, our approach properly instruments DLLs. Finally, benchmark GnuWin32 shows that the relative performance overhead of our approach is only between 3.47% and 8.59%.
Stack Smashing依然是攔截程式控制權最常用的方法之一。return address是一個程式裡最常被攻擊的目標,而previous frame pointer僅次於它。已經有許多的防禦機制被提出來抵擋Stack Smashing Attack,但是大部份都須要修改compiler或硬體支援,而且只有少數是發展在Windows上。我們發現了一個潛在的安全性問題針對於那些使用動態配置Return Address Stack來抵抗Stack Smashing Attack的方法。我們能夠攔截受這些方法保護程式的程式控制權經由操作Memory Pointer Corruption Attack,因為這些方法只注意到要保護Return Address Stack而完全忽略Return Address Stack的Entry Pointer也是須要保護的。在這篇論文裡,我們將設計一種Secure Return Address Stack來保護上述二者以防禦Stack Smashing Attack在Windows上。此外,我們還延伸我們的方法去處理一個DLL、一個multi-thread程式、多個DLL被應用於multi-thread程式。相較於先前的研究,我們的方法更完善的處理DLL問題。最後,benchmark GnuWin32顯示我們的方法只有增加3.47%到8.59%的performance overhead而已。
Table of Contents..........................................I
List of Figures..........................................III
List of Tables............................................IV
Chapter 1 Introduction.....................................1
1.1 Outline................................................1
1.2 Background.............................................4
1.3 Memory Pointer Corruption Attack.......................5
1.4 Bypass StackShield by Memory Pointer Corruption Attack.8
1.5 Organization..........................................12
Chapter 2 Approach........................................13
2.1 Overview..............................................13
2.2 Secure Return Address Stack...........................16
2.3 Instrumentation Process...............................17
2.4 Binary Disassembly and Function Analysis..............19
2.5 DLL Injection and Dynamic Binary Rewriting............20
2.5.1 DLL Injection.......................................20
2.5.2 Return Address Stack Initialization.................20
2.5.3 Dynamic Binary Rewriting............................21
2.6 Instrumenting DLLs and Multi-threading Applications...21
2.6.1 Instrumenting a DLL.................................22
2.6.2 Instrumenting a Multi-threading Application.........23
2.6.3 Instrumenting DLLs used by Multi-threading Applications..............................................25
Chapter 3 Experiment and Analysis.........................26
3.1 Micro-Benchmark.......................................27
3.2 Macro-Benchmark.......................................27
Chapter 4 Discussion......................................33
4.1 The setjmp() and longjmp() Problem....................33
4.2 The Optimization Problem..............................34
4.3 The Synchronization Problem...........................34
Chapter 5 Related Work....................................36
5.1 Static Analysis.......................................36
5.2 C Library Patches.....................................37
5.3 Kernel Patches........................................37
5.4 Compiler-Based........................................38
5.5 Hardware-Support......................................39
5.6 Binary Rewriting......................................40
5.7 Summary...............................................41
Chapter 6 Conclusion......................................42
Bibliography..............................................50
Appendix..................................................50
Chapter A Unsafe Functions in the Standard C Library......51
Chapter B Windows APIs....................................52
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