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研究生(外文):Sheau-jung Lu
論文名稱(外文):A Comparison Study on Military and Enterprise Decision Making ProcessExemplified by the Israeli Strategic Decision over its 2006 Conflict with Lebanon
指導教授(外文):Chung-Hsing Huang
外文關鍵詞:decision-makingdecision-making processmilitary decision-making process
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A Comparison Study on Military and Enterprise Decision Making Process
Exemplified by the Israeli Strategic Decision over its 2006 Conflict with Lebanon
A proper decision is better able to provide more ideal results and the ability to reach expected objectives, while an improper or wrong decision tends to lead to the loss of money, reputation, and effectiveness. In the worst case, it can potentially result in the loss of life, or threaten the survival of an organization or a nation. Therefore, when making important decisions, the decision-maker must understand how to make wise decisions.
From the viewpoint of management science, the decision-making process influences the quality of decisions. Thus, in order to effectively craft superior decisions, decision-makers need to thoroughly understand and flexibly apply the decision-making process.
This author has previously received various levels of training related to the military decision-making process (MDMP) and had the opportunity to learn the knowledge of the enterprise decision-making process (EDMP). It is the belief of this author that there are degrees of similarity between the two, although both retain their distinctive characteristics. This author has contemplated several questions; including what specifically are their differences, which is superior, and can they complement one another? This study has therefore been undertaken with the purpose of systematically examining the similarities and differences between these two decision-making processes, and attempting to find how to compensate for potential shortcomings of one with the strength of the other, and enhancing their mutual impact.
Using the 2006 Israel-Lebanon (Hezbollah) conflict as an example, this study applies the MDMP and the EDMP to simulate Israel’s decision-making. The results obtained saw both similar and dissimilar alternatives and strategic concepts. The outcome obtained by the MDMP analysis was “give Hezbollah a short, but painful and strong punishment, in order to rescue the captured soldiers.” On the other hand, the analysis by EDMP resulted in a recommendation of “rescue the captured soldiers through negotiation first, and punish Hezbollah later.” The main reason for the differing outcomes is the alternatives presented by MDMP analysis are limited by the objective (pulverize the enemy) announced by the prime minister, and hence lacks flexibility. EDMP however begins by first considering the problem from a higher level (war or peace), allowing for relatively more freedom. However, both analyses led to a suggestion to “take limited military action towards a focused objective.”
A comparison with the recent Gaza conflict (Operation Cast Lead, OCL) during the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 found that the strategy employed in that operation of OCL matches extremely closely to that arrived at through analysis by the above-mentioned MDMP. From the outcome of the conflict, it can be said that through OCL Israel achieved its goal of striking a highly damaging blow to Hamas, and wiping away the humiliation of the 2006 failure in Lebanon. It also provides solid proof that a logical decision-making process leads to a more feasible course of action.
Finally, the study compares these two processes from several different perspectives and finds that each has its own strengths, advantages, and limitations. Through the application of the compensating and corollary factors of both theory and technique, the study provides some practical suggestions for each discipline to upgrade the thoroughness and flexibility of the decision-making process, thereby enhancing both the technique and capability of decisions. The suggestions are the followings:
1. For the MDMP:
High level decision-making should add “identify problems” before “mission analysis,” understand the “center of gravity” and “desired outcome,” utilize the mechanism of “innovative thinking,” shape the culture of “constructive debate,” improve the methods of “COAs comparison,” and prevent the “limitations of rigid regulations.”
2. For the EDMP:
Properly set more concrete rules and methodologies, control the risks in the early stages, strengthen planning directions, collect information for decision-making, apply the functions of “war gaming,” “rehearsal,” and conduct “decision-making training.”
感 謝 iii
摘要 iv
Abstract vi
第一章 緒 論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究動機 1
1.3 研究目的 2
1.4 研究範圍與流程 3
第二章 文獻探討 5
2.1 軍事決策程序相關理論探討 5
2.1.1 軍事決策程序 5
2.1.2 軍事決策程序內涵(要領) 5
2.1.3 改良之軍事決策程序 23
2.1.4 與軍事決策程序有關程序簡介 24
2.2 企業決策程序相關理論探討 27
2.2.1 企業決策程序 27
2.2.2 企業決策程序內涵(要領) 28
第三章 研究個案描述 34
3.1 以阿世仇 34
3.1.1 古代歷史 34
3.1.2 近代歷史 36
3.2 以巴宿怨 39
3.2.1 巴解成立 40
3.2.2 以巴戰爭 40
3.2.3 以巴和談 40
3.3 以黎糾葛 41
3.4 真主黨竄起 41
3.4.1 成立 41
3.4.2 抗以反美 42
3.4.3 逐漸坐大 42
3.5 剽悍以色列 46
3.5.1 地理 46
3.5.2 人口及宗教 47
3.5.3 政治 47
3.5.4 經濟 47
3.5.5 軍事 47
3.6 UN 立場 48
3.7 2006年以黎(真主黨)衝突 49
3.7.1 衝突開始 49
3.7.2 作戰兵力 49
3.7.3 作戰概要 49
3.7.4 傷亡戰損 51
第四章 研究個案分析 53
4.1 以軍事決策程序觀點分析 53
4.1.1 第一階段 任務分析 53
4.1.2 第二階段 發展行動方案 58
4.1.3 第三階段 評估及選定行動方案 60
4.1.4 第四階段 產製計畫、預演、執行及評估 63
4.2 以企業決策程序觀點分析以黎衝突 63
4.2.1 第一階段 確認問題及定義目標 64
4.2.2 第二階段 發展方案 67
4.2.3 第三階段 評估及選定方案 68
4.2.4 第四階段 執行方案及後續處置 70
4.3 綜合評論以黎衝突 70
4.3.1 以色列決策實況 70
4.3.2 軍事與企業決策交叉分析 71
4.3.3 從決策程序評論 73
4.3.4 從戰爭結果評論 74
4.3.5 從戰後回饋機制評論 76
4.4 鑄鉛作戰策略驗證 76
4.4.1 背景簡介 76
4.4.2 作戰階段 80
4.4.3 作戰結果 81
4.4.4 決策剖析 82
4.4.5 綜合評述 86
第五章 結論與建議 90
5.1 軍事及企業決策程序比較 90
5.1.1 決策問題差異 90
5.1.2 程序步驟差異 92
5.1.3 規則方法差異 96
5.1.4 決策組織(人員角色)差異 97
5.2 研究發現運用建議 97
5.2.1 對軍事決策程序之建議 97
5.2.2 對企業決策程序之建議 104
5.2.3 綜合建議 106
參考書目 109

表2-1 軍事決策程序 5
表2-2 軍事決策風險管理步驟 7
表2-3 作戰任務兵力需求比例 8
表2-4 同步矩陣法範例 14
表2-5 數字決策矩陣 16
表2-6 主觀分析決策矩陣 17
表2-7 概括分類決策矩陣 17
表2-8 各版MDMP使用時間 24
表2-9 美軍及國軍部隊指揮程序 25
表2-10 企業決策程序內容比較表 27
表3-1 以阿古代歷史大事紀要 36
表3-2 真主黨火箭 45
表3-3 參戰團體傷亡 52
表4-1 以軍決策矩陣 62
表4-2 以色列內閣方案比較 70
表4-3 鑄鉛作戰傷亡 81
表4-4 鑄鉛作戰決策內涵比較 86
表5-1 企業與軍事決策程序比較 92

圖1-1 流程與章節安排 3
圖1-2 研究架構 4
圖2-1 受領任務後之作業 6
圖2-2 行動方案要圖範例 9
圖2-3 帶狀兵推法 12
圖2-4 接近路線縱深兵推法 13
圖2-5 塊狀兵推法 13
圖2-6 方案比較 15
圖2-7 預演方式 19
圖2-8 指管架構 20
圖2-9 聯合特遣部隊 (JTF) 幕僚組織 21
圖2-10 指管系統架構 22
圖2-11 指管系統功能 22
圖2-12 指參作業程序 25
圖3-1 巴勒斯坦位置 34
圖3-2 巴勒斯坦簡史 35
圖3-3 Sykes-Picot 協議 37
圖3-4 英國託管範圍 37
圖3-5 UN分割建議 38
圖3-6 綠線邊界 38
圖3-7 以色列1967年迄今佔領區 39
圖3-8 黎巴嫩地形圖 41
圖3-9 真主黨組織圖 43
圖3-10 真主黨勢力地區 43
圖3-11 薩巴農場及UNIFIL 44
圖3-12 火箭射程示意 45
圖3-13 以色列領土 46
圖3-14 以色列衛星照片 46
圖3-15 以色列地形 46
圖3-16 真主黨火箭攻擊以色列地區 51
圖3-17 以色列火力轟擊地區 51
圖3-18 以軍黎南攻勢戰鬥地區 51
圖4-1 第一行動方案 58
圖4-2 第二行動方案 59
圖4-3 迦薩地形 77
圖4-4 安全地帶圍�� 78
圖4-5 安全地帶檢查哨 78
圖4-6 檢查哨管制進出 78
圖4-7 安全地帶擴張 78
圖4-8 鑄鉛作戰階段 80
圖4-9 巴勒斯坦民眾觀戰 84
圖4-10檢查哨大排長龍 87
圖4-11車輛無奈等待檢查 87
圖4-12粗暴安檢(1) 87
圖4-13粗暴安檢(2) 87
圖4-14受盡屈辱 87
圖4-15抗議衝突 87
圖4-16喪親之痛 88
圖5-1 決策程序循環 94
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Wade N. (2005). The Battle Staff Smartbook, 2nd. Lakeland, Florida: The Lightning Press.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007). Alternatives Analysis Policy Guide, 2nd. Washington, DC: Department of the Treasury.

軍事準則(Field Manual)
FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Symbols, February 2003. Washington, DC: Headquar-ters, Department of the Army.
FM 100-14 Risk Management, April 1998. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
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FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production, January 2005. Washington, DC: Head-quarters, Department of the Army.
FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, August 2003. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.
TC 25-20 A Leader''s Guide to After-Action Reviews, September, 1993. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Box Technique (Globalsecurity, www.globalsecurity. org/ mili-tary/library/report/call_93-3_ch4)
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Decision Matrix (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_Matrix)。
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