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研究生:周國偉
研究生(外文):Kuo-Wei Chou
論文名稱:形象及認定對貨幣政策之三個相關議題:貨幣外觀、權衡性通貨膨脹、及匯率制度變革的探討
論文名稱(外文):Three Issues of Monetary Policy on Image and Identity: the Appearance of Currency, Discretionary Inflation, and Exchange Rate Regime Collapsed
指導教授:曹添旺曹添旺引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tien-Wang Tsaur
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:92
中文關鍵詞:形象認定通貨替代時間不一致權衡性通貨膨脹第二代模型
外文關鍵詞:imageidentitycurrency substitutiontime inconsistencydiscretionary inflationsecond generation model
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本文嘗試運用社會學與心理學之形象及認定的概念,據以探討總體經濟及國際金融理論中,廣受矚目之通貨替代、通貨膨脹、及通貨危機等三項議題。認定代表體系成員的類別,不同的類別皆有其特定的行為準則及規範。形象是指體系成員對彼此的觀感與印象,使體系成員在互動的過程中,影響彼此的效用,進而左右決策的制訂。在第二章中,首先延伸通貨替代的議題,結合Akerlof and Kranton(2000)對自我形象(或認定)之效用函數分析方法與Chen and Tsaur(1983)之貨幣具有流動性勞務的理論架構,建構一貨幣外觀象徵著不同政黨屬性的通貨替代模型。於分析的過程中,我們發現:
(1) 貨幣的使用除了原先交易媒介的功能外,亦可作為民眾表達政治傾向的工具;人們可以依據不同場合使用不同貨幣,藉以獲得互動下的形象利得,提升整體社會之效用水準。
(2) 若當社會面臨通貨膨脹的壓力,則此一構想相較於原先單一貨幣的發行,有助於引發超額貨幣需求,達到減緩物價上揚的效果。
在第三章中,我們首先清楚描繪政府形象之定義。執政者若以貨幣政策作為因應經濟議題的工具,則政策的制定一方面受到執政者本身對經濟議題的偏好(認定)左右;另一方面,政策後果是否影響政府在民眾的聲望(形象),也應有部分關聯。因此,分析上假定執政者的貨幣政策若侵蝕到民眾的實質購買力,將對政府形象有負面的效果,某種程度地帶給執政者主觀上的效用損失。於研討的過程中,我們發現:
(1) 執政者的形象動機,能降低使用擴張性貨幣政策的誘因。而民眾在與政府互動的過程中(對政策之預期),會事先體察執政者的這項動機,故不會有太高的預期物價,改善權衡性貨幣政策的均衡結果。
(2) 執政者注重政府形象,即關心民眾的觀感;換句話說,亦可描述為關注民情或民意的程度。本章的推導或可延伸為:較以民情導向的政府,往往會有較佳的經濟表現;或許能解釋在民主政治之下,比較不會有惡性通貨膨脹的現象發生。
第四章承襲第三章的理論模型,更進一步將執政者政策的制定,延伸至小型開放經濟體系下,匯率制度之抉擇與匯率危機等問題上。所得結論可整理為:
(1) 經濟成員對於政府決策行為的悲觀預期,是匯率危機發生的關鍵因素;一個關心形象的執政者,將能減少民眾投機性炒作的誘因,故能降低匯率危機發生的可能性。
(2) 當前經濟體質的好壞與民眾的預期息息相關,民眾根據執政者的所作所為來猜測經濟的未來走向。執政者希望維持良好形象的動機,能降低民眾對匯率的悲觀預期,因而改善當前之經濟體質,減輕通貨危機的威脅。反之,執政者輕率的決策行為(不顧形象),將是助長危機的關鍵因素。
口試委員會審定書………………………………………………….……i
誌謝............................................................................................................ii
中文摘要………………………………………………………………...iii
英文摘要…………………………………………………………………v
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………1
第二章 自我形象、貨幣外觀、及通貨替代……………………………4
第一節 緒言……………………………………………………….4
第二節 通貨替代模型…………………………………………….8
第三節 政黨認定與通貨替代…………………………………...11
第四節 社會互動、政黨認定、與貨幣需求……………………...15
第五節 小結…………………………………………………...…23
第二章 注釋……………………………………………………...26
第三章 政府形象、權衡政策、與通貨膨脹之傾向…………………31
第一節 緒言……………………………………………………...31
第二節 模型建構………………………………………………...36
第三節 政府形象與通貨膨脹之傾向…………………………...39
第四節 小結……………………………………………………...48
第三章 附錄……………………………………………………...50
第三章 注釋……………………………………………………...52
第四章 政府形象、匯率制度的變革、與匯率危機………………..55
第一節 緒言……………………………………………………...55
第二節 匯率危機模型…………………………………………...59
第三節 政府形象與匯率危機…………………………………...62
第四節 小結……………………………………………………...77
第四章 附錄……………………………………………………...79
第四章 注釋……………………………………………………...83
第五章 總結…………………………………………………………..86
參考文獻………………………………………………………………..88
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