臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文旨在分析「樂觀的預期」會如何影響交易時間的延遲。此篇模型
是先固定交易物品的耐久性，再在這段物品使用期限內，將時間細分
為許多期。擁有這個耐久財可以享受其所提供的服務，在每一期都得
到相同效用。買賣雙方對於未來他是否能出價，各自有一個主觀上的
認定。我們證明在某些情況之下，延遲交易的時間是顯著的。

This paper analyze the role of optimism in bargaining delay as
Yildiz(2003) did. Given the life time of the durable goods, owner can obtain the same value every period. Each player may hold his subjective belief about being recognized in the future. We find possibility that delay is significant when bargaining periods grows into infinite.

1 Introduction 2
2 Model 3
3 Equilibrium 5
4 Efficiency 9
5 Conclusion 12
6 Appendix A 12
7 Appendix B 14
8 Reference 15

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