臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文建立一個三國兩財貨模型，並引用重複賽局的分析方式，討論近來關於貿易自由化與仿冒查緝備受矚目之的國際協議。過去的文獻指出，若開發中國家進行仿冒查緝，將使受保護的外國廠商獲益而卻帶來自身福利損失。因此，已開發國家必須藉由給予開發中國家非關智慧財產權的條件，方能使開發中國家有意願與其簽訂協議，進行仿冒查緝以保護智慧財產權。雖然協議需要在雙方均遵守之下才能成立，但本文發現，當擁有專利權之廠商的單位生產成本高於從事仿冒之廠商的單位生產成本時，此協議是否能成立並繼續維持，將完全取決於國家2政府之合作意願。另一方面，本文考慮擁有專利權之廠商生產的正版品，與從事仿冒之廠商生產的仿冒品之間存在產品差異的情況。當正版品與仿冒品之間的差異性不大時，協議是否能成立並由雙方維持，仍須取決於國家2政府之合作意願。然而，當正版品與仿冒品之間的差異性相對大時，此時協議是否能成立並維持，將取決於國家1政府之合作意願。

Using a repeated game approach, this dissertation constructs a three-country trade model to analyze a bilateral trade agreement in which a developed country proposes an improved market access to a developing country if the developing country agrees to reinforce the protection of intellectual property rights against the third-country’s imitation. It is shown that whether such a trade agreement will be sustained or not depends on the developing country’s intention to cooperate. This study also considers a scenario where there exists product differentiation between the patent goods and counterfeit goods. It is found that if the product is not differentiated too much, whether the agreement will be sustained still depends on the intention of the developing country. On the other hand, if there exists too much product differentiation, whether an agreement will be sustained depends on the developed country’s intention to cooperate.

感謝辭 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
目錄 IV
圖目錄 V
表目錄 VI
第1章 前言 1
第2章 包含自由貿易與仿冒查緝內容之國際協議 6
第2.1節 國家1與國家2在不同策略組合下的福利水準 9
第2.2節 國家1與國家2維持協議之分析 16
第3章 具產品差異性下包含自由貿易與仿冒查緝內容之國際協議 24
第3.1節 國家1與國家2在不同策略組合下的福利水準 25
第3.2節 國家1與國家2維持協議之分析 33
第4章 結論 41
參考文獻 43

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