跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(3.236.124.56) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/07/31 06:12
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

: 
twitterline
研究生:陳孔麒
研究生(外文):Kung-Chi Chen
論文名稱:私募股權之折價與宣告效果
論文名稱(外文):Discount and Announcement of Private Equity
指導教授:紀麗秋紀麗秋引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立虎尾科技大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:57
中文關鍵詞:私募折價宣告效果應募人股權集中程度銀行往來關係
外文關鍵詞:private equitydiscountannouncementparticipating investorsownership concentrationbanking relationships
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:357
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
過去研究私募股權的文獻在應募人特性部份,僅利用二分法將應募人區分為內部人或外部人,本研究有鑑於此分類未能考慮內部人與外部人同時參與之情況,故將應募人特性區分成三類,並以之探討私募之折價幅度與宣告效果。再者,過去探討股權集中程度與折價幅度或宣告效果之關聯的文獻,並未考量應募人之特性,因此,本研究變數中納入應募人特性,探討股權集中程度對折價幅度與宣告效果之關聯。
大部份的私募公司皆與銀行保持著某種程度的往來關係,且銀行在蒐集私有資訊方面具有比較優勢,然而,目前卻未有文獻探討銀行往來關係與私募之折價幅度或宣告效果間的關聯性,因此,本研究也探討私募公司與銀行往來關係間的強度是否影響私募之折價幅度與宣告效果。最後,本研究認為若私募公司可藉由私募的宣告傳遞出有利於公司價值的正面訊息,應有助於提升私募公司與銀行間之往來關係,反之,若傳遞一負面訊息,則會降低私募公司與銀行間之往來關係。因此,本研究亦探討私募之宣告資訊對於其銀行往來關係之影響,以判斷私募資訊如何影響銀行往來關係。
實證結果指出,受到私募公司之協商成本與資訊揭露成本之影響,只有內部應募人參與之折價幅度大於只有外部應募人時之折價幅度,而同時有內部應募人與外部應募人同時參與之私募,其折價幅度最大,且應募人數愈多愈具有擴大折價幅度之效果。再者,有積極應募人參與或應募人數愈多的私募,對私募之宣告效果愈具有正向的影響。
另外,本研究發現股權集中程度會由於僅有內部應募人或僅有外部應募人的參與,而對折價幅度產生不同的影響。當僅內部應募人參與時,董監事的持股率與折價幅度呈顯著正相關,但當僅外部應募人參與時,董監事的持股率與折價幅度則呈顯著負相關。再者,經理人的持股則具有縮小折價幅度的抑制效果,實證發現在僅外部人參與時,經理人的持股有提升監督的效果,與宣告效果呈顯著正相關;但在僅內部人參與時,經理人的持股則對私募公司有保護的效果,與宣告效果呈顯著負相關。至於董監事的持股則與宣告效果呈顯著負相關,董監事持股愈大,愈會降低私募的宣告效果,且此關聯不會受到應募人特性之影響。
實證證實銀行往來關係的強度與折價幅度間呈顯著負相關,換言之,與銀行往來關係愈好的私募公司,其折價幅度會愈小。至於銀行往來關係的強度與宣告效果之間,研究發現與應募人之動機有關,積極性私募之銀行往來關係呈顯著負相關,而消極性私募之銀行往來關係呈顯著正相關。最後,本研究發現私募之宣告資訊,僅折價幅度會影響銀行往來關係,因愈小的折價幅度代表著一正面訊息,更有助於提升銀行往來關係。
Past studies on the characteristics of participating investors for private equity only used
dichotomy to divide them into internal parties or external parties. As this classification fails to
consider the situation whereby both internal and external parties both participate, this paper
first divides participating investors into three types, and then examines the relationships
between the characteristics of participating investors and the discount percentages and
announcement effects of private equity. Meanwhile, past literature addressing the correlation
between ownership concentration and discount percentages or the correlation between equity
ownership concentration levels and announcement effects does not consider the
characteristics of participating investors. Therefore, this paper incorporates the characteristics
of participating investors as a research variable to explore the correlation between ownership
concentration and discount percentages as well as the correlation between ownership
concentration and announcement effects.
Most private equity firms maintain certain relationships with banks. Also, banks have
comparative advantages in collecting private information. However, there is no literature
discussing the correlation between banking relationships with discount percentages or the
correlation between banking relationships with announcement effects. Therefore, this paper
also explores whether the intensity of banking relationships for private equity firms has
influence on discount percentages and announcement effects. It is suggested that if private
equity firms can deliver positive signals beneficial to company values with announcements, it
should help to improve their relationships with banks. On the contrary, if a negative signal is
delivered, it detriments their relationships with banks. Therefore, this paper investigates the
influence of the announcement information of private equity firms on their banking
relationship in order to determine the influence of private placements on banking
relationships.
The empirical result indicates that due to the effects of renegotiation costs and
information disclosure costs of private equity firms, the discount percentage when there are
only internal participating investors is greater than the discount percentage when there are
only external participating investors. Meanwhile, the discount percentage is the greatest when
there are both internal and external participating investors at the same time. Also, with more
participating investors, the discount percentage is greater. With more participating investors or
active participating investors, the announcement effect is greater.
Also, this study finds that the influence of the levels of ownership concentration on
discount percentages is different for the situation where the participation is only limited to
internal participating investors or limited to external participating investors. When the
participation is limited only to internal participating investors, there is a significantly positive
correlation between the percentage of holdings by directors and supervisors and discount
percentages. However, when the participation is limited only to external participating
investors, there is a significantly negative correlation between the percentage of holdings by
directors and supervisors and discount percentages. Meanwhile, the percentage of holdings by
managers shows the effects of narrowing the discount percentage. The empirical finding
indicates that when the participation is limited only to external participating investors, the
percentage of holdings by managers can improve monitoring and demonstrates a positive
correlation with announcement effects. When the participation is only limited to internal
participating investors, the percentage of holdings by managers serves to protect the private
equity firms and reports a significantly negative correlation with announcement effects. There
is a significantly negative correlation between the percentage of holdings by directors and
supervisors and announcement effects. With higher percentage of holdings by directors and
supervisors, the announcement effect is weaker. Also, this correlation is not affected by the
characteristics of participating investors.
The empirical result suggests that there is a significantly negative correlation between the intensity of banking relationships and discount percentages. In other words, the better
banking relationships private equity firms have, the smaller their discount percentages. As far
as the intensity of banking relationships and announcement effects, this paper finds that it is
related to the motives of participating investors. There is a significantly negative correlation
between active participating investors and banking relationships but a significantly positive
correlation between passive participating investors and banking relationships. Finally, this
paper finds that only discount percentages report any influence on banking relationships when
it comes to announcement information. A small discount is a positive signal and helps to boost
banking relationships.
摘要.............................................................................................................................................i
ABSTRACT..............................................................................................................................iii
誌謝...........................................................................................................................................vi
目錄.........................................................................................................................................vii
表目錄.......................................................................................................................................ix
壹、前言......................................................................................................................................1
1.1 研究背景與介紹..............................................................................................................1
1.2 研究動機與目的..............................................................................................................2
1.3 研究架構..........................................................................................................................6
貳、文獻探討與假說發展...........................................................................................................7
2.1 應募人特性與折價幅度..................................................................................................7
2.2 股權集中程度與折價幅度............................................................................................10
2.3 折價幅度與宣告效果....................................................................................................12
2.4 應募人特性與宣告效果................................................................................................13
2.5 股權集中程度與宣告效果............................................................................................15
2.6 銀行往來關係與折價幅度、宣告效果..........................................................................17
2.7 宣告資訊與銀行往來關係............................................................................................19
參、研究方法.............................................................................................................................22
3.1 資料來源與樣本選取....................................................................................................22
3.2 宣告效果的衡量............................................................................................................22
3.3 實證模型與變數............................................................................................................24
肆、實證結果.............................................................................................................................34
4.1 敘述性統計結果............................................................................................................34
4.1.1 折價幅度.................................................................................................................34
4.1.2 宣告效果.................................................................................................................36
4.1.3 銀行往來關係的強度.............................................................................................36
4.1.4 應募人數.................................................................................................................37
4.1.5 股權集中程度.........................................................................................................38
4.1.6 控制變數.................................................................................................................38
4.2 多元迴歸結果................................................................................................................40
4.2.1 應募人特性與折價幅度之關聯.............................................................................40
4.2.2 股權集中程度與折價幅度之關聯.........................................................................42
4.2.3 折價幅度與宣告效果之關聯.................................................................................44
4.2.4 應募人特性與宣告效果之關聯.............................................................................44
4.2.5 股權集中程度與宣告效果之關聯.........................................................................47
4.2.6 銀行往來關係與折價幅度之關聯.........................................................................49
4.2.7 銀行往來關係與宣告效果之關聯.........................................................................49
4.2.8 宣告資訊與銀行往來關係.....................................................................................51
伍、結論....................................................................................................................................53
參考文獻..................................................................................................................................55
表1 樣本選取..........................................................................................................................22
表2 研究變數..........................................................................................................................30
表3 研究模型..........................................................................................................................32
表4 敘述性統計結果..............................................................................................................35
表5 應募人特性對於折價幅度之多元迴歸結果..................................................................41
表6 股權集中程度對於折價幅度之多元迴歸結果..............................................................43
表7 折價幅度與應募人特性對於宣告效果之多元迴歸結果..............................................45
表8 股權集中程度對於宣告效果之多元迴歸結果..............................................................48
表9 銀行往來關係對於折價幅度與宣告效果之多元迴歸結果..........................................50
表10 宣告資訊對於銀行往來關係之多元迴歸結果............................................................52
Agarwal, R. and J. A. Elston, 2001, “Bank-firm relationships, financing and firm performance
in Germany,” Economics Letters 72, 225-232.
Barclay, M. J., C. G. Holderness, and D. P. Sheehan, 2007, “Private placements and
managerial entrenchment,” Journal of Corporate Finance 13, 461-484.
Bharath, S., S. Dahiya, A. Saunders, and A. Srinivasan, 2007, “So what do I get? The bank’s
view of lending relationships,” Journal of Financial Economic 85, 368-419.
Bhattacharya, S. and G. Chiesa, 1995, “Proprietary information, financial intermediation, and
research incentives,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 4, 328-357.
Bhattacharya, S. and A. Thakor, 1993, “Contemporary banking theory,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation 3, 2-50.
Boot, A. W. A., 2000, “Relationship banking: What do we know,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation 9, 7-25.
Boyd, J. H. and E. C. Prescott, 1986, “Financial intermediary-coalitions,” Journal of
Economic Theory 38, 211-232.
Brown, S. J. and J. B. Warner, 1980, “Measuring Security Price Performance,” Journal of
Financial Economics 8, 205-258.
Campbell, T. S., 1979, “Optimal investment financing decisions and the value of
confidentiality,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 14, 232-257.
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri, 1999, “A theory of the going-public decision,” Review of
Financial Studies 12, 249-279.
Diamond, D. W., 1984, “Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,” Review of
Economic Studies 51, 393-414.
Fama, E. F., 1985, “What’s different about banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics 15,
29-39.
Hertzel, M. and R. L. Smith, 1993, “Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing
equity privately,” The Journal of Finance 48, 459-485.
Hoshi, T., A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein, 1993, “The choice between public and private debt:
An analysis of post-deregulation corporate financing in Japan,” Working Paper,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
James, C., 1987, “Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans: A comparison of bank
borrowing, private placements, and public debt offerings,” Journal of Financial
Economics 19, 217-235.
Janney, J. J. and T. B. Folta, 2002, “Signaling through private equity placements and its
impact on the valuation of biotechnology firms,” Journal of Business Venturing 18,
361-380.
Janney, J. J. and T. B. Folta, 2005, “Moderating effects of investor experience on the
signaling value of private equity placements US biotechnology firms,” Journal of
Business Venturing 21, 27- 44.
Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback, 1983, “The market for corporate control: The scientific
evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 11, 5-50.
Kahn, C. and A. Winton, 1998, “Ownership structure, speculation and shareholder
information,” The Journal of Finance 53, 99-130.
Krishnamurthy, S., P. Spindt, V. Subramaniam, and T. Woidtke, 2004, “Does investor
identity matter in equity issues? Evidence from private placements,” Journal of
Financial Intermediation 14, 210-238.
Lins, K. V., 2002, “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets,” Working Paper,
University of Utah.
Lummer, S. L. and J. J. McConnell, 1989, “Further evidence on the bank lending process and
the capital market response to bank loan agreements,” Journal of Financial Economics
25, 99-122.
Ma, T., H. Y. Hsu, C. Y. Yeh, and K. W. Chang, 2006, “What determines the discount for
private equity offerings – Ownership or control rights?” Proceedings of 14th Conference
on the Theories and Practices of Securities and Financial Markets.
Nakamura, L. I., 1993, “Monitoring loan quality via checking accounting analysis,” Journal
of Retail Banking 14, 16-34.
Ruth, S. K. T., P. L. Chng, and Y. H. Tong, 2002, “Private placements and rights issues in
Singapore,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 10, 29-54.
Sharpe, S. A., 1990, “Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: A
stylized model of customer relationship,” Journal of Finance 45, 1069-87.
Slovin, M. B., M. E. Sushka, and J. A. Polonchek, 1993, “The value of bank durability:
Borrowers as bank stakeholders,” Journal of Finance 48, 247-266.
Smith, C. and J. B. Warner, 1979, “On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants,”
Journal of Financial Economics 7, 117-161.
von Thadden, E. L., 1994, “The commitment of finance, duplicated monitoring
and the investment horizon,” Working Paper, University of Basel.
Wruck, K. H., 1989, “Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private
equity financings,” Journal of Financial Economics 23, 3-28.
Wruck, K. H. and Y. L. Wu, 2007, “Closeness counts: The role of relationships in private
placements of equity,” Working Paper, Charles A Dice Center and Fisher College of
Business.
Wu, Y. L., 2003, “The choice of equity-selling mechanisms,” Journal of Financial Economics
74, 93-119.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊