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研究生:馬文利
研究生(外文):Wen-Li Ma
論文名稱:所有權型態、經理人行為與公司治理關係之研究—以總經理流動率為實證
論文名稱(外文):Relationship of ownership structure, manager behavior and corporate governance – Example for CEO turnover
指導教授:張力張力引用關係林翠蓉林翠蓉引用關係
指導教授(外文):Li ChangTsuei-Rung Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:世新大學
系所名稱:企業管理研究所(含碩專班)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:55
中文關鍵詞:公司治理家族企業過度自信總經理流動率所有權型態
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceFamily BusinessOver ConfidenceCEO turnoverOwnership structure
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本研究目的主要探討企業所有權型態、經理人行為與公司治理機制間之關係,並以總經理流動率為公司治理機制之代理變數進行驗證。研究樣本為2001年到2007年台灣上市櫃公司共1214家企業共8498筆資料進行假說驗證。研究結果發現,當企業所有權型態為家族企業時,其總經理流動率較非家族企業低;在企業所有權型態對經理人過度自信的影響方面,本研究結果顯示家族企業經理人過度自信較高;且總經理的過度自信傾向並非是造成總經理異動的重要因子;但在以經理人行為為所有權型態對總經理異動的調節變項檢測中發現,若是該企業由家族所持有且經理人又有過度自信傾向時,總經理流動率無明顯影響,顯示經理人行為不會改變所有權型態對總經理異動的影響,亦即經理人行為在所有權型態與公司治理機制間不具備調節功能。
This paper examines the relation between ownership structure、manager behavior and corporate governance, focusing on whether ownership structure and over confidence affects CEO turnover. Our sample includes firms listed on Taiwan’s stock market during the period of 2001 to 2007. We find that family ownership has a negative effect on CEO turnover;family ownership has a positive effect on manager over confidence, and manager over confidence not main factor to CEO turnover;manager over confidence has a positive effect on CEO turnover;in the family ownership and manager over confidence has negative effect on CEO turnover. This result implies that however manager over confidence has no effect to which ownership structure and CEO turnover, such as manager behavior has no regulate function to ownership structure and corporate.
謝誌 I
摘要 II
Abstract III
目錄 IV
表目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 5
第一節 所有權型態與總經理流動率的關係 5
第二節 所有權型態與總經理過度自信的關係 6
第三節 總經理過度自信與流動率的關係 7
第四節 所有權型態、總經理流動率和過度自信的關係 8
第三章 研究方法 10
第四章 實證分析 16
第五章 結論建議 26
參考文獻 28
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