臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去許多有關經營短視的文獻指出代理問題會造成公司的短視決策，其中大部份歸因於股東與經理人間的目標或利益不一致所導致。而本文除了觀察代理問題對投資決策之影響外，並觀察影響經理人決策的內外部因素如何影響短視問題，在公司內部因素方面，本文檢視國內的監理機制是否能監督並改善經營短視的問題；外部因素方面，驗證分析師預測盈餘所產生的壓力是否會影響經理人的決策。實證結果發現國內的監督機制會強化經理人產生短視投資之行為，即可能在董事會重視公司短期會計績效的壓力下，不利公司從事長期投資決策，也是造成公司短視的原因之ㄧ。另外，本文結果亦指出分析師壓力會使公司產生短視投資決策，若與董事會監督機制的共存下，經理人的經營短視效果則更趨明顯。

In the past, there were many comments about myopia, which point the agency problems could result in myopic investment, and most papers are attributed the agency problem to the difference in goal or benefit between shareholders and managers. Therefore, this paper examines not only how the investment decisions could be affected by the agency problem, but also observes the inside and outside factors of affecting managerial decisions. About the inside factors, we examine whether the corporate governance in Taiwan would improve the myopia or not, and confirm whether the analyst pressure is the outside factors of managerial investment decisions. Evidences show the corporate governance would strengthen the myopia, which means the managers delay or reduce the long term investments when the board of director pay much attention to the accounting profitability; meanwhile, taking the supervisal pressure of analyst for managers also cause the myopia.

壹、緒論 ........................................................ 1
貳、文獻回顧 .................................................... 4
一、固守職位 ................................................. 4
二、治理機制 ................................................. 6
三、分析師預測 ............................................... 7
叁、研究方法 .................................................... 9
一、樣本選取 ................................................. 9
二、固守職位經理人之衡量 ....................................... 9
三、公司治理之衡量 ............................................ 10
四、投資短視之實證模型 ........................................ 10
五、公司治理與績效之關聯性 ..................................... 11
六、分析師壓力之實證模型 ....................................... 12
肆、實證結果與分析 ............................................... 14
伍、結論 ........................................................ 18
參考文獻 ........................................................ 33

圖表目錄

表一 敘述統計量 ................................................. 20
表二 固守職位、治理機制與公司長期投資之關聯性 ...................... 21
表三 治理機制下固守職位經理人與公司長期投資之關聯性 ................. 22
表四 治理機制與會計績效之關聯性 ................................... 25
表五 分析師壓力與公司長期投資之關聯性 ............................. 26
表六 董事持股機制與分析師壓力下固守職位經理人與公司
長期投資之關聯性 ........................................... 27
表七 是否存在大股東機制與分析師壓力下固守職位經理人
與公司長期投資之關聯性 ...................................... 30

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