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研究生:楊元傑
研究生(外文):Yuan-Chieh Yang
論文名稱:物理論與功能論的對立:意識問題的新爭論
論文名稱(外文):Physicalism versus Functionalism: The New Debate on Consciousness
指導教授:洪裕宏洪裕宏引用關係
指導教授(外文):Allen Y. Houng
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立陽明大學
系所名稱:心智哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:86
中文關鍵詞:意識物理論功能論科學知識
外文關鍵詞:consciousnessphysicalismfunctionalismscientific knowledge
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  • 下載下載:120
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在物理論與功能論兩派主張中,最核心的相異之處在於如何回應「意識是什麼?」此形上學問題。物理論支持者認為意識是一種腦狀態或其性質;相反的,功能論支持者認為意識是一種功能角色。我認為對於這一個歧異可以分做兩個層次的爭論來探討:第一個層次聚焦在概念上的一致性與合理性,我們可以稱它做傳統層次的爭論。第二個層次拓展到經驗科學上,在此我接受Ned Block對於意識概念的分類,並以此討論「現象意識」與「取用意識」的區分是否是科學上可驗證的,也就是意識問題的新爭論。
此篇論文中,我將討論「後驗物理論」的主張。他們認為意識本質上是一種現象經驗、一種具有感質的經驗,且意識經驗與大腦的等同是後驗的真理。因此,認為意識能夠概念上化約成某種功能角色的主張是不適當的。但是,我將要論述在科學上並無法建立有關意識經驗的知識,因此「現象意識」與「取用意識」的區分不是是科學上可驗證的。原因來自於我們不知如何用因果角色的概念來捕捉意識經驗的內存性質,而以探討因果關係為基礎的心理學方法,自然在理論發展中遺漏了意識經驗的感質性質。更進一步,我要探討某些基礎科學的理論雖然能夠包含事物的內存性質,但意識經驗的另一特別之處在於其主觀特質。所以即使是完整科學,也無法建立有關現象意識的科學知識。問題在於主觀經驗無法被客觀概念的科學所捕捉,因此後驗物理論的主張是值得懷疑的。
Between physicalism and functionalism, the central disagreement regarding consciousness is whether consciousness is a functional role or a property of brain states. There are two levels of debate in this disagreement. The traditional debate focuses on conceptual coherence. Physicalists who regard phenomenal properties as conceptually irreducible argue that functionalism cannot explain qualitative properties of consciousness. The new debate focuses on scientific knowledge, arguing about whether the concepts of phenomenal properties and the functional properties have different extensions; and if they do, are they scientifically tractable? In these two debates, Block adopted the physicalist view that consciousness is substantially phenomenal and identical to its total neural basis instead of a functional role. He also claimed that the phenomenal property is scientifically tractable under the best explanation. In this paper, I will review previous work and argue that we cannot have scientific knowledge about phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, I will provide an argument that subjective experience is left out within currently objective science, so the unsolved burden of physicalism is to explain away the apparent contingency between the mental and the physical.
第一章、導論……………………………………………………… 1
第一節、本文的論點與編排……………………………………… 1
第二節、本文要探討的意識問題是什麼?……………………… 2
第三節、意識的形上學問題與其本體地位……………………… 4
第四節、物理論與功能論的對立………………………………… 5
第二章、物理論與功能論的爭論………………………………… 10
第一節、心腦同一論與類型物質論……………………………… 10
第二節、Kripke的模態論證……………………………………… 13
第三節、感質經驗與意識的艱難問題…………………………… 15
第四節、意識經驗是物理知識嗎:瑪莉房間論證……………… 19
第五節、功能論的主張…………………………………………… 22
第六節、感質經驗與功能論……………………………………… 28
第七節、物理論對抗功能論:意識問題的對立………………… 32
第八節、物理論與艱難問題:感質經驗的真實性……………… 38
第三章、意識問題的新爭論……………………………………… 43
第一節、現象意識與取用意識…………………………………… 43
第二節、物理論與功能論的新爭論……………………………… 48
第三節、最佳解釋推論…………………………………………… 52
第四節、評論Block的論證 ……………………………………… 60
第四章、科學知識與意識問題…………………………………… 67
第一節、科學知識與科學實在論………………………………… 67
第二節、我們能夠建立有關意識的科學知識嗎?……………… 73
第三節、科學理論的瓶頸………………………………………… 76
第四節、物理論與功能論的前景………………………………… 79
第五章、結論……………………………………………………… 86
參考文獻…………………………………………………………… 87
中文參考文獻……………………………………………………… 91
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中文參考文獻
王文方 (2008),《形上學》。台北:三民出版社。
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