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研究生:劉淑琴
研究生(外文):Shu-chin Liu
論文名稱:公司發布自願性盈餘預測後的策略選擇
論文名稱(外文):The strategies after firm’s voluntary earnings forecast
指導教授:李春安李春安引用關係胥愛琦胥愛琦引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chun-an LiAi-chi Hsu
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:管理研究所博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:103
中文關鍵詞:自我選擇偏誤樣本選擇偏誤預測更新自願性盈餘預測盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:self-selection biassample selection biasearnings managementvoluntary earnings forecastforecast revision
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2005年以前同時存在的強制盈餘預測與自願性盈餘預測是台灣地區特有的現象之一。在同業發布強制預測的情況下,促使無需發布預測的公司自願性的發布盈餘預測以吸引市場投資人的注意。但由於法令未限制自願性行盈餘發布的次數,因此當公司發布預測後為避免過大的預測誤差,公司可能採取更新預測或盈餘管理等手段影響預測品質。本研究利用台灣地區特有的現象分析公司發布自願性盈餘預測後的策略選擇。
研究結果顯示,雖然公司管理當局對自願性盈餘預測的發布傾向於樂觀,但是發布預測者有較佳的經營績效。其次,在市場反應對發布預測的公司影響方面,雖然市場投資人的反映會影響公司管理當局後續的預測更新發布行為,但是對於預測的準確度卻無顯著影響。另外,影響公司預測發布後的策略選擇方面,公司管理當局可操控的財務彈性大小則是重要因素。當管理當局有較大的財務彈性時,傾向於採取盈餘管理的方式影響預測品質,而不發布預測更新;但若管理當局可操控的財務彈性較小時,則傾向利用更新預測的方式調整市場投資人的預期。最後,在影響管理當局自願性盈餘預測品質的因素方面,研究結果發現模型中存在樣本選擇與自我選擇偏誤的現象,經偏誤調整後發現公司管理當局會採取調高盈餘管理來提升預測品質。但採取預測更新的樣本中,則未發現此一現象。過去有關盈餘揭露品質的研究多以已開發市場為主,本文利用台灣資料觀察開發中市場的公司資訊揭露的品質與策略選擇,提供一個有別於已開發市場的觀點。
Both mandatory earnings forecast and voluntary earnings forecast exist in listed firms is the unique phenomenon in Taiwan stock market before 2005. With other companies release mandatory earnings forecast, company that is not required would voluntarily release earnings forecast to attract attention in the market. As there is no limitation on revision of voluntary earnings forecast release, company would issues forecast revision or manipulate quality of forecast through earnings management. This paper studies the strategies after firm’s voluntary earnings forecast.
The findings indicate that: First, the voluntary earning forecasters, though tend to be overestimated, are the ones who perform better. Second, the market reaction affects the forecast revision strategies but not the accuracy of forecast. After forecasting, accounting flexibility is an important determinant in managing strategies to meet the disclosure quality. Finally, both sample selection and self-selection biases occur in the model of voluntary forecast. The results indicate that managers manipulate earnings management to improve the accuracy of forecast after correcting the sample selection and self-selection biases. Moreover, if the manager issues forecast revision then the earnings management does not affect the accuracy of forecast. This analysis uses the listed firms in Taiwan as subjects to provide an opportunity to observe the disclosure quality management in a developing market rather than in developed ones.
中文摘要 --------------------------------------------------------------- i
英文摘要 --------------------------------------------------------------- ii
謝 誌 --------------------------------------------------------------- iii
目 錄 --------------------------------------------------------------- iv
表 目 錄 --------------------------------------------------------------- v

第一章 緒論 ---------------------------------------------------------- 1
第一節 研究背景 ------------------------------------------------------ 1
第二節 研究動機 ------------------------------------------------------ 3

第二章 文獻探討 ------------------------------------------------------ 7
第一節 公司盈餘資訊與市場反應 ---------------------------------------- 7
第二節 管理當局可能採取影響預測準確度的策略 -------------------------- 13

第三章 研究設計 ------------------------------------------------------ 18
第一節 研究假說建立 -------------------------------------------------- 18
第二節 計量模型發展 -------------------------------------------------- 22
第三節 樣本選擇與實證模型設計 --------------------------------------- 27

第四章 實證結果 ------------------------------------------------------ 52
第一節 樣本資料敘述統計 ---------------------------------------------- 52
第二節 影響管理當局是否發布預測更新的實證結果 ------------------------ 59
第三節 影響管理當局預測準確度的實證結果 ------------------------------ 61
第四節 影響預測準確度的穩健性檢定 ------------------------------------ 71

第五章 研究結論與建議 ------------------------------------------------ 84
第一節 研究結論 ------------------------------------------------------ 84
第二節 後續研究建議 -------------------------------------------------- 85

參考文獻 --------------------------------------------------------------- 87

簡歷 --------------------------------------------------------------- 96
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