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研究生:莊育通
研究生(外文):Yu-Tung Chuang
論文名稱:企業經營績效、投資機會與兼任董事總經理酬勞關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between Business Performance、Investment Opportunity and The Compensation of on Board President
指導教授:林有志林有志引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yu-Chih Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:會計系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:中文
論文頁數:50
中文關鍵詞:企業經營績效總經理酬勞投資機會
外文關鍵詞:Business PerformanceInvestment OpportunityPresident Compensation
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自從爆發安隆、世界通訊等企業弊案後,總經理的薪資結構逐漸受到關注。由於股東與經理人間存在代理問題,可能導致經理人做出危害公司權益的決策。公司若能訂立完善的酬勞制度,預期可以有效降低兩者間的利益衝突。故本文旨在研究企業經營績效、投資機會與兼任董事總經理酬勞之關係。本文與以往相關議題研究的差異,主要在於總經理酬勞的推估方式不同。研究對象為台灣證券交易所上市櫃公司,研究期間為2005年至2007年。經過資料篩選後,符合本研究設定條件之樣本數共為1,224筆。實證發現,企業經營績效愈好時,兼任董事總經理領取較高額酬勞,兩者呈顯著正相關;而企業投資機會愈高時,總經理是否領取較高額酬勞,僅獲得部份支持該論點。
After Enron and WorldCom scandals, president compensation is focused increasingly. The agency problem between shareholders and manager could damage the company. If the company could write a comprehensive reward contract, the conflict of interests between the two is expected to be reduced effectively. The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between business performance, investment opportunity and president compensation. Different from the past papers of similar topics, the measure of president compensation in this paper adopts an unique method. The data were gathered initially from those firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange and Gretai Securities Market from 2005 to 2007. There are totally 1224 final samples in line with the conditions set in this study. The results show that president in the company which has higher corporate performance receives higher compensation. But that president in the company with has higher investment opportunity gets higher compensation is only partially supported.
摘要....................................I
ABSTRACT...............................II
誌謝..................................III
目錄.............. .....................IV
表目錄.................................VI
圖目錄................................VII
一、緒論................................1
1.1 研究背景...........................1
1.2 研究動機與目的.....................2
1.3 研究流程...........................4
1.4 論文架構...........................5
二、文獻探討............................6
2.1 代理理論...........................6
2.2 影響總經理酬勞之決定因素...........7
2.2.1 企業經營績效......................7
2.2.2 投資機會..........................9
2.2.3 公司特性..........................9
2.2.4 董事會特性.......................11
2.2.5 股權結構.........................12
三、研究方法...........................15
3.1 觀念性架構........................15
3.2 研究假說..........................17
3.3 實證模型與變數衡量................18
3.3.1 實證模型.........................18
3.3.2 被解釋變數之衡量.................18
3.3.3 解釋變數之衡量...................20
3.3.4 控制變數之衡量...................22
3.4 研究樣本選取與資料來源............23
3.4.1 研究樣本.........................24
3.4.2 資料來源.........................24
3.5 研究方法..........................24
3.5.1 敘述性統計分析...................24
3.5.2 相關係數檢定 .................... 25
3.5.3 迴歸分析.........................25
四、實證分析結果.......................26
4.1 敘述性統計分析....................26
4.2 相關係數檢定......................28
4.3 假說檢定結果......................30
4.4 敏感性測試........................32
五、結論與建議.........................34
5.1 研究結論..........................34
5.2 研究貢獻..........................34
5.3 研究限制..........................35
5.4 建議 ..............................35
參考文獻...............................36
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