跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(3.236.124.56) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/07/28 08:59
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:蔡宗修
研究生(外文):Tsung-Hsiu Tsai
論文名稱:外部董事與公司決策
論文名稱(外文):Outside Directors and Corporate Decisions
指導教授:夏侯欣榮夏侯欣榮引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:38
中文關鍵詞:公司治理外部董事股利政策資本結構
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceOutside DirectorsDividend PolicyCapital Structure
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:142
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
在所有樣本公司中,其外部董事比例越高隱含著公司所受到的監督越多。過去文獻中大多著重於外部董事對於公司績效之關聯性。本篇論文中主要是在研究公司外部董事比例越高是否代表公司決策越佳。研究結果發現從7,472個觀察值中發現外部董事比例越高的公司,其股利發放率及股利殖利率越高,其中若是高科技產業,股利會越低。另外也發現外部董事比率越高的公司,其負債比率及長期負債比率越高,但流動比率會較低。最後,比較外部董事對沙賓法案(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)前後的影響,結果發現,在沙賓法案通過之後,外部董事的影響會變小。
In intuition, more director hold by outsiders that implied the companies more be monitored. Most previous studies concern the relation between outside directors and firm performance. Our research is focus on the interaction of outside directors and corporate decision rather than performance. In a sample of 7,472 observations from 1,455 companies, I show that firms with higher proportion of outside directors have higher dividend payout ratio and dividend yield, it inconsistent with agency models of dividends. In addition, the relationship between high tech industries and dividend policy are negative. I also show that firms with higher proportion of outside directors have higher debt and long-term debt ratio, but the lower current ratio. Finally, we comparing form per-SOX to post-SOX, we can find that the outside directors affect corporate become small.
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review And Hypothesis Development 4
2.1 Agency Problems and Outside Directors 5
2.2 Board composition and Firm Performance 6
3. Data Description 8
4. Variables Definition 11
5. Methodology 16
6. Basic Empirical Results 17
6.1 Regression Results of Dividend Policy 17
6.2 Regression Results of Capital Structure 20
7. Conclusion 22
References 24

Table I. Sample Description 26
Table II. Difference Industries on Sample Description 27
Table III Correlation Matrix 28
Table IV Regressions of Dividend Policy on its Board and Ownership Structure Variables and Year Controls 29
Table V Regressions of Capital Structure on its Board and Ownership Structure Variables and Year Controls 32
Table VI Multivariate regression by difference group 36
Appendix I High Tech Industries (SIC codes) 38
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj and P. Sengupta. (2005). The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43: pp. 343-376.
Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, Vol.71, No. 4, pp.55 443-465.
Bhojraj, S. and P. Sengupta. (2003). Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional investors and the outside directors. The Journal of Business 76: pp 455-475.
Brickley, James A., Jeffrey L. Coles, Gregg Jarrell, (1997). Leadership structure: separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance 3: pp 189-220.
Brown, W.O., Maloney, M.T. (1999). Exit, voice, and the role of corporate directors: Evidence from acquisition performance. Claremont Colleges Working Paper.
Choi, J.J., S.W. Park and S.S. Yoo (2007). The value of outside directors: evidence from corporate governance reform in Korea, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42: pp 941-962.
Coles, J. and W. Hesterly (2000). Independence of the chairman and board composition: firm choices and shareholder value. Journal of Management 26(2): pp 195-214.
Cornett, Marcia Millon, Alan J. Marcus, Anthony Saunders, and Hassan Tehranian. The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance. Working Paper NYU Stern.
Cotter J., A. Shivdasani and M. Zenner (1997). Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics: Vol. 43, pp 195-218.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. (1996). Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation:an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research: 13, pp 1-36.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, (2001), Disappearing dividends: Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-44.
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 27: pp 301-325.
Jensen, M. C., (1986), Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeover. American Economic Review, 76: 323-329.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). The theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
Klein. (1998). A. firm performance and board committee structure. Journal of Law and Economics 41: pp 275-303.
Lehn and Poulsen, (1989),"Free cash flow and stock holder gains in going private transactions." Journal of Finance 44, 771-787.
Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M. and Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. Journal of Financial Economics 87: pp 308-328.
Rozeff, Michael (1982). “Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios.” Journal of Financial Research 5 : 249-259.
Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation. Journal of Financial Economics 20: pp 293–315.
Lehn, K., Patro, S., Zhao, M., (2004). Determinants of the size and structure of corporate boards: 1935–2000. Working paper, University of Pittsburgh.
Perry, T. and A. Shivdasani, (2001), Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring, Working Paper, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill.
Perry, T.. and A. Shivdasani, (2005). Do boards affect performance? Evidence from corporate restructuring. Journal of Business: vol. 78, no. 4. pp 1403-1431.
Prevost, A. K., R. P Rao, and M. Hossain. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Finance 9: pp 373-397.
Rosenstein,S.and J.G.Wyatt. (1990). Outside director, board independence and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics: Vol.26, pp 175-191.
Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: pp 167-198.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, (1997) A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52: pp 737-783.
Weisbach, M. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20: pp 431-460.
Wright, P., Ferris, S., Sarin, A., & Awasthi, V. (1996). The impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. Academy of Management Journal 39: pp 441-463.
Yermack, David. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 40: pp 185-211.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
無相關期刊