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研究生:楊欣蓉
研究生(外文):HSIN-JUNG
論文名稱:機構投資人持股對401(k)計畫基金名單選擇之影響
論文名稱(外文):Institutional Holdings and the Selection of Mutual Funds into 401(k) Plans
指導教授:賴慧文賴慧文引用關係
指導教授(外文):Christine W.Lai
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:47
中文關鍵詞:401(k)計劃機構投資人持股投資選擇
外文關鍵詞:401(k) plan、Institutional Holding
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本研究主要目的想藉由基金公司與採用401(k)退休計劃體制下的公司之間之持股關係進行檢測,若基金公司持有較高比例公司的流通在外股數,則公司所提供給員工的401(k)退休計畫是否會因此有所影響,意即公司是否會因為與基金公司關係密切而提供較多屬於相關基金公司的基金作為員工退休金計畫的投資選擇;另外,這些被選入為退休投資計畫的基金中,屬於有持股關係的基金是否因此表現較差,藉此檢測為了員工提撥一部分的薪資當作退休金,公司必須提供一系列退休投資計畫,而公司於選擇投資標的之過程中,是否遵守善良管理者的責任,還是彼此之間存在著利益衝突。實證結果發現基金家族若持有較高比例的流通在外股數,則其旗下基金被選入為401(k)計劃的機率較高。此外,另一項有趣地發現為turnover ratio越高的基金,被選入的機率也相對較高,由此可知基金家族對於被選入401(k)計劃的基金有積極操作的可能性,此和”hidden fees of actively trading”論點相合。關於觀察一年與三年的績效,其結果發現這些基金的表現並不會因為有持股關係存在而表現較差,由此推斷其利益衝突的存在並不會嚴重影響員工的權益。
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between institutional holdings and the selection of investment options into 401(k) plan over the period 2001 to 2004. The empirical results indicate that the likelihood of a fund being selected into a sponsor firm’s 401(k) plan is positively related to the percentage of 401(k) sponsor firm’s outstanding shares held by the fund’s family. However, the 1-year and 3-year risk-adjusted returns of 401(k) funds with share holding relationship do not perform worse than other 401(k) funds that do not have such share holding relationship. The results indicate that the existence of institutional ownership between sponsor firms and fund families will affect the probability of member funds being selected into sponsor’s 401(k) plans, but such relationship does not necessarily breach the fiduciary duty of 401(k) sponsor firms. Moreover, there is a by-product of the analysis that the higher the turnover ratio of a fund, the higher the likelihood that this fund will be selected into sponsor’s 401(k) plans, a result consistent with the “hidden fees of actively trading” argument that are widely suspected in the pension fund industry.
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 4
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 4
B. HYPOTHESIS 8
III. METHODOLOGY 10
A. DATA 10
B. MODEL 13
1. The probability of pension funds belonging to the fund families with closer ownership 13
2. The performance of 401(k) options with ownership 15
C. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 18
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 20
A.The number of 401(k) plan options 20
B. Shares of Institutional holding and the selection of funds into 401(k) plans 21
C. THE PERFORMANCE OF FUNDS INTO 401(K) PLANS WITH OWNERSHIP AND WITHOUT OWNERSHIP 27
V. CONCLUSION 34
REFERENCE 36
Reference
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