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研究生:呂冠蓉
研究生(外文):Kuan-Jung Lu
論文名稱:企業自願性揭露資訊內涵之研究
論文名稱(外文):Research on Information Content of Voluntary Disclosures
指導教授:吳瑞萱吳瑞萱引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:元智大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2009
畢業學年度:97
語文別:英文
論文頁數:59
中文關鍵詞:研發費用揭露頻率盈餘管理分析師預測行為
外文關鍵詞:R&D intensitydisclosure frequencyearnings managementforecasts characteristics
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本研究探討研發費用、資訊不對稱、盈餘管理和分析師預測特徵之間的關聯性。實證結果顯示,研發費用密集度越高,其揭露頻率越高。此外,高研發費用公司若其揭露頻繁,的確會降低公司盈餘管理的程度。再者,高研發費用公司若其揭露頻繁,盈餘管理程度較低,分析師對其預測準確度應會增加,且預測修正波動應會降低。然而,本研究並未發現上述關係,可能原因為公司所揭露之所有資訊並非全為分析師預測時主要考量因素,抑或是分析師之有限注意力導致其無法充分使用所有公司媒體揭露資訊。
I examine the relation among R&D, disclosure frequency, earnings management and forecast characteristics, including forecast accuracy and revision volatility. The results show that high-R&D firms disclose frequently due to their nature of uncertainty, even if when they make profits. Besides, high-R&D firms manage less earnings when they make frequent disclosures, which is consistent with my hypotheses. Further, high-R&D firms with frequent disclosures and less earnings management may increase analysts’ forecasts accuracy and decrease forecast revision volatility. However, the results in hypotheses 3 are insignificant. The possible reasons are that analysts do not take press releases into accounts when making forecasts or their have limited attention.
ABSTRACT II
LIST OF TABLE V
LIST OF FIGURE V
1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 1
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE 1
1.2. CONTRIBUTION 5
1.3 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 6
1.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 7
2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 8
2.1 NATURE OF R&D ACTIVITY AND DISCLOSURE 8
2.2 DISCLOSURE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 10
2.3 DISCLOSURE, EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND ANALYST FORECASTS 11
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 12
3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 12
3.2 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY AND R&D INTENSITY 13
3.3 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 16
3.4 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY, EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND ANALYST FORECASTS 20
4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 23
4.1 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTIC 23
4.2 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY AND R&D INTENSITY 31
4.3 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 36
4.4 RELATION BETWEEN DISCLOSURE FREQUENCY, EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND ANALYST FORECASTS 40
5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 47
REFERENCE 48
APPENDIX 58
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