臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去文獻發現家族公司之資訊透明度通常比非家族公司低；而資訊透明度低之企業，其績效表現通常較透明度高之企業為差。由前述研究結果似可推論，家族企業之經營績效應比非家族企業差，但過去研究卻發現家族公司的績效表現較佳。本研究推測資訊透明度與家族公司這兩個因素會同時會影響公司績效，但過去的文獻上只針對單一因素進行討論。因此，本研究將台灣上市上櫃公司依透明度及家族持股比例區分為透明度高家族企業、透明度低家族企業、透明度高之非家族企業及透明度低之非家族企業四群組，並進一步測試其相對之績效表現。本研究推測高透明度公司績效優於低透明度公司，而相同的透明度水準下，家族公司的績效會優於非家族公司。本研究採用2005年至2007年證券市場發展基金會之資訊揭露評鑑系統結果，作為資訊透明度之代理變數。本研究首先檢驗家族公司與資訊透明度、資訊透明度與績效，以及家族公司與績效之關聯性，獲得與過去文獻一致之結論。本研究之主要實證結果發現，高資訊透明度之家族公司績效最佳、高透明度之非家族公司次之，而低透明度之非家族公司績效表現最差。

Prior researches show that family firms have lower transparency and that firms with lower disclosure level perform poorly. One can infer from these previous findings that family firms have poorer performance, but the inference is contradict with prior research findings, which find family firms have better performance. We observe that transparence and family control will affect firm performance interactively, but prior researches do not test both factors simultaneously. This study uses the listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan and classifies them into four categories by their transparent level and family control level. We hypothesize that the high transparent firms have better performance and family firms have better performance under the same transparent level. In this study, we use 2005 to 2007 “Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking Results” provided by Securities and Futures Information Center in Taiwan as a proxy of information transparency. Firstly, this study examines the relationship between family holdings and transparency, transparency and performance, family holdings and performance, and obtains consistent results as prior studies. The empirical results of this study find that family firms with high transparency have best performance, and followed by non-family firms with high transparency; and non-family firms with low transparency perform the poorest.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 家族公司與透明度的關聯性 6
第二節 透明度與績效的關聯性 11
第三節 家族公司與績效的關聯性 15
第四節 資訊揭露評鑑系統 20
第参章 研究設計 24
第一節 研究假說之建立 24
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 27
第三節 變數衡量 29
第四節 實證方法與模型 32
第肆章 實證結果與分析 36
第一節 敘述統計分析 36
第二節 相關性分析 38
第三節 平均數檢定及中位數檢定 40
ㄧ、傳統公司型態的差異檢定 40
二、四種公司型態的差異檢定 43
第四節 多元迴歸分析 46
一、家族公司與透明度的關聯 46
二、透明度與績效的關聯 47
三、家族公司與績效的關聯 48
第五節 敏感性測試 56
第伍章 結論及建議 63
參考文獻 65

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