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研究生:蔡騰緯
研究生(外文):Tsai, Teng-Wei
論文名稱:關稅與配額等價性:政治獻金之應用
論文名稱(外文):The equivalence of tariffs and quotas: an application of political contributions
指導教授:王智賢王智賢引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wang, Jue-Shyan
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:財政研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:98
語文別:中文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:政治獻金關稅配額關稅與配額等價性
外文關鍵詞:Political ContributionsTariffsQuotasthe Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas
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本文採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立的政治獻金模型為架構,來分析國內外廠商如何透過政治獻金的捐贈,以達到影響政府對於貿易管制政策中關稅或配額政策的偏好,進一步我們可得出關稅與配額等價性成立與否之結論。本文研究發現,首先,在兩國廠商皆無政治獻金遊說的情況下,關稅與配額等價性的命題不會成立。其次,在兩國廠商有政治獻金遊說的情況下,除了一個特例的情形外,本國政府均會偏好採用從量關稅政策,此時,關稅與配額等價性的命題將無法成立。
This paper applies the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and analyzes how the domestic and foreign firms may influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy via political contributions. Besides, we can examine whether the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, may in fact hold or not given the political contributions. It is shown that in the case of no campaign contributions, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold. Furthermore, when the firms in the two countries lobby by political contributions, the domestic government will adopt a tariff policy except some special case. Then the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold.
第一章 前言................................................1
第二章 關稅遊說模型.........................................6
第一節 兩國廠商的市場競爭..................................6
第二節 本國政府最適從量關稅的決策...........................8
第三章 進口配額遊說模型.....................................16
第一節 兩國廠商的市場競爭.................................17
第二節 本國政府最適進口配額的決策..........................18
第四章 各種本國社會福利權數下,本國政府採行之貿易管制措施.......25
第五章 結論...............................................30
附錄一....................................................31
參考文獻...................................................32
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2. 王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005),「政治獻金限額與關稅遊說」,《經濟研究》,41(2),207-247。
3. 吳世傑、楊雅博、黃鴻 (2002),「外籍廠商之技術授權:關稅與配額政策之比較」,《經濟論文叢刊》,30(1),49-75。
4. 吳依芳、王智賢 (2005),「勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型」,《經社法制論叢》,36,199-241。
5. 林奇蓉 (2004),「政治遊說與策略性貿易政策」,《經濟論文叢刊》,32(3),347-367。
6. 林燕淑、許淑媖、黃鴻 (1999),「關稅與配額的等價性:現代公司與傳統公司之異同」,《人文及社會科學集刊》,11(2),183-202。
7. 許淑媖、黃鴻、林燕淑 (2007),「差別化關稅與政治獻金」,《經濟論文叢刊》,35(2),155-182。
8. 陳綉里 (1999),「技術選擇內生下關稅與各種限額之等價性」,《經濟研究》,36(2),105-120。
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11. 賴育邦 (2005b),「全球經濟整合對地方環境政策之衝擊-一個「共同代理人」模型的應用」,《經社法制論叢》,35,259-284。
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1. 1. 王智賢、楊敦雅 (2008),「仿冒查緝與政治獻金」,《經濟研究》,44(1),107-138。
2. 2. 王智賢、蔡坤良 (2005),「政治獻金限額與關稅遊說」,《經濟研究》,41(2),207-247。
3. 3. 吳世傑、楊雅博、黃鴻 (2002),「外籍廠商之技術授權:關稅與配額政策之比較」,《經濟論文叢刊》,30(1),49-75。
4. 4. 吳依芳、王智賢 (2005),「勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型」,《經社法制論叢》,36,199-241。
5. 5. 林奇蓉 (2004),「政治遊說與策略性貿易政策」,《經濟論文叢刊》,32(3),347-367。
6. 6. 林燕淑、許淑媖、黃鴻 (1999),「關稅與配額的等價性:現代公司與傳統公司之異同」,《人文及社會科學集刊》,11(2),183-202。
7. 7. 許淑媖、黃鴻、林燕淑 (2007),「差別化關稅與政治獻金」,《經濟論文叢刊》,35(2),155-182。
8. 8. 陳綉里 (1999),「技術選擇內生下關稅與各種限額之等價性」,《經濟研究》,36(2),105-120。
9. 9. 楊明憲 (2006),「關稅調降與關稅配額擴大之抵換關係:敏感性產品談判策略之涵意」,《農業與經濟》,37,99-124。
10. 10. 賴育邦 (2005a),「利益團體、工資談判與環境政策」,《農業與經濟》,35,87-118。
11. 11. 賴育邦 (2005b),「全球經濟整合對地方環境政策之衝擊-一個「共同代理人」模型的應用」,《經社法制論叢》,35,259-284。