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研究生:吳博翀
研究生(外文):Wu, Po Chung
論文名稱:投資人情緒與法人說明會關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):Investor sentiment and conference calls
指導教授:金成隆金成隆引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chin, Chen Lung
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2010
畢業學年度:98
語文別:中文
論文頁數:60
中文關鍵詞:投資人情緒法人說明會自願性揭露
外文關鍵詞:Investor sentimentConference callsVoluntary disclosure
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:5
  • 點閱點閱:305
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
  本文旨在探討投資人情緒與法人說明會之關聯性,即公司如何經由召開法人說明會,策略性地回應投資人情緒反應,以企圖影響情緒所導致的預期偏差。實證發現:管理當局策略性地改變其自願性揭露政策,以反映投資人情緒。當投資人情緒愈低落時,公司將傾向於召開法人說明會,且公司召開法人說明會之頻率亦會增加。相反的,當投資人情緒高昂時,公司則愈不會召開法人說明會。再者,當投資人情緒愈低落時,法人說明會所揭露之公司資訊將愈樂觀。此研究亦顯示公司自願性揭露政策的選擇,反映管理當局渴望維持樂觀之評價。
  In this paper we explore the association between investor sentiment and the likelihood of holding conference calls. In other words, this paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their conference calls in an attempt to influence the sentiment-induced biases in expectations. We show that managers strategically vary their voluntary disclosure policies in response to prevailing sentiment. We find that during low-sentiment periods, the firms are more likely to conduct conference calls and conduct them more frequently; while during periods of high sentiment they decrease the frequency of conference calls. In addition, during low-sentiment periods, the conference calls disclose more optimistic information. Overall, this study provides evidence that company’s voluntary disclosure choices reflect managers desire to maintain optimistic valuations.
第壹章 緒論 1
  第一節 研究動機與目的 1
  第二節 研究問題 4
第貳章 文獻探討 5
  第一節 投資人情緒 5
  第二節 法人說明會 8
第參章 研究方法 10
  第一節 研究假說 10
  第二節 分析方法 11
  第三節 變數衡量 12
  第四節 資料來源與處理 19
第肆章 實證結果 23
  第一節 敘述性統計分析 23
  第二節 投資人情緒與召開法人說明會分析結果 32
  第三節 投資人情緒與法人說明會內容分析結果 36
第伍章 敏感性分析 38
  第一節 產業別變數取代電子業變數 38
  第二節 共線性之探討 41
第陸章 結論與建議 45
  第一節 研究結論 45
  第二節 研究貢獻 46
  第三節 研究限制 47
  第四節 研究建議 48
參考文獻 49

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