臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

根據過去文獻以及資訊不對稱理論，當公司內部人與外部投資人資訊不對稱越嚴重時，會導致企業外部融資成本的提高以及傾向利用外部治理來約束管理者。然而，租賃融資除了在公司的融資決策上扮演重要的融資工具之外，在公司治理方面租賃融資也是減緩負債代理成本以及外部融資成本的機制。公司治理機制主要分成外部和內部治理，而本研究從外部治理的控制權市場角度來看，利用IRRC提供的反購併條款以及股東保護條款，探討反購併條款和租賃融資之間的關係。本研究樣本期間從1990年至2006年，並發現在這段期間反購併條款設立的多寡與租賃融資呈現負相關，也就是說當公司傾向利用外部市場來監督管理者時，反購併條款設立越少的企業(即G-index越低)傾向使用租賃融資來降低外部融資成本。

According to information asymmetry theory and related research, firms facing greater information asymmetry have higher cost of external fund and tend to be confined by market disciplines. However, lease financing is not only an important financing instrument for corporations, but also a mechanism for reducing agency cost of debt and external funding cost. Corporate governance primarily includes internal and external governance mechanisms. Using various anti-takeover and shareholder protection provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), this study investigates the relationship between lease financing and corporate governance from the view of external governance mechanism. This study finds a negative relationship between lease financing and corporate governance (as measured by G-index). That implies that the firms with lower G-index tend to use more lease financing to reduce external funding cost when firms are more confined by market disciplines.

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 V
圖目錄 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 4
2-1 租賃相關文獻 4
2-2 公司治理相關文獻 6
第三章 研究方法 10
3-1 研究假說 10
3-2 樣本選擇 10
3-3 變數說明與定義 11
3-4 研究模型 17
第四章 實證結果 20
4-1 資本租賃 20
4-2 營業租賃 21
4-3 總租賃 22
4-4 小結 22
第五章 結論 24
參考文獻 26

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