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研究生:曾郁芳
研究生(外文):Yu-fang Tzeng
論文名稱:互惠、懲罰與社群中的合作機制
論文名稱(外文):Reciprocity, Punishment, and Cooperation in a Social Group
指導教授:劉正山劉正山引用關係
指導教授(外文):Frank Cheng-shan Liu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:政治學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:政治學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2010
畢業學年度:98
語文別:中文
論文頁數:99
中文關鍵詞:懲罰互惠公共財實驗合作
外文關鍵詞:public goods experimentcooperationreciprocitypunishment
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如何讓社群中的人們選擇合作?本文以實驗探討互惠與懲罰在合作出現過程中扮演的角色。本文指出,互惠與懲罰有助合作的提昇。首先,在高度互惠的情境下,人們傾向穩定地維持合作,但在低度互惠的情境下,人們容易選擇保守或報復的策略。有趣的是,當氣氛是合作時,高互惠更加有助人們的合作,然而若處於低互惠的氣氛下,懲罰則會抑制報復傾向的轉劇。
Why do people cooperate? Why does not every individuals in their groups choose to be a free-rider all the time? Based on two series of experiments, the author finds that reciprocity and punishment contribute to cooperation. When a group allows positive reciprocity where people can choose to cooperate, positive reciprocity facilitates cooperation. When reciprocity between group members turns to negative, however, group members make little contribution to the group and start to retaliate against their partners. Once punishment is incorporated into the experiment, people’s behavior of cooperation varies. In the high positive reciprocity environment where punishment is used, people, as expected, continue to give more of their resources to their group. But it is worth noting that negative reciprocity did not get worse if punishment is used in group dynamics.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 4
第三節 重要概念界定 5
第四節 研究方法簡介 8
第五節 研究限制、貢獻與章節安排 11
第二章 文獻探討 16
第一節 合作的研究與互惠 17
第二節 懲罰與合作 22
第三節 名聲與合作 24
第四節 研究預期與國內相關文獻 27
第三章 實驗設計 31
第一節 公共財實驗 31
第二節 實驗設計內容 34
第三節 實驗流程 43
第四章 研究發現 46
第一節 實驗甲:互惠有無與合作 47
第二節 實驗乙:互惠、懲罰與合作 53
第五章 結論與討論 61
第一節 結論 61
第二節 討論 62
第三節 研究建議與展望 64
參考資料 66
附錄 76
附錄一 實驗甲議題情境與任務 76
附錄二 說明文件一 78
附錄三 說明文件二 79
附錄四 實驗乙議題情境與任務 80
附錄五 實驗甲實驗結果 81
附錄六 實驗乙實驗結果 86
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