本文提出台灣固網市場之產業結構是一種「雙邊市場（Two Sided Markets）」，網路必須完全互連才能維持資訊流通順暢的網際網路，研究結果顯示有效元件定價法可作為國內獨特固網產業結構下之互連費計算規則，在此計算規則下之互連費用趨近零，有效元件定價法同時可以防止上下游垂直整合獨佔業者實施價格擠壓與非價格歧視。基於雙邊市場理論指出連線服務的網路服務供應商應該提供網路內容供應商免費頻寬服務，此點呼應網路中立性之觀點，雖然抵觸「使用者付費」的一般觀念，卻能使網路服務供應商與網路內容供應商獲利都增加，更重要的是對整體社會福利也都有提昇的效果。

We propose that the industry structure in Taiwan broadband market is a two-sided market. In this framework, the networks need to be completely interconnected in order to ensure unhindered (or smoothly) information flow. Based on a two-sided market model, we analyze the IP peering mechanism for Taiwan Internet market. We show that the IP peering access charges should be a very low constant amount to reflect the unique Taiwan broadband industry structure. Furthermore, in attracting more Internet content providers (ICP) and end users to provide more content services and Internet applications, the Internet service providers (ISP) should provide free broadband services to ICPs. Though these results are contradictory with the “user-pays” principle, it ensures more profitable for ISPs and ICPs. Most importantly, the impacts on the whole social welfare are improved. Last, we examine a more efficacious framework for ensuring network neutrality is Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) in a vertically-integrated monopoly market, as in Taiwan Broadband industry.

壹 前言-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
貳 雙邊市場之架構、特性與固網市場--------------------------------------------------5
參 模型設定與推導-------------------------------------------------------------------------10
一、網路互連目的--------------------------------------------------------------------------11
二、網路互連時之業者定價--------------------------------------------------------------12
三、最適互連費之制定--------------------------------------------------------------------13
四、價格擠壓與非價格歧視--------------------------------------------------------------17
五、雙邊市場偏斜訂價與網路中立性--------------------------------------------------19
肆 結論與政策意涵--------------------------------------------------------------------------25
參考文獻----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------27

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