臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在經營權與所有權分離情況下，真正對公司經營績效負責的是總經理，異動經營績效不佳之總經理，是公司治理重要的一環，本文最主要的目的是探討公司績效對總經理異動之影響情況及公司治理的有效性，以作為代理問題的参考機制，蒐集西元2005至2008年共四年之台灣上市公司樣本資料，使用變數為應變數(總經理異動)和自變數(產業相對績效、董事會規模、董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比和外部董事持股) ，並採用Logistic迴歸模型。
研究結果發現經理人持股比愈高，對總經理異動之影響程度呈負相關，外部董事持股比愈高，對總經理異動之影響程度呈正相關，公司績效愈高，對總經理異動之影響程度呈負相關，而董事會規模和董事長兼任總經理因未達顯著性，並不會對總經理異動產生重大影響。

The purpose of this paper to study the firm performance effect on the CEO turno-ver and the effectiveness of corporate governance, agency problems as a reference mechanism. The data used in the study are obtained from the listed companies in Tai-wan, covering the period between 2005 and 2008. Using dependent variables (CEO turnover) and independent variables (relative industry performance evaluation, board size, CEO duality, CEO ownership and outside ownership). And use logistic regression model.
The results showed that CEO ownership more than higher impact on the CEO turnover was a negative correlation. Outside ownership more than higher impact on the CEO turnover was a positive correlation. Firm performance more than higher impact on the CEO turnover was a negative correlation. The board size and CEO duality due to less than significant, will not have a significant impact on the CEO turnover.

內容目錄
中文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iii
英文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． iv
誌謝辭　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． v
內容目錄　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． vi
表目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． viii
圖目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． ix
第一章　　緒論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第一節　　研究背景與動機．．．．．．．．．．．． 1
　　第二節　　研究問題與目的．．．．．．．．．．．． 4
　　第三節　　論文架構．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 6
第二章　　文獻探討．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 8
　　第一節　　公司治理．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 8
　　第二節　　總經理異動之相關文獻．．．．．．．．． 15
　　第三節　　公司治理與總經理異動．．．．．．．．． 20
　　第四節　　公司績效與總經理異動．．．．．．．．． 27
第三章　　研究方法．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 34
　　第一節　　研究架構．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 34
　　第二節　　研究假說．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 36
　　第三節　　研究變數及定義衡量．．．．．．．．．． 40
　　第四節　　實證模型．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 43
　　第五節　　資料來源與樣本選取．．．．．．．．．． 46
第四章　　實證結果與分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 49
　　第一節　　敘述統計分析．．．．．．．．．．．．． 49
　　第二節　　相關性分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 52
　　第三節　　迴歸分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 55
第五章　　結論與建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 59
　　第一節　　研究結論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 59
　　第二節　　研究限制．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 61
　　第三節　　研究建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 62
參考文獻　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 64
表目錄
表 2- 1 總經理異動原因文獻整理．．．．．．．．．． 17
表 2- 2 公司治理與總經理異動文獻整理．．．．．．． 23
表 2- 3 公司績效與總經理異動文獻整理．．．．．．． 30
表 3- 1 變數操作性定義．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 42
表 3- 2 公司治理及公司績效對總經理異動之預期影響方向
表．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 45
表 3- 3 樣本篩選說明表．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 46
表 3- 4 總樣本分佈．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 47
表 3- 5 總經理異動表．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 48
表 4- 1 敘述統計量．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 51
表 4- 2 皮爾森相關分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 53
表 4- 3 斯皮爾曼相關分析．．．．．．．．．．．．． 54
表 4- 4 羅吉斯迴歸分析結果．．．．．．．．．．．． 56
表 4- 5 研究假說與實證結果彙總對照表．．．．．．． 58
圖目錄
圖 1- 1 研究流程圖．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 7
圖 2- 1 世界銀行提供的公司治理架構圖．．．．．．． 12
圖 3- 1 觀念性架構圖．．．．．．．．．．．．．．． 35

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