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研究生:巴悟蘭
研究生(外文):Enkhdalai Batjargal
論文名稱:中國大陸上市公司股權結構對經理人薪酬績效敏感度之分析
論文名稱(外文):The role of ownership structure on the linkage of senior managers’ compensation to firm performance in China’s listed firms
指導教授:林卓民林卓民引用關係陳明麗陳明麗引用關係
指導教授(外文):Cho-Min LinMin-Lee Chan
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:靜宜大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2010
畢業學年度:98
語文別:英文
論文頁數:27
中文關鍵詞:股權結構經理人薪酬績效敏感度之分析
外文關鍵詞:Senior managers’ compensationOwnership structure
相關次數:
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This article examines the relationship between senior managers’ compensation and firm performance in China’s listed firms during 2001 to 2005, and also the role of ownership structure on this relationship. We find senior managers’ compensation significantly shows positive relation to firm performance, and this indicates that incentive pay scheme is gradually being used to motivate top managers after the reform of corporate privatization at the beginning of 1990s. Our results further find that firms with controlling shareholder of foreign investors tend to link their senior managers’ pay to firm performance more closely than the other types of control, mainly under control of the state government. We conclude that ownership structure definitely plays a key role not only in determining the senior managers’ pay but also in the pay to performance relationship in China listed firms. This conclusion is robust across different models by using OLS estimation or Panel analysis. The results of this study help understand the importance of ownership structure in the linkage of senior managers’ pay to firm performance in the emerging market, especially for the country experiencing economic reforms from the central planning system.

Keywords: Ownership structure, Senior managers’ compensation, Firm performance, China’s listed firms
Abstract …………………………………………...................…….I
Contents………………………………………………………….……..II
List of Tables……………………………...........…………......….III
Chapter 1 Introduction…………………………………………………...1
Chapter 2 Literature review and Hypothesis development..................4
Chapter 3 Research Methodology…………………................…….….9
3.1 Study sample……………………………………........……..…9
3.2 Models…………………………………….............……………9
3.3 Ownership structure variables……………………………..…10
3.4 Board composition variables …………………………. .............. 12
Chapter 4 Empirical Results…………………………………………...13
4.1Descriptive statistics……………………………………...13
4.2 OLS regression results………………………….…………...15
4.2.1 Influence of ownership structure…………………15
4.2.2 Influence of board structure……………………....17
4.3 Result of panel analysis……………………………….….21
Chapter 5 Conclusion…………………………………………….…23
References…………………….....................…………………………….... 25
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