實在論與反實在論或非實在的爭辯長久以來是哲學中很重要的一個議題，一方面實在論被形容為接受「遍及形上學可能世界的同一性」、「對於世界的絕對概念」等等神秘的觀念，另一方面反實在論或非實在論則被形容為「對實在世界不負責任」。Hilary Putnam認為在這兩者之外有第三條路，能夠讓我們了解知識宣稱對實在是負責任的，而無需接受形上學的幻想。
筆者在這篇文章中的主要目的，便是要研究Putnam對於這個對實在負責任的理論，也就是自然實在論的主張。本文分為三個部份，第一部份筆者探討Putnam轉向自然實在論之前的一些主張，包括語意外部論和內在實在論，而這些主張被一些哲學家如John McDowell批評為在知覺者和世界之間設置一個「分界面」這樣不必要的概念，妨礙了我們關於世界的說法，使得「語言如何勾住世界？」以及「知覺如何勾住世界？」成為了急迫卻又無法回答的問題。第二部份筆者則接續研究Putnam遭受這些批評之後，作了哪些徹底的省思而轉而主張自然實在論，並且從對知覺問題的討論，來勾勒出自然實在論的立場。在第三部份筆者將會探究Putnam如何以自然實在論的思維模式，來談論事實與價值的交纏這個他關心已久的議題，以期能更加深入了解這個沒有分界面的認識論。

The debate between realism and antirealism or irrealism has been one of the most important philosophical issues for a long time. Realism is described as embracing such mysterious notions as “identity across metaphysical possible worlds” and “the absolute conception of the world”; on the other hand, antirealism or irrealism is described as “irresponsible to the world”. Hilary Putnam claims that there is a third way with the realism issue which does justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality without accepting metaphysical fantasy.
The aim of this article is to research how Putnam talks about natural realism which is responsible to reality. There are three parts in this article. In Part one, it is the study of the positions, including semantic externalism and internal realism, which Putnam advocates before he turns to natural realism. These positions are criticized by philosophers such as John McDowell and few others as the setting up of an interface between perceivers and the world, which he also comments as an unnecessary concept. The interface hinders us from talking about the world, and questions like ‘How does perception hook on to the world?’ and ‘How does language hook on to the world?’ have became urgent and insolvable problems. In Part two, the contents are further car-ried on the critics and Putnam’s new positions. The chapter starts with discussing the problem of perception. In part three, it is the argumentation of how Putnam talks about the fact-value entanglement which is the issue he concerns for a long time by means of his natural realism, and the arguments will help to understand Putnam’s epistemology without interface.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究內容 3
第三節 研究目的 8
第二章 在自然實在論之前 9
第一節 Putnam的語意外部論 10
(一) 傳統意義理論的假設 10
(二) 孿生地球之例 12
第二節 Putnam的內在實在論主張 14
(一) 桶中腦的假設 15
(二) 兩個桶中腦論證 17
(三) 對於桶中腦論證的批評與回應 21
第三節 McDowell對Putnam的批評 28
(一) 意義不在腦中的錯誤假設 28
(二) 心靈作為器官的錯誤假設 30
(三) 表徵的直接指向性 32
第三章 Putnam的自然實在論 35
第一節 對內在實在論的反省 35
第二節 一般人的常識實在論 37
(一) William James的洞見 38
(二) 分界面的概念所造成的問題 40
第三節 自然實在論如何談論知覺 42
(一) 傳統知覺理論的論證 42
(二) 笛卡兒附帶唯物論 45
(三) 推論主義的知覺共同對象 48
(四) 意向論的知覺對象 50
第四節 自然實在論遭受的批評 53
(一) 是否存在獨立自存的世界？ 54
(二) 自然實在論是否欠我們一個解釋？ 56
第四章 事實與價值的交纏 63
第一節 事實與價值的二分 64
(一) Putnam對於價值的說法 64
(二) 邏輯實證論對事實與價值的二分之主張 65
(三) 事實與認知價值的交纏 70
第二節 對邏輯實證論者進一步的批評 72
(一) 真理是否作為評價科學理論的唯一判准？ 72
(二) 邏輯經驗論的兩難 75
(三) 無價值涉入的科學所遭遇的困難 76
第三節 回到事實與價值的二分 82
(一) 對於「厚的」倫理學概念之討論 82
(二) 相對主義對事實與價值的二分之主張 85
第四節 無分界面的思維模式 87
第五章 結論 90
參考書目 96

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